Creating a Dedicated Rifle Company Reconnaissance Element
by Captain Daniel Martin and 1stLt Ryan Casey
Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in July 2020. We have re-published this article based on the positive feedback received from Hunting and Killing: Reconnaissance and Small Unit Actions at MAGTF SIFEX 2023, and to contribute to the Marine Corps’ on-going discussion about scouting and reconnaissance.
Introduction
The Marine Corps infantry is undergoing a major transitional shift within its organization. A critical shortfall within the rifle company’s current T/O is the absence of a dedicated company level reconnaissance asset, which would support decision making and provide the company increased flexibility during independent operations.
Problem Statement
Battlespace owners require internal elements dedicated to gathering reliable ground level intelligence IOT shape their decision-making cycle. This fact is timeless and relevant across the conflict continuum. The ability to understand terrain and the enemy in developing and executing operations is a must. The frequency at which rifle companies are expected to operate independently within their own battlespace continuously increases and is a requirement by design in the Marine Corps’ future trajectory. Going forward with Force Design 2030, this shortfall will become increasingly evident within the Infantry Battalions proposed T/O shifts. Minor restructuring of the current T/O can internally rectify the rifle company’s ground reconnaissance shortfall.
Proposed Solution
Halfway through a 16-month workup for Marine Rotational Force- Darwin (MRF-D), Kilo Company, V37 was set to execute Mountain Warfare Training Exercise (MTX) in Bridgeport, California and the MAGTF Warfare Exercise (MWX) aboard the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC). These events are dynamic force-on-force exercises focused on decision making. Force-on-force training drives decision making in situations where the enemy is unknown, thinking, and ever-changing. This environment places a premium on a commander’s ability to gather intelligence and make decisions rapidly. In preparation for the upcoming service level exercises, the company sought an edge for fighting in dispersed environments with limited communication. To gain an advantage, the company developed the experimental “Scout Section.” The Section focused on advancing the company’s understanding of the battlespace and operating forward of the company’s line to increase decision space. Operating off of intent, the section would advance the METT-TC analysis of the commander.
Creation of Scouts
The Scouts reside within weapons platoon, which gives the company an organic asset that can gather intelligence tied to fires and maneuver. The idea and thought process behind the section’s manning, training, and development was to provide a basic reconnaissance capacity within the company, specifically equipped to advance battlefield estimates and shape operations. Similar to reconnaissance and snipers at the regimental and battalion level, Scouts operate inside the 3500m range ring the company can support with its 60mm mortars. The section is directly tied to the company planning cycle. Scouts are employed as a separate entity within the company’s zone. Unencumbered from platoon coordination lines, they have enhanced freedom of movement.
The weapons platoon is the ideal location for the Scout Section. Having a seasoned lieutenant who has already led a rifle platoon as well as a senior platoon sergeant creates a command team knowledgeable in training an independent and reconnaissance-oriented unit. Since the weapons platoon commander ties into company planning efforts for fires employment, the addition of the Scout Section enables further coordination between maneuver, fires, and intelligence. The Kilo Company Scouts consisted of an eight-man element split into two three-man teams with a section leader and corpsmen. The assault section initially accounted for the majority of scout’s population however, additional 0311’s filtered into the section overtime. An 0311 NCO who recently graduated the Advanced Infantry Marine Course was billeted as the section leader.
Scouts training prioritized doctrine from Marine Corps publications including Scouting and Patrolling, Combat Hunter, Rifle Squad and Rifle Company Operations as well as introducing concepts within Ground Combat Intelligence Operations. The section studied machine gun and mortar employment in order to support their ability to scout mortar firing or support by fire positions. In their training, an increased emphasis was placed on long haul communications, call for fire, tracking/counter tracking, terrain analysis, land nav, route planning, and reconnaissance patrols. Scouts would also coordinate with the rifle platoons to covertly observe and report on friendly squad training. This is not a conclusive summarization of their training but provides focus points that the company found valuable.
Why having a company dedicated recon asset matters
The Scouts provide a skillset that is critical to the success of the rifle company. Traditionally, in the rifle company all nine of its squads execute scouting in support of company operations in addition to their platoon reconnaissance and combat patrolling efforts. While this has been an adequate solution in the past, consistency and specialization within this mission set will yield better results. Dedicated Scouts will perform scouting and patrolling to an elevated capacity. When it comes down to determining essential mission planning considerations and information, Scouts can be employed without interrupting ongoing operations.
The section’s current core missions are battlefield estimation, route planning for major movements, and forward reconnaissance. The intent is not to strip squads of the scouting responsibility or eliminate reconnaissance patrols from their mission set, but to specialize a small unit for reconnaissance dedicated to the planning process. The section does not have the combat power of a squad based on its singular mission focus. Fighting and winning the reconnaissance/counter reconnaissance fight goes beyond relying on higher headquarters for support. Currently, dedicated reconnaissance assets remain at the battalion level via snipers or capable UAS platforms. The company has limited resources particularly in regard to ground sourced intelligence.
