Front-line Counter-sUAS in the Ground Combat Element

by 1stLt James Fair and LtCol Jerome Greco

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In early 2024, Major General Watson tasked First Marine Division Schools with establishing a course focused on the integration of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) and counter-sUAS (C-sUAS) at the small unit level. Designing the C-sUAS portion of the course was a particular challenge for our small team at Division Schools.  Doctrine and our own experience were lacking.  As we researched the problem we came across individuals in organizations like TTECG, MCWL, the Center for Naval Analysis, and the Joint C-UAS program Office with deeper experience. Even their experience, however, stopped well short of providing coherent, actionable tactical guidance for front-line ground combat element units. 

This article is an attempt – at least a start – to filling that gap. It strives to not simply describe the threat or admire the problem.  Rather it will walk the dog from theoretical to practical on how a small unit leader at the Company or Platoon level realistically establishes a front-line, layered, C-sUAS system.

Understanding the Threat

In eastern Ukraine today, sUAS makes the battlespace transparent, imposes friction on casualty evacuation and supply lines, and decisively supplements traditional air support and indirect fire in both the offense and the defense.  Both sides are simultaneously employing layered “stacks” of sUAS for command situational awareness, communications relays, fires observation, one-way strike, and even C-sUAS intercept.  The battlespace is deeper and the rear area less secure.  Resupply is best conducted through dispersed infiltration tactics as traditional convoys, even 10 kilometers behind the front-line, are routinely targeted.  The cost exchange ratio of cheap first-person view (FPV) drones makes them viable for use against individual human targets, which itself is a paradigm shift in tactical warfare.  As one Ukrainian soldier in Kupiansk described, “there's almost this no man's land, grey zone area that's just covered by drones. It makes assaulting and advancing almost impossible, to do an assault or raid you have to dodge snipers, mortars, and FPV drones”. The scale of the threat is novel as well.  Ukraine alone consumes more than 10,000 sUAS per month, mostly of the cheap quadcopter and FPV variety.  Our adversaries’ employment of sUAS in the Marine Corps’ next fight will not look identical to this, but it will bear all the same general features.

Drones are the new IEDs and our adaptation at the small unit level will reflect this. As the IED threat emerged in Iraq and Afghanistan, front-line units responded with a layered approach, a combination of tactics and technology.  Tactical formations adjusted in accordance with the specific area and the local threat. Units conducted variations of dismounted V-sweeps or Ranger files, and convoys employed varying rates of speed and dispersion depending on whether they faced Remote Controlled IEDs, command wire, or pressure plates.  An alphabet soup of Electronic Countermeasures (ECMs) arrived and were strapped onto both vehicles and personnel.  DUKE, WARLOCK, ACORN, and many others jammed remote controlled IEDs, though not perfectly.  Vehicle armor evolved rapidly, from welded-on hillbilly armor initially to the eventually ubiquitous MRAP and MATV. Special vehicles were fielded to engineer units and Route Clearance Packages were sourced from Regimental Combat Teams for high-priority missions.  Mine Rollers were attached to MTVRs.  EC-130s reinforced small-unit effort with periodic high-powered electronic attack, or “Compass Calls.” Units at every echelon were taught to attack the network, with the aim of disrupting enemy’s ability to build and emplace IEDs in the first place.  

The point of this trip down GWOT Memory Lane is not to extol the brilliance our historic C-IED efforts.  In fact, none of these efforts individually defeated IEDs as a threat.  Even collectively, they did not defeat the threat. It was no more possible to defeat IEDs in GWOT as it would have been to defeat artillery shells in World War I.  The point is that when properly employed as a layered system, however, these tactics and systems could reduce the threat to a threshold at which we could operate and accomplish our assigned tactical mission.  Philosophically and practically, this is how the GCE needs to approach C-sUAS.  Leaders in the GCE at every echelon need to establish this front-line C-sUAS system, this combination of tactics and technology, to ensure we can effectively seize and hold key terrain on a drone-saturated battlefield.

A flexible, layered approach to C-sUAS

We can apply the Joint C-UAS framework of Detect, Track, Identify, Defeat all the way down to the squad level. We at Division Schools advocate that we include Mitigate at the beginning of that cycle. Regardless of what systems you do or do not have, you still must have a plan to Mitigate, Detect, Track, ID and Defeat sUAS.  In the graphic below are representative examples of options for each of these steps that range from simple tactics to complex and costly systems.  This article does not endorse or review any specific industry system but uses these systems to demonstrate a range of options. Similarly, you can combine systems from across this spectrum. The tactical framework of Mitigate, Track, ID, Defeat is system-agnostic. While systems do matter and the Marine Corps does need a POR solution, passively waiting is antithetical to GCE leaders who take their fight now responsibilities seriously.  To that end, the rest of this article provides a range of solutions and outlines battle drills that are executable now.

