Editor’s note: Below are reader solutions to DMX 09: Early Check Out. We read every response we get and appreciate everyone who sent in, or shared their ideas—the community is better for it. Think you’ve got a better plan? Make your case in the comments below, warfighter. For those looking for more reps, DMX 10 is on short final—stay tuned!
2ndLt Robert Gortner
The scenario led to a very fruitful discussion about the “intent” that truly give orders their backbone, how we can make sense of an uncertain enemy situation, and the level of agency that an individual Marine has to make decisions that will shape the battlefield far above his paygrade. Especially when things are going from “bad” to “worse” in a hurry.
As for my solution:
“Longbow team, take out that ENY drone.
T/O: 1st Plt: No attachments.
2nd Plt: 2 Jav teams, 2 MMG Squads
3rd Plt: 1 MMG Squad
Cpy HQ retains mortar section.
O: India Company is approximately 1km to our east. The Bn reserve is 4km south.
S: I think 1/7 and 2/7 are being fixed up north and India company is getting overrun by the ENY Deep Attack Group (DAG). I believe the ENY DAG is at least a mech infantry company with attached tanks.
M: Lima Company delays ENY DAG in order to allow the Bn reserve to counterattack.
E: 1x Plt link-up with scouts in order to facilitate friendly RPOL.
2x Plt + HQ attack S-N IVO Hill 205 IOT prevent the ENY DAG from enveloping our regimental frontage.
T: 2nd Plt, ME. Delay ENY DAG in order to allow the Bn reserve to counterattack.
3rd Plt, SE1. Follow and Support the Main Effort in order to facilitate our delaying action.
1st Plt, SE2. Seize Hill 122 IOT allow 1/7 and 2/7 to conduct RPOL.
Mortars: establish MFP IVO Hill 205 IOT support Cpy delay efforts.
Radio to higher (or message with 1x ACV “runner” if comms are jammed): “Blade 3, this is Lima 6. ENY mech penetration @ TAA Hilton. Estimate at least an ENY Cpy(+) with tanks. Lima Cpy is moving to delay IVO south Hill 205. Recommend CAAT/Kilo counterattack IOT prevent regimental envelopment. Send any supporting arms available. 1x FR Plt IVO Hill 122 IOT facilitate RPOL.”
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In my opinion, the first most pressing question that we must answer is always, “what is the enemy doing here?” The ability to rapidly place the battlefield in context is crucial to the creation of a sensible plan of action. We must first create a narrative which can plausibly explain the enemy’s presence and what they seek to achieve. Decisions made in the absence of even a cursory assessment are reactionary and ineffective.
In this case, I believe that the Threat C adversary has penetrated our regimental frontage to our North and has passed a Depth Attack Group (DAG) through our lines with the intent of destroying our unprepared rear area. Unfortunately for us, the DAG has caught India Company with their pants down.
The second question that we must ask ourselves is, “how much time do I have to deal with this threat?” The ability to make sound and timely decisions is as central to Marine warfighting as to be enshrined in our leadership principles. Timely decision making does not always mean instantaneous. There is always time to think about the problem, if even for a few moments, before committing to a course of action. In this case however, that time is fleeting. Every moment we spend trying to gain additional certainty is a moment that India Company’s precarious situation is left to spiral further out of control. If we seek to delay the enemy DAG and buy the rest of our battalion time to maneuver, then we must drive as much combat power as we can muster toward India Company’s position. Our goal should not be to defeat the enemy in one fell swoop, but to develop the situation in a way which will be favorable to friendly follow-on actions.
Next, we must ask ourselves, “what are my orders?” Our professional warfighting system works as a force greater than the sum of its parts. We are not a rag-tag militia whose “commanders” cannot be relied on to follow orders, but nor are we a programmable army of automatons that will thoughtlessly obey the specified task no matter the cost. Marines at every level operate within the framework of the commander’s intent. This fundamental attribute to our command-and-control system fosters an adaptability at echelon that, when applied correctly, allows our force to out-decide and out-fight the enemy, even when forced on the backfoot. In this case, Blade 3 has ordered us to, “retain the current position IOT prevent envelopment of the regiment.”
