EMCON for the Infantry Battalion
by Capt Luke Klena
Like many infantry officers, the term signature management was not in my lexicon until I read the 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance. At the time of the CPG’s publication, I had just started the Information Warfare Systems Engineering program at the Naval Postgraduate School. I quickly realized two things: how ignorant I was about signature management and how important it was for operations against a peer adversary. While conducting background research into the topic, I found many potential SIGMAN TTPs, but few details about the effectiveness of these measures. For my thesis, I worked with Captain Joe Skopowski to model the common technical signature management TTPs using the Naval Research Laboratory’s Interactive Scenario Builder. We assessed how each TTP reduced the signature of the unit, and the cost of implementing each TTP in terms of a reduction in the ability to communicate with adjacent units.
The question we sought to answer was “How can a unit leader best employ technical signature management tactics, techniques, and procedures to deny the enemy critical information while maintaining the ability to communicate for mission accomplishment?” In our models, we used a Company Fire Support Team as the primary node implementing SIGMAN TTPs. We used a fire support framework for our models because communication is required to successfully accomplish the mission. Simply not transmitting is not an option. While the use of other frequency bands and waveforms must be considered for a comprehensive EMCON plan, the scope of our research extended to VHF SINCGARS communications.
The results of our research generally showed that the SIGMAN TTPs recommended in various publications are effective at reducing a unit’s technical signature from VHF communications. Some TTPs were more effective than others, and each had distinct advantages and disadvantages; however, each method we assessed was a viable option for company commanders to implement today. The implication of this result is that while methods of technical signature mitigation are known, they are not being implemented consistently across infantry battalions. Stated more simply, SIGMAN and EMCON training have not been a high priority in infantry training. A cultural change is required within the battalion to put these TTPs into action.
Recommendations
Battalion commanders must emphasize SIGMAN. The S-2, S-6, and company commanders can advocate for SIGMAN all day, but if it continues to take a back seat to operations rather than being integrated into the planning process, the battalion will not become proficient and units will be detected. The S-3 must work with the S-2 and S-6 to balance EMCON procedures with operations. Implementing EMCON conditions will inhibit operations to some degree. Overly restrictive conditions will unnecessarily hinder the flow of information, while overly permissive conditions will not adequately mitigate the unit’s signature.
The S-6 must educate the companies. Their technical knowledge is critical for companies to understand their technical signatures. Modeling unit signatures using SPEED can provide leaders with a visual aid to better understand their unit’s emissions. While this may be impractical to do for every exercise, demonstrating the difference between a mitigated and unmitigated signature will help leaders comprehend the importance of SIGMAN measures.
The S-2 must regularly brief adversary COMINT and ES platforms. Early in a battalion’s workup, these briefs will serve to educate unit leaders on generic adversarial capabilities. As the battalion gets closer to deploying, the intelligence briefs can become more focused on specific capabilities and systems. The briefs should cover a system’s frequency range, whether it can direction find or geo-locate a signal, and how it is typically employed.
Ultimately, the battalion must approach EMCON training with the same mentality that they do live fire: crawl, walk, run. The first time a unit employs a technical SIGMAN TTP or EMCON plan should not be when the unit is being evaluated. First, infantry leaders need to be aware of the tools that are available to make them harder to detect. Second, they need to habituate them by rehearsing in their backyard and during small unit exercises before being thrown into a service level exercise. Marines need to practice lowering their antenna height, changing power settings on the radio, making an antenna more directional, and choosing terrain that will mitigate their signature. All these TTPs can be rehearsed without having a spectrum analyzer or dedicated red cell. After these skills have been developed, then, just like a live fire event, they can validate their training by avoiding detection during a large-scale force- on-force exercise.
Our Research
Our research focused on techniques which reduce the amount of power received by the COMINT or ES antenna. As a result, most of the following TTPs focus on preventing the adversary from detecting a technical signature, rather than preventing the adversary from establishing a pattern of life based on that signature. The following are a few techniques that were evaluated during our study, along with a few simple TTPs that can be implemented by commanders today:
Communicate using the lowest power setting necessary to form a communications link. Habituate setting your radio at the lowest power setting, and only increasing the power as needed to communicate. Higher echelon EMCON plans may dictate the maximum permissible power output.
Use terrain to mitigate your signature in the direction of the enemy. Natural obstructions placed between you and the enemy will reduce the strength of the signal that is received by the COMINT or ES system. The more significant the terrain feature, the greater the attenuation of the signal in that direction. Obstacles other than terrain, such as a man- made wall, will have a similar but less significant effect.
Set your antenna to the lowest height necessary to form a communications link. Raise it as needed to establish a positive link.
Use directional antennas when possible. This can be challenging for VHF communications. MCRP 6-22D discusses how to build an array to increase directivity; however, constructing such an antenna may be prohibitively difficult for most radio operators.
Strictly enforce proper reporting formats. This will speed up the time it takes to communicate and decrease the adversary’s opportunity to detect the signal. While there is no target time to get transmissions under, communicating clearly and concisely will mean less time spent transmitting.
Communicate only when absolutely necessary. Inculcate a culture of deciding whether the information being communicated is worth the risk of being detected. We have all been told to think before you key out. Before you even think about what you are going to say, think about whether or not it even needs to be said.
Use other means of communicating when possible. Use hand and arm signals when in visual range. Send a runner when the information is not urgent. If the S-6 can acquire field phones, run wire when in a stationary position. The rudimentary methods of communication may seem inconvenient, but they eliminate the risk of being detected by a transmission that could have been avoided.
This list is by no means exhaustive. These are relatively simple measures that can be taken to decrease the technical signature of a unit and thereby decrease the likelihood of being detected. It is important to remember there is no silver bullet solution to prevent detection from RF transmissions. To accomplish the mission, units will need to communicate in some capacity. The goal is not total elimination of risk, but rather for a unit to make itself a hard target.
Capt Luke Klena is an instructor at EWTGLANT. He can be reached at lbklena@gmail.com.