This past week, I was fortunate to join The School of War to discuss the infantry and where we’re heading. Aaron MacLean, the host and a former 0302 himself, and I cover:
How the CxFile contributes to the Marine Corps’ learning ecosystem
Learning the right lessons from Ukraine and Gaza for the infantry
The limits of drone employment within company formations
Current experimentation and innovation across battalions (with a hat tip to 3d LAR)
Trust between commanders on the modern battlefield in an era of information saturation
And the odds of a Marine one day clubbing an enemy to death with a drone
If you’d rather listen than watch, you can find the show on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. The School of War also has its own Substack. If you don’t subscribe, you should. Aaron is an exceptional host, and his guests cover a wide range of military history, leadership, decision-making, and tactics. The CxFile audience will be well served by his commentary and discussions.
The Future of the Infantry and You
The thoughts I shared on the show are informed most by the work and notes the CxFile receives from our readers—you. What gets passed up from the forward line of troops are not just critical observations; they’re the insights that will decide whether we adapt fast enough to win.
Which is why we’re asking you to send us one idea on how to improve the infantry or recon communities.
Send us a short note, bullet points, or a paragraph that:
Identifies a problem.
Proposes a solution.
Provides a recommendation for implementation.
You are, of course, welcome to write us a full article — in fact, we would love that. But we also know how busy many of you are, especially those of you in the FMF.
We will compile and publish the ten best ideas from the audience.
The debate in the comments should energize all of us—and one way or another, we’re going to learn something.
From the Company Board
Own the Night or Die | John Spencer | Modern War Institute | 01.19.26
John Spencer identifies that one of the clearest patterns in recent wars is how often armies “pause” at night. Major ground maneuver and decisive fighting still tend to happen in daylight, even when both sides have night-vision tech. He emphasizes this core point: owning the night isn’t about optics—it’s about unit mastery, defined disciplined training, leader development, rehearsed integration, and expectations.
For conventional infantry formations, Spencer’s warning is that night competence is uneven and perishable, especially after years of COIN, where decisive tasks often occurred during daylight. Future large-scale combat will demand brigades/divisions that can maneuver, control fires, sustain, and command in darkness as a default.
His practical recommendations are training-culture driven:
Start night proficiency early
Make night movement/marksmanship/C2 routine requirements
Stop scripting big training attacks to begin at dawn
Technology (next-gen sensors/AR overlays) can help, but they must remain an enabler
The decisive edge comes from repetition, standards, and leaders who demand night excellence.
The Closing of the Marine Corps Mind? Strategy, Credentialism, and the Pursuit of Intellectual Depth | Benjamin Van Horrick | Modern War Institute | 01.23.26
Major Ben Van Horrick, a recent addition to the CxFile team himself, argues that the Marine Corps talks about being a “thinking force,” but its current approach to “strategy” education is fragmented and increasingly credential-driven, risking the production of officers with longer résumés but shallower intellectual depth. Using Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (recently placed on the Commandant’s Professional Reading List) as a lens, he critiques the reading list’s eclectic, thematically incoherent mix—more like the unfocused curricula Bloom attacked than a deliberate framework for developing strategists.
Ben extends the Bloom critique to our PME system: professional schools often substitute seat time, page counts, and master’s degrees for real rigor, turning education into credentialism and reinforcing a “managerial class” mindset rather than cultivating judgment for war.
His prescription: the Marine Corps should facilitate disciplined engagement with enduring “great books” and guided discussion, not just publish lists. Facing the pacing threat (PLA) will demand leaders who combine hard field training with historical understanding, moral clarity, and intellectual resilience.
The Largest Small War | Michael Hanson | Small Wars Journal | 1.20.2026
Major Michael Hanson, also a CxFile editor, argues that while the Marine Corps is rightly focused on deterring the PRC, it can’t afford to neglect a North Korea contingency, especially regime collapse, which could us into a sprawling stabilization fight. He frames this as potentially “the largest small war” of the 21st century because the DPRK is heavily militarized, retains substantial (if often outdated) conventional combat power, and fields WMD and missile forces that create urgent security problems if command-and-control fractures.