Image provided by authors

Mitigate. The first step in effective C-sUAS is to mitigate your signature and enhance your survivability. Reducing your visual and thermal signature, your electromagnetic signature, and especially overhead signature is critical. Dispersion and “not being worth the strike” is important mitigation. Simple decoys are effective in soaking up enemy sUAS.  Overhead concealment (at least) and overhead cover (best) is critical.  Overhead concealment can double as entanglement.  Standard camouflage netting, specialized counter-drone netting, and cope-cage style standoff systems significantly mitigate the threat of both strike sUAS and ordnance dropped from sUAS by entangling it or prematurely detonating it. Mitigation is bounded by leaders’ creativity.  It seeks to avoid being targeted and, if targeted, enhances survivability.

Detect, Track, and Identify. Methods of detecting, tracking, and identifying refer to the conceptually simple process of sensing sUAS as early as possible, maintaining that detection to enable eventual targeting, and identifying the sUAS as friend or foe to meet engagement criteria.  The simplest method of detecting sUAS is air sentries that visually and audibly search surroundings for presence of enemy sUAS. Much like sectors of fire in the defense, post sentries with overlapping sectors of observation, and orient them to the most likely avenue of approach of enemy sUAS. Most sentries can audibly detect enemy sUAS flying at 400ft AGL and below. Your Company CLIC should train Marines on enemy sUAS systems to facilitate identification. Consider establishing a marking plan of friendly sUAS to easily discern between friendly and enemy sUAS and create brevity codes for lateral communication of enemy sUAS. Task Marines in observation posts and screen lines with air sentry duties to provide early warning of enemy sUAS well forward. 

The vast majority of sUAS on the battlefield today are Radio Frequency (RF) - controlled and can therefore be detected via a spectrum analyzer, even if not specifically built for C-UAS.  Some of these spectrum analyzers cost as little as a few hundred dollars and can detect the presence of enemy sUAS out of the baseline from several kilometers away if threat frequencies are known. Spectrum analyzers with more capability can direction find and even classify the probable type of sUAS detected. 

Both passive (non-emitting) and active (emitting) radar systems exist in industry that can detect, track, and identify enemy sUAS. Some of these systems are man-portable, and their incorporation into infantry units at the battalion level and below will only increase warning time of incoming sUAS. Most of these small form factor radars can detect and track sUAS at a range of up to 10km. While purchasing these systems is beyond the capability of a Company, it is reasonably within the resources of a Battalion or Regiment, at least in small quantities.  Many of these systems can be networked and their tracks can be shared via the Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) so a single detect system can feed multiple defeat nodes.

Defeating enemy sUAS requires a similar layered approach and is done broadly in two ways: hard-kill or soft-kill. 

At the small unit level, relevant hard kill methods include precision-aimed fire like that provided by Smartshooter SMASH, massed rifle fire, and shotguns at close range.  Note that the most common ammunition in the DoD inventory is 00 buckshot, which is largely ineffective due to its spread and small shot quantity.  We plan to continue experimentation and we speculate that 7.5 shot likely provides the right balance between stopping power and spread needed to down sUAS at close range. 

Soft-kill options include a variety of man-portable electronic warfare jammers.  Options include the POR MODI II system and any one of many industry solutions that range in cost from single-digit thousands to tens of thousands of dollars each.  Systems such as the Dronebuster can fit in an assault pack and can both detect and jam sUAS, forcing it to execute its lost link procedures or (if manually flown) crash.  Similarly, Trust Automation’s GAT system attaches to a rifle and is capable of short-range EW jamming. 

C-sUAS Battle Drills and Task Organization

1st Marine Division’s sUAS/C-sUAS Integration Course teaches two basic scenarios for C-sUAS battle drills: static defense and dismounts on the move. There are myriad combinations of C-sUAS technologies potentially available to a small unit, but to illustrate the battle drill, we will consider a platoon with:

• No dedicated detect asset

• 3 x GAT/SMASH systems (one per squad)

• 1 x MODI II

• 3 x service shotguns (one per squad)

Platoons should designate one fire team per squad as the C-sUAS fire team. These Marines will have the shotgun, air sentry, and GAT/SMASH system. C-sUAS requires deliberate tasking in an operations order that also clearly defines engagement criteria (Weapons Hold / Tight / Free) for enemy sUAS. 

Image provided by authors

Dismounts on the move that encounter sUAS must rapidly discern between enemy and friendly.  Assume enemy if unsure.  The Marine that first sees enemy sUAS must immediately issue an ADDRAC. “Alert” looks like a pre-briefed brevity code for enemy sUAS.  “Direction” can be given in cardinal direction or the clock method.  “Description” includes type of UAS if known, Fixed Wing, Quadcopter, or FPV suffices as a distinction at this point. “Range” is given in meters and altitude is given in feet AGL. The unit’s designated air sentry maintains eyes on the sUAS, and the key leader’s “Assignment” and “Control” includes pre-briefed direction (cardinal or clock method) and distance of movement to cover and concealment.  Thus far, this looks like a combination of a react to indirect fire and a react to air immediate action drill.

