Putting "All Stations this is Kodiak Actual" Into Practice
by Col Christopher J. Douglas
I first read “All Stations this is Kodiak Actual” during the start of my second Rifle Company Command tour in Iraq in 2005. I found the article during a time when I realized my ability to decide, communicate and act to impose our will on the insurgency in Al Anbar was hindered by my inability to rapidly disseminate orders in a way that could be understood at the lowest level. Specifically, clear, concise mission type orders with my intent that focused upon the enemy, and remained relevant when the situation changed.
As a reservist, I had been an instructor at TBS and was comfortable and confident in my ability to decide, communicate, and act in addition to my ability in planning, coordinating, and executing combat operations and the orders process. But the tempo of operations in a time compressed, violent, complex, and ambiguous environment required the ability to rapidly decide, communicate an order, and act even more so than against a traditional enemy. I found the Marine Corps traditional planning process and method of written combat orders worked in training, and early combat operations, yet decreased my ability to issue an effective and efficient verbal order while in contact. The decreased ability to issue an effective verbal order caused me to fail to out-pace my enemy who was operating in small teams with decentralized command and control.
When I received “All Stations This Is Kodiak Actual” by Brendan McBreen, I began to execute Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) on my own, utilizing his index card example to practice issuing orders. Once I was confident, I executed training with my Platoon Commanders, Squad Leaders, and Team Leaders to achieve the “5 Line in :50 Seconds Under Fire,” and the “3 Lines Under :30 Seconds Under Fire,” and TDGs to reinforce this concept. As a result, we effectively and efficiently implemented the enhanced verbal order techniques and gained the initiative on the enemy we faced. I realized that we had maximized our effectiveness and efficiency when I had been called to receive an order at the Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT 2) headquarters in Al Asad, Iraq. Prior to my departure, I issued a warning order to the Company to enable them to conduct combat preparation.
Upon link up with HHQ, I learned that RCT 2 identified an opportunity to impose their will on the enemy and ordered the early execution of Operation SAIF (SWORD). During my return to the company, the our unit identified an improvised explosive device, and was subsequently delayed due to contact. In the meantime, I provided my index card “5 lines in: 50 Seconds Under Fire” order to my Platoon Commanders over the radio. When I arrived at Camp Hit, the Amphibious Assault Vehicles, Tanks, and Marines were staged and ready to execute. Rehearsals, re-combat checks, pre-combat inspections, back briefs had been accomplished, and my Platoon Commanders were waiting for me upon my arrival. We crossed the line of departure, secured our first objective, and the Marines performed exceptionally.
Reflecting upon the successful implementation of Verbal Orders at the Company level and below, I recognized the success was a direct result of the dedication, professionalism, and relationships of the Platoon Commanders, Squad Leaders, and Team Leaders. All Marines read and discussed MCDP 1 in small groups during our pre-deployment training to ensure there was no misunderstanding of our doctrine from Private through Company Commander; I was inspired when I would hear Marines engaging in discussions about Warfighting. The initial TDGs that we utilized to exercise the verbal order process were from “Mastering Tactics” by Major John Schmitt (USMCR ret). Over time we utilized perceived friction points that were based upon planned and executed operations in order to exercise tactics, techniques and procedures and put the small unit leaders in a position that required them to make a decision, communicate their decision to subordinates, higher and adjacent units. The feedback that we provided was based upon asking why they chose their decision and what other options they had. Next we conducted knowledge checks of specific subordinates. This was to ensure that there was no misunderstanding of the order or actions of the subordinates.
The Platoon Commanders and I ensured that we reviewed and supervised the process at all levels to ensure continuity within our company. We modified our process of conducting the TDGs and order issue to include Marines who we planned to use as Team Leaders when Marines were wounded.
After 19 years of war, and five combat deployments since 9/11, I have come to the realization that we need to ensure a common understanding from private through Commandant of the common professional language of our Warfighting Doctrine; MCDP-1. It is important that all Marines understand maneuver warfare as discussed in MCDP-1 Warfighting. It is our doctrine the fundamental principles by which our military forces guide their actions. General Gray published FMFM-1 to do business, General Krulak published MCDP-1 as the way we do business. This method of operating was to be throughout all concepts, words, and actions. MCDP-1 was not just a cold war doctrine; MCDP-1 defined our warrior culture.
Inspiring vs. requiring discussions of warfighting, tactical decision games, and a return to our doctrine is what is necessary to remain an expeditionary force in readiness. Our doctrine is not USA Today – it should not be trivialized down into a couple of bulletized points, discussed in some locations and not in others. It is our responsibility as leaders not just to ensure that all Marines understand our doctrine; but to ensure that they also do not misunderstand our warfighting philosophy.
The education of Warfighting needs to inspire Marines of all ranks to live our Warfighting Ethos vice requiring them to espouse concepts that they really do not understand. Next, properly led TDGs will facilitate the ability to introduce the concept of the verbal; “5 Line in: 50 Seconds Under Fire” and the “3 Lines Under: 30 Seconds Under Fire.” To ensure that we are reaching our full potential we must ensure that all Marines study, discuss, practice, and most importantly, decide, communicate and act upon all of the tenets of Warfighting.
Col Douglas currently serves with Marine Corps Forces Central Command and can be reached at christopher.j.douglas@usmc.mil.