Using a collapse scenario, he highlights five likely mission sets drawn from prior analysis:
Stability/humanitarian relief and policing key terrain
Border control/refugee management
Locating and securing WMD
Disarming conventional weapons
Deterring/defeating armed resistance
Each mission is overlapping, mutually dependent, and likely contested by remnants of the regime, insurgents, or criminal actors. It’s a classic “Three Block War” problem.
Bottom line: keep training across the ROMO, because Korea could demand small-wars competencies at a massive scale even in an era dominated by pacing-threat planning.
As always, thank you for reading, your support, and sharing this platform.
Stay lethal and long live the infantry.
Major Geoff Ball is the co-founder of the CxFile and is currently an instructor at the Naval Academy. You can reach the CxFile team at cxfile0302@gmail.com.
Division Schools can be the provider of low cost, high impact training across the fleet. Whenever a unit has white space, commanders can send their Marines to a quick one, perhaps no longer than 2 week course right down the street. When you aren't at AITB attending courses because you aren't slotted for a leadership billet and your unit isn't going to EOTG because it isn't part of a MEU, where can you go to train outside of the battalion? Division Schools.
I would argue that we should establish a Division Schools for 3rd MarDiv, as well as a 1st MarDiv Schools detachment at 29 Palms.
Next, the Attack Drone Team, Drone Courses, Drone Operator's Manual, and Drone Operator are great additions to the USMC, and I am glad they are a thing. We are better for it. With that being said, why have we not established attack drone teams in Hawaii, Pendleton, Lejeune, and 29 Palms? Every base with infantry should have their own team. The original attack drone team at Quantico is making great strides but let's be honest, there are no deployable infantry units in Quantico.
I am glad the Fleet has it's own Designated Marksman's Course (Aadvanced Precision Marksman's Course) now. Before, MCSFR has the only formalized DM course with it's own curriculum- as such, they could not compete with the FMF for seats. Courses in the Fleet did exist, but they were held at the battalion level, so their curriculums varied from battalion to battalion. However, the new Advanced Precision Marksman's Course is in Quantico. It should at least be taught at every Marine Division, especially if we want to completely get rid of Snipers.
You can't have good good squad leaders without good fire team leaders. The USMC is right to focus on developing squad leaders with things like the Annual Rifle Squad Competition, FMF Squad Leader Program, ISULC, and so on. With that being said, what about Fire Team Leaders? The new JEPES promotion system means that Marines are less likely to see Sergeant on their first contract, as as such, Squad Leader time. That is fine, we want more mature and experienced Marines anyway as part of FD 2030. What is totally possible and more realistic is becoming a Fire Team Leader on your first enlistment. I hope we consider developing an FMF Fire Team Leader Program to select good candidates and train them up to be Fire Team Leaders. This could start at the recruiter's office. Poolees must have a 90 GT Score, score well on a PFT graded to infantry standards, desire an 03XX contract that is not Recon, be a high school graduate, have no legal issues, and be willing to sign a 6 year infantry contract (since standard contracts are 5 years and a greater time commitment means said poolee has an extra year to learn, earn, and lead before deciding to stay or leave). Benefits include being able to choose between a "Rifleman Track", "Weapons Platoon Track", and "LAR Track" so that poolees have more control over what 03xx MOS they are assigned without totally leaving their mos assignment to chance, while allowing the USMC to better compete with the Army who does offer the exact (infantry) MOS their poolees want. Next, offer guaranteed PFC out of Boot Camp. This ensures potential candidates get paid more and can get started on the road to Corporal and a Fire Team Leader billet faster. Next, guaranteed Tuition Assistance (TA) once these Marines check into their first unit. No more waiting several years after hitting the fleet like some other Marines have had to do in the past. We want our Marines getting educated, staying in the infantry, and maybe even commissioning to become Infantry Officers. Next, ensure these Marines have a guaranteed seat at the PME and Advanced MOS Courses they