A disciplined unit will not immediately assume active compromise.  If the sUAS was at significant range and did not loiter, it is possible the unit was not observed by the sUAS. We refer to this as passive compromise.  In the event of a passive compromise, which is an on-scene commander’s judgment call and a difficult risk decision, the unit should rapidly seek concealment and cover. Establish all-around security with sectors of fire and observation that include overhead coverage.  Wait until sUAS is off-station and continue on mission. Wait time will vary depending on mission requirements, but should generally align with a long halt on patrol which typically lasts more than ten minutes.

If it is evident the sUAS has observed the unit, whether by its close range or its actions, the unit must assume active compromise.  Once contact is made, the air sentry should maintain eye contact with the enemy sUAS until it is defeated. Ideally, the unit seeks concealment and cover, the C-sUAS fireteam maneuvers to a position to employ both its GAT (soft-kill) and SMASH + Shotguns (hard-kill).  As soon as sUAS is defeated, has struck, or if off-station, the unit rapidly displaces at least 500 meters under the assumption that follow on attack (further strikes or IDF) are imminent. While the C-sUAS fire team engages the sUAS, friendlies displace in the direction and distance indicated by the small unit leader. Like an IDF IA drill, direction and distance of movement should be codified as unit SOP; a suitable terrain feature or rally point can be briefed ahead of time. Much like a "break contact" battle drill, the C-sUAS fire team acts as a base of fire element to suppress the enemy sUAS threat and prepares for subsequent sUAS threats. It's important the air sentry look for sUAS not just from the original direction of attack. Finally, the C-sUAS element should displace to rejoin the unit. Small unit leaders should designate an alternate air sentry and alternate C-sUAS fire team to provide overwatch as the original team displaces.

Image provided by authors

In the static defense, place the C-sUAS fire team centrally in the squad’s assigned sector in a position that maximizes aerial observation. Establish an alternate position providing 360-degree aerial observation for each squad; the C-sUAS fire team may require multiple hot positions for use of “defeat” assets similar to rocket employment. Treat the MODI II Marine like a radio operator, centrally located near platoon leadership who can tightly control when the system is buzzer on / off and can reactively vector the Marine to a position of advantage.

In the absence of advanced detect assets, an air sentry provides first indication of sUAS and must determine enemy or friendly. Like the previous scenario, an ADDRAC laterally communicates the presence of enemy sUAS. Defeating sUAS requires a layered approach using both EW (approximately 500m max effective depending on many variables) and kinetic assets, also known as freeze and fire. The method of kinetically engaging enemy sUAS aligns with the HAW/MAW/LAW approach to antiarmor in the defense, which aims to engage the enemy as far forward of friendly units as possible. Beginning around 300m out, the C-sUAS fire teams engage with SMASH, followed by massed squad fire and shotguns as a last resort within 100m of friendly lines. Kinetically engaging sUAS typically indicates active compromise. Displace as the mission allows.

Attack the Network

While the details of how to do this are presently beyond the scope of this article, attacking the network is as important in C-UAS as it was in C-IED operations and is a nearly untouched tactical subject in the GCE.  In general, sUAS teams are higher value targets than the systems themselves. Both Ukrainians and Russians devote significant effort and resources to hunting drone teams through a variety of TTPs.  They use direction finding RF signals from control stations, follow drones back to launch locations, and dedicate substantial ISR to looking for drone operators.  As we refine our course curriculum, this is an area we intend to explore further.  

Conclusion

We have found at Division Schools that there is ample C-UAS expertise throughout the DoD Enterprise and industry.  However, it has yet to percolate down to the GCE in systems or, just as importantly, tactics.  While the GCE currently lacks a coherent solution, we should not allow that to paralyze us as leaders into inaction.  There are things we can do right now, at every echelon to get after this problem.  We have certainly not presented the entire solution in this article.  What we hope we have done is give small unit leaders a baseline education and a tactical point from which to deviate.   We eagerly await feedback, criticism, suggestions, and questions.

LtCol Jerome Greco is the former Director of First Marine Division Schools and the former Commander of V35. He can be contacted at jerome.greco@usmc.mil.

1stLt James Fair is an 0302, former rifle platoon commander, and currently a sUAS / C-sUAS Integration Instructor at First Marine Division Schools. He can be contacted at james.t.fair@usmc.mil.

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The opinions expressed above are those of the author and The Connecting File. They do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, or any other government entity.