When that order is applied within the context of our enemy assessment, it becomes clear that India Company has found itself right in the tracks of the enemy envelopment effort. In order to achieve our commander’s intent and prevent the envelopment of the regiment, we will have to break his specific tasking by leaving our position to more effectively delay the enemy advance south.
Last, we must ask ourselves, “who needs to know what I know?” The friction involved in warfighting, even in simulated actions as simple as Range 410A, creates a certain gravitational pull toward the immediate problem. Platoon Commanders often find themselves sucked into the actions of just a few Marines at the forward line and inadvertently abdicate their responsibility to not only their unit at large, but to their higher headquarters and their adjacent units. Similarly in this case, the temptation to focus our attention completely on the gunfight at TAA Hilton is strong. A Company Commander may rightly feel that in a situation as dire as this, that he belongs with his Marines at the point of friction. What is at risk, however, is the ability for our higher headquarters to react with any tactical relevance.
No matter how strong this pull toward the immediate problem, Marines at every level must keep in mind their responsibility to inform their higher headquarters of situations which they may not be aware of. The Battalion Commander would likely be interested in learning that one of his companies has been overrun. Further, he is the unit leader at a “point of influence” who controls the resources we need to affect a more permanent solution to the situation at TAA Hilton. Jammed comms are no excuse. The fight to communicate is just that. No matter what happens to us at TAA Hilton in our effort to delay the enemy DAG, the message of what is happening must make it back to higher headquarters.
In his broken radio communication, India 6 said that he was “in a knife fight.” In order to prevent a total rout, Lima Company must fix bayonets and prepare to march.
2ndLt Robert Gortner is a platoon commander in Animal Company, 1/7. He discussed this scenario with his platoon and provided a solution and a write-up of their conversation.
Capt Connor Koukol
As I pull in Platoon Commanders I will immediately tell them:
- I think the EN is attacking I Co with at least a Company IOT penetrate the Regimental rear as part of a larger counterattack. Drones that we see suggest a follow-on attack of our position.
- We need to support I Co immediately IOT to prevent envelopment of the Regiment.
Tasks:
- 1st Platoon, ME. You’re with me. Attack EN by fire from SE side of Hill 100 IOT prevent destruction of I Co. BPT to serve as a maneuver element in a N to S attack.
- 2nd Platoon, SE 1. Attack EN by fire from SW portion of Hill 100 IOT prevent destruction of I Co. 2x Javelin teams are attached time now.
- 3rd Platoon, SE 2. You are the reserve. Occupy tree line N of CP 21 IOT retain combat power and facilitate RPOL with 1/7. I’m attaching 3x FPV teams and 2x sUAS team to your platoon. Immediately upon occupation get those drones up and get eyes on the battlefield, and maintain SA on our previous TAA. Let me know what you see. Engage C2 nodes and automatic weapons with FPV drones.
- FiST, occupy Hill 205 and begin adjusting 81s ASAP. Work on getting Arty and Air in the fight. Take 60s with you. Suppress EN for now, but be prepared to develop a closure series. You now have 1x sUAS team attached.
Lateral Comms with I Co:
- Pushing 2x platoons to S side of Hill 100 to provide immediate fires. ETA 20 min. If able, we could use a guide to position us and talk us on the EN. We can coordinate an attack once the situation stabilizes.
Report to BN on the move:
- Moving towards Hill 100 to support I Co at TAA Hilton IOT prevent EN from enveloping Regiment. Recon drones spotted IVO TAA Holiday Inn.
- Recommend you pull up Kilo and CAAT to TAA Holiday Inn IOT prevent a western envelopment. Requesting LAAD to occupy IVO CP 21. We could also use any air and artillery support that we can get.
Capt Connor Koukol is the MOI at the University of Missouri.