Book Review and Commentary- Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (H.R. McMaster)
by 1stLt Ryan Casey
Dereliction of Duty is a to-the-point book that attempts to confront the question: who is to blame for the failures of the Vietnam War? While reading and thinking about this book, the adjective that would not leave my head was: scathing. General H.R. McMaster (writing at the time as an active-duty Major in the U.S. Army) does not hold back on who failed and why they failed. He starts at the top with President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Secretary Defense Robert McNamara. Additionally, McMaster expands in detail on how each of the top members of the Department of Defense including Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (General Earle G Wheeler, US Army, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army; General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations; General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant, USMC.) all fell short of their duty to advise the President of the United States on matters dealing with the U.S. military. The President’s Military Adviser Maxwell Taylor (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and later, Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam) also received a fair share of the blame. This book is not just McMaster playing “armchair quarterback”, he meticulously presents the relevant events and explains how each member involved failed. He then elaborates on how things could have turned out differently. Some major themes of this book that will resound with leaders today are: civil- military relations, speaking truth to power, interservice rivalry.
The book begins with the Kennedy Administration’s response to the Bay of Pigs fiasco in early 1961. This set a precedent of mistrust between the chief executive and his joint chiefs of staff (JCS) that led to many of the failures experienced by the Johnson Administration. Kennedy, a man known to socialize before getting to business, was not used to the direct mannerisms of his military advisors. Furthermore, Kennedy, with little-to-no military planning experience, was uncomfortable with his generals’ high-level of knowledge and expertise, adding more tension to the already tainted work-relationship. This inclination to not bring in the military advisors for planning carried forward into the Johnson Administration.
As the U.S. got involved militarily in Vietnam, the JCS’s ability to make recommendations to President Johnson was already diminished due to the precedent set by the Kennedy administration. The influence of the JCS was further diminished by the influence of the so called “Whiz Kids.” The “Whiz Kids” were a group of young, intelligent, numbers-focused advisors brought over from the RAND
Corporation by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The goal of McNamara and his “Whiz Kids” was to use quantitative analysis to transform the way the Department of Defense (DoD) solved problems. Throughout the book, McMaster portrays McNamara as a ruthlessly loyal advisor akin to Niccolo Machiavelli’s “Ministers” from his book The Prince. The Prince, written by Machiavelli in the 16th Century as an instructional guide for monarchs, details traits to seek in advisors as well as techniques to justify the use of immoral means to achieve an objective. McMaster’s narrative expertly paints a picture of President Johnson’s administration, from his policies to the way he picked advisors, that is eerily similar to Machiavelli’s handbook for renaissance-era Italian warlords.
McNamara was able to gain the President’s trust and confidence over the JCS by doing anything necessary to get Johnson what he wanted. This was particularly evident in achieving the President’s political objectives and then influencing public opinion through the use of the media. This was a stark contrast to the Chief’s, who were solely focused on the military issues pertaining to the war in Vietnam. The Chiefs were fighting an uphill battle, their focus on foreign policy could not compete with McNamara’s ability to connect his specific foreign policy recommendations with Johnson’s main focus: domestic policy and implementing the Great Society.
It is important to understand that the JCS’s singular purpose is to be “the principal military advisers to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense” per the 1947 National Security Act. But they cannot execute those duties if the ones being advised won’t listen. Yet, the failure does not solely rest on the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. The nation counted on its senior military advisers to be honest, stern, and professional military officers; officers who would not back away from speaking truth to power. It certainly did not help the JCS that their first Chairman, General Maxwell Taylor (1962-1964), in his own book The Uncertain Trumpet called for a single distinct Senior Military Advisor and a dedicated staff consigning the heads of each respective service to serve as a watered-down advisory council.
The constant struggle that embroiled the JCS during the entirety of the Johnson Administration highlights one of the main themes of this book: civil-military relations. The failure of the Chief’s during this time brings to light how difficult the job really was. The Chiefs knew that their responsibility was to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense but they failed to make their recommendations heard. Whether this failure rests with the JCS or their civilian leadership, is up for debate. I would argue, both parties are to blame for the overall failure of the war in Vietnam. McMaster argues that the specter of interservice rivalry hamstrung JCS efforts to present unified recommendations. On some of the major decisions of the war, from troop numbers to bombing targets, President Johnson specifically looked to the JCS for advice. McMaster notes that on many of
these occasions the JCS could not come to an agreement, feeding into the already potent gulf of distrust with the President. Instead of understanding each service’s role in fighting a war and formulating a recommendation that appropriately incorporated the armed services as whole, the Chiefs could not escape the compulsion to advocate exclusively for their own branches.
Throughout the Johnson Administration the division between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, was a constant clash to win over the President’s vote. To many, it seemed like President Johnson favored McNamara and his Whiz Kids over the JCS, though the President knew that if he allowed General Taylor (Chairman of JCS at the time) to consolidate all power from the JCS that it would further align with his goal of having a unified administration. This strategy allowed Johnson to portray to the public that he had the full support of the JCS in the military employment in Vietnam.
As the war in Vietnam dragged on, McNamara and the “Whiz Kids” believed that the old ways of military strategy, defined by massing on the enemy and giving ground commanders the resources to accomplish a well-defined end state, was outdated. Out came the strategy of “Graduated Pressure:” the idea that military conflicts could be planned, coordinated, and executed on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. This meant “gradually” increasing pressure on the enemy via military means (bombing) versus figuring out where the enemy is most vulnerable and massing all available assets to destroy the enemy. The intent behind Graduated Pressure was as North Vietnam started feeling the “pressure” placed on them, they would soon realize that the goal of seizing South Vietnam was not worth the cost they were going to pay, forcing them to the bargaining table.