To maintain a rapid decision-making cycle, a commander needs information regarding the friendly situation, enemy situation, and terrain. Infantry Company Operations states that “the forms of warfare are evolving, and the infantry company commander is now facing new challenges and responsibilities that previously had been under the purview of higher command”. Considering this guidance, dedicating a scout element to these estimations enables the section to deliberately focus planning, training, and operational efforts in pursuit of essential information. This data molds faster decision making and intelligence routing. Additional primary mission sets (not conclusive) outside of forward reconnaissance efforts include:
Expertly plan, mark, and proof lanes for major movements both day and night
Capable of manning observation posts beyond traditional company distances when equipped with appropriate communication assets (HF, MUOS, or SATCOM)
Remain the dedicated advanced guard for company movements and split the section to operate as guides at critical junctions or choke points
Obstacle recognition in reconnoitering a defensive position as well as determining the objective of the obstacle plan
Employment Examples
Kilo 3/7’s Scouts came to fruition approximately halfway through V37’s work-up for MRF-D. While the Scouts participated in multiple field exercises, MTX and MWX maximized their employment.
MTX forces units to focus on light infantry tactics. The FOF portion which included demanding company movements over challenging terrain, offered a proving ground for the Scouts. During the exercise, the section was employed multiple times in two of their core mission sets. On two occasions, the section coordinated with the commander to develop suitable routes for both day and night company movements over severe terrain. Separating into three elements, the section not only scouted, proofed, and marked routes but aided in the echelon, phasing, and timing of the company through critical junctions. The construction of rope lines by the section and deliberate marking plans increased the tempo of the company during a major night movement. The split section concept became a trend throughout the exercise. Often times, half of the section occupied forward observation post’s (OP) while the other half scouted for possible mortar firing position’s, FiST OP’s, and company ORPs. The section’s ability to utilize terrain allowed them to operate in traveling-over watch positions for multiple company movements and as an adjacent covering lane for platoon level infiltrations.
During the execution of MWX, V37 executed a dismounted night movement through a narrow corridor along an un-reconnoitered route. A sniper team and Company K’s Scouts led the movement. They successfully reconnoitered and marked the route forward enabling the battalion to pass under the cover of darkness. As the exercise progressed, Scouts deployed forward of company lines in defensive postures to include manning an observation post forward of the battalion’s main engagement area. Sitting for over 12 hours in their forward observation position, they provided early warning and were critical in the timing and sequencing of actions in the engagement area. Throughout the exercise, Scouts enabled company decision making and supported the accomplishment of battalion objectives.
During the company’s current deployment to Okinawa, Scouts gained additional repetitions in a jungle environment. During the Infantry Jungle Skills Course (IJSC) 18-20 aboard the Jungle Warfare Training Center (JWTC) Scouts were a major enabler in the culminating company FOF exercise. Within the construct of the exercise, the company (-) cleared a platoon (+) adversary force who had established multiple defensive positions across the AO. The AO contained four primary objectives and multiple named areas of interest (NAI’s) associated with probable enemy locations. Due to the Scouts’ ability to travel light with limited communication windows they were inserted two kilometers north of the company’s main body in vicinity of a major objective. Their ability to maintain reconnaissance on the objective and reconnoiter NAI’s as viable or non-viable focused company offensive operations and enabled the main effort’s clear. Following the clear of the first objective, they were quickly re-tasked to move to a secondary position along with the company’s JTAC to observe and coordinate fires. IJSC served as an additional opportunity to refine SOP’s.
Future of Scouts in Force Design 2030 and decentralized operations
General Berger’s Force Design 2030, contains a number of dramatic shifts within the Fleet Marine Force. One in particular presents a strong impetus for the scouts concept. The relocation of the battalion’s scout sniper platoon to regiment eliminates the traditional reconnaissance asset companies could expect support from. The company scout section is not a replacement for snipers, and they are not expected to fill the void. However, the reconnaissance capacity scouts provide a company will be instrumental within the proposed 2030 construct IOT fill what will be a wide gap after the reduction of the battalion’s only dedicated ground reconnaissance effort.
Success in the future relies on the ability to have multiple highly capable small units spread across the battlespace (whether island chain or landmass) being able to make decisions faster and act on intent. The scout concept is in line with this vision. Scouts enhance the decision-making cycle at the company level in order to support dynamic distributed operations. Within this type of warfare, a rifle company would most likely be the central unit controlling specific sub-units (platoons or squads) verses a battalion and/or regiment HQ like we have seen the last 20 years in contemporary warfare. Companies will need a reconnaissance capability.
As the concept and the section grows over time, so will the company’s ability to exploit its growing list of TTPs. Going forward, the recommended size for the scout section is 10 personnel. This allows for two, 4 man teams with elected team leaders and provides increased flexibility for the section leader and corpsman to move between teams when disaggregated. Lastly, in regards to the capabilities of the section, all members should be exceptionally competent and trained on patrolling, handling communication assets, land navigation, calling for fire, and reporting procedures.
Conclusion
Being able to recognize deficiencies and have a creative solution is what the Marine Corps expects of its company grade leaders. Doctrine should not only be refined from the bottom up, but also forged from the roots when necessary. The experimental scout section has proven itself viable in providing the company an increased level of situational awareness and tactical flexibility. The ability to estimate the situation, identify surfaces and exploit gaps ties maneuver and intelligence together at the critical tactical level both now and in decentralized future operations. Ultimately, scouts are a company initiative that has proved itself viable and may be a useful asset to other companies across the FMF.
Capt Daniel Martin and 1stLt Ryan Casey are the Company Commander and Weapons Platoon Commander of Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. Capt Martin can be reached at daniel.martin@usmc.mil.