need to get to a Fire Team Leader billet, so Lance Corporal Seminar, Corporal's Course, Tactical Small Unit Leader's Course (TSULC), and Advanced Infantryman's Course (AIC). This guarantees that the Marines we select to become fire team leaders are getting a solid foundation in ethics, leadership, and tactical training. Next, barring disciplinary action, Marines on this program should be promoted to the next rank as long as they are PME and Advanced MOS Course complete, as well as TIG eligible. This allows Marines to gain experience and be promoted once they have that experience without rushing the JEPES TIG requirements. Next, guarantee an opportunity to participate in at least the Division Rifle Squad Competition. There is a certain "wow" factor about this competition (and badge) that while great for the infantry may very well be a drawing factor for poolees that desire an infantry contract. Next, guarantee 1 seat at any USMC course (aside from BRC or MARSOC A&S) once a Marine has earned the rank of Corporal and passed AIC/ Weapons-MOS specific Advanced Courses as long as the Marine's parent unit has white space to let them go. Holding off til Advanced Course completion ensures the Marine not only gets the more important requirements done first, but also that they can be rewarded for all their hard work thus far. A joint school or course (ex Airborne) would be too much, but one USMC school seat (ex CQB School, Summer Mountain Leader, MCIWS, etc) is doable. Again, we want our Marines getting educated. Finally, guarantee at least 2 deployments with a strong possibility of 3 in 6 years. Poolees will be excited to see that they are going to deploy not once but multiple times (UDP, MEU, MRF, SPMAGTF, etc), and units gain experienced Marines. Notice how I never once mentioned cash bonuses or guaranteed duty stations? As a Marine is approaching the end of this 6 year contract, they would be a prime candidate for the FMF Squad Leader Program, so one leads into another. This FMF Fire Team Leader Development Program can be the vehicle that all but ensures we get good squad leaders.
When is IMC going to be extended to 18 weeks, and will they teach river crossings as part of the curriculum since we are amphibious infantry?
The "Arms Room Concept" from IBX 2030/ FD 2030 sounds awesome but it may be too difficult to pull off in all actuality. A better course of action may be to develop a Basic Mortarman's Course, a Basic Assaultman Course (MAAWS, Breaching, Demolitions), and a Basic Anti-Tank Missileman's Course in addition to our current Basic Machinegunner's Course. I think this would allow for Riflemen to gain more exposure to and proficiency with crew served weapons without deleting the in-house MOS continuity and depth of knowledge our Weapons Platoon Marines are known for.
We should consider creating 1 standardized infantry specific basic skills test for all 1000 and 2000 level individual infantry skills. Using the T&R as a framework, we can train and evaluate Infantrymen on skills that every 03 is supposed to know, from the newest Private to the Battalion Commander. Regardless of your rank, age, unit, or 03 MOS, there are certain skills everyone in the infantry needs to remember and demonstrate. Standardizing these informal train-ups means the usmc has a baseline skill floor to build off of after entry level training is complete. Marines could recertify every year, once as part of a pre-deploymemt workup, once when returning to the infantry from a non-infantry assignment like recruiting, and once when trying out for advanced 03xx courses. Nothing on this test should be a suprise, everything Marines will be tested on should be in the T&R and pubs for them to study ahead of time. Nothing on this test should require gear or equipment that causes the unit an undue logistical burden. There should be a week long max train up period and a week long max test out period, one after another with no break in between besides the weekend so that Marines can study and test in a timely manner. I beleive something like this will reduce friction from knowledge gaps created due to Marines EAS'ing,/PCS'ing as well as units simply not testing their Marines on these skills. Not everyone can be in a leadership billet, but everyone can demonstrate they are proficient in the basics as an infantryman.
The Marine Infantry squad must grow. Three fireteams of four Marines each. FT leader with one AR man and two riflemen all issued Bullet Trap Rifle Grenades.
One Asst Squad leader who is both the radioman and drone operator. One Navy Corpsman. Total of 15.