There were many problems with the application of Graduated Pressure on the battlefield, for example, the “Rolling Thunder” bombing campaign spear headed by McNamara’s team prosecuted targets as they appeared on the battlefield. Rolling Thunder was ineffective because it allowed existing key targets to remain untouched because U.S. forces were bogged down applying the “pressure” of the moment instead of utilizing a detailed high-value target list and prosecuting them based on precedence. Graduated Pressure was deeply dissimilar with the fundamentals of the military’s preferred approach of having a planned concept of operation to attrit the enemy. Furthermore, Graduated Pressure handcuffed U.S. forces on the ground. It prevented ground commanders from acting with decisive action on enemy supply routes and critical logistical nodes due to the deeply centralized command and control structure and the rules of engagement that were demanded by McNamara’s office.
The debate that surrounded Graduated Pressure between the Johnson Administration and the JCS brings up the next major theme of the
book: Importance of speaking truth to power. McMaster does not hold back on his criticism for the Chiefs in regards to their lack of recommendations to the President. He argues that the Chiefs did agree that Graduated Pressure was not the proper course of action. Instead of insisting to their civilian bosses that there is a better course of action through substantive debate, the Chiefs conceded to the Administration by accepting larger budgets and inconsequential troop increases. To this end, McMaster shares a quote from Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson looking back on the failure of Vietnam:
“What should my role have been? I’m a dumb soldier under civilian control”
The statement by the Army General clearly expresses the disposition of the entire JCS during the Johnson Administration: they were exhausted by the constant struggle they faced on every topic they attempted to advise on. The Generals accepted that the civilians were in charge and they were not going to listen to their military advisors. McMaster’s view was that the JCS should have gone public with the disagreements they had with the Administration. This could have been accomplished through testifying to Congress but would have had to be carried out professionally.
Today, the top military officers are still advising civilian policymakers. In the last 20 years, the conflicts our Nation has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan reveal
that McMaster’s book remains relevant for leaders across the profession of arms. The numerous calls by media talking-heads and journalists that the Generals are responsible for the so-called “endless wars” are inaccurate because of the nature of how our civil-military relations are designed. For example, an article published in early 2020 titled “America’s Army Betrayed in Afghanistan by Presidents and Generals”, blames the deaths of U.S. service members on the top military advisors to President Bush and President Obama. Additionally, this author goes as far as stating:
“Our soldiers have died because there was not a single general—not David Petraeus, not Stanley McChrystal, not James Mattis—who demanded of the president, on pain of instant resignation, that we win.”
This statement from the author does not give the Generals due process, the fact is that our governmental system places the top military officers as advisors to the policymakers who were voted into the position by the electorate to create and implement policies. The key concept we in America need to understand is civilian control. This concept of having elected officials in control of our nations Armed Forces is a foundational root to our nation and what makes our Nation different. This relationship of having the top military officers solely in an advisory role, gives the policymakers the ability to accept or reject those specific recommendations. Consequently, the military is obligated to obey and serve those policies within the
parameters set by the President and Congress.
Though McMaster does allude to the JCS not going far enough in their insistence of recommendations and their policy disagreements with the President and Secretary of Defense during the war in Vietnam. The same blame that was cast on the politicians and the generals for the handling of the war in Vietnam have come to light in recent years with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The argument that Generals during the Bush administration did not challenge Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld enough on his nation-building, neo-conservative foreign policies that led to the 20-plus year failed wars is made repeatedly, but is it fair?
In the book, McMaster suggested the Generals should have gone public using legal and professional means (i.e. testify in front Congress to explain the short falls of the administration’s policies) but if that is not enough-what is? At what point will the top military officers charged with advising the President of the United States be willing to take their rank off their collar and hand it over if the policymakers refuse to listen to their advice? These questions are not meant to single out any specific officer, the weight of all the armed services lie on the shoulders of those officers that are charged with the responsibility of advising the top officials of our Nation. But these questions need to be asked in order to not allow what happened in Vietnam and the past 20-plus years in the Middle East to happen again. The answers to these questions are tough: if the politicians who are elected into office have service members in place solely in an advising role, they should take their advice. The genesis of the JCS was with the belief that the President and SECDEF needed a staff of the most highly qualified and experienced military officers in order to advise them on the most important military-related issues, but if they are not taking the recommendations, those Generals need to resign. Because those military officers cannot and will not coerce the civilians, they can use the public image of senior military advisors resigning in order to show the Nation that the politicians are not listening to the experts. This course of action will force the politicians to face the public and explain why they are not using the military’s most senior advisor’s advice and recommendations.
In closing, McMaster highlights many unknown events that occurred within the Kennedy and Johnson administration that led to the mistrust of the Joint Chiefs and consequently what led to the failure of the war in Vietnam. The major themes of the book that that are most worthwhile for leaders are: civil-military relations, speaking truth to power, interservice rivalry are all still relevant in contemporary times within the profession of arms. In order for our Nation to be prepared for the next fight, we need to learn from the failures of the past, failures that started from the top and trickled all the way down to the small unit level. Dereliction of Duty is a must-read for all leaders within the force in order to thoroughly understand the importance of civil-military relations and the significance of properly advising our civilian policy makers.
1stLt Ryan Casey is the former FiST leader, Kilo Company, V37. He is currently a congressional fellow in Washington DC. He can be reached at ryancasey113@gmail.com.