Tactical Deception: Breaking Away from Military Deception for Small Unit Leaders
By Maj Devin Fultz
“We did not adequately plan for [tactical] deception during the Exercise Force air assault,” anecdote from the Facilitated After Action Review hosted by MAGTF-Training Center (TC) during MAGTF Stand-In Force Exercise (SIFEX) 2024 at CATC-Fuji, Japan.
That statement is not unique to many training exercises at echelon, but one that is stated too often even though the Service has placed a renewed emphasis on Reconnaissance vs Counter-Reconnaissance (RxR) and the implementation of new technology down to the lowest levels as seen with the latest reorganization for 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines for IBEX 2030. MCDP 1-3 Tactics states, “Achieving surprise can greatly increase leverage. In fact, surprise can often prove decisive. We try to achieve surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity.” Surprise, specifically deception, is not just a hallmark of small unit tactics, but a must for consideration in planning for those that seek to fight and win on the battlefield. Additionally, too often do discussion on military deception and tactical deception rapidly elevate in classification beyond use for small unit leaders. The purpose of this article is to define military deception, provide small unit leaders a practical approach to tactical deception (TAC-D) as found in the recently publish FM 3-90, Tactics, by the U.S. Army, and provide a vignette in which small unit leaders can gain surprise and achieve an asymmetrical advantage on the battlefield.
Overview of Chapter 19 Tactical Deception, FM 3-90 Tactics
First, it is important to understand the difference between military deception and tactical deception. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Military deception is typically executed at the combatant command level and requires planning, approval, and execution to adhere to theater-level instructions and AR 525-21 (FM 3-90, Pg 19-1). Tactical deception on the other hand, is a friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction detrimental to their objectives. Tactical deception operations are designed to support the commander’s plan by enhancing the probability of mission success (FM 3-90, Pg 19-2). Tactical deception is not military deception on the tactical level, but unit level actions to gain space and time for decision making while disrupting the calculus for enemy commanders.
The principles of TAC-D are centralized planning and control, focus, integration, objective, security, and timing. Additionally, the FM 3-90 breaks out the Types of Tactical Deception and the Tactical Deception Means, but for application the focus is on the technical means that small unit leaders can implement today or at the next field exercise, TDG, or Kriegspiel. See Table 19-1. Sample deception techniques:
A quick example from this table is the overloading of enemy sensors as an effective and simple technique for companies and below. This can be used in the form of decoys or even the dispersal of units at a suspected enemy Named Area of Interest (NAI). It must be assumed that there is constant collections soak of an operating area, but the use of overloading the enemy sensors enables a unit to tip the hand of an enemy commander which could lead to the early employment of fires or disproportionate allocation of assets to validate an assumption. Again, the focus is on what friendly actions can occur in order to create ambiguity for the enemy.
Tactical Tasks
The two tactical tasks found in the FM 3-90 are feint and demonstrate. Feint is defined as a variation of tactical deception that makes contact solely to deceive the adversary as to the location, time of attack, or both (FM 3-90, Pg 19-7). The purpose of a feint is to lead the enemy into erroneous conclusions about friendly disposition. Forces conducting feints make direct fire contact with enemy forces and potentially decisively engage to draw resources from the enemy to enable the success of the friendly force’s main effort. It is not a one and done action, but may involve multiple actions to sell the desired effect and an understanding of the operational tempo of both friendly and enemy forces. Feints require detailed planning and should align with the actions of the main effort.
Demonstrate is a variation of tactical deception used as a show of force in an area where a unit does not seek a decision and attempts to mislead an adversary (FM 3-90, Pg 19-8). The purpose of a demonstration is similar to a feint but contact with the enemy is not intended. Forces conducting demonstrations make visual contact and attempt to lure the enemy forces into a course of action that is favorable to friendly lines of operations. The key disadvantage to a demonstration is that it is difficult at the tactical level to validate enemy force disposition without contact as well as the timing of a demonstration favors activities prior to sustained kinetic action during operations.
Vignettes from MAGTF SIFEX 24
MAGTF SIFEX 2024 served as a “proof of concept” to execute Service Level Training Exercises (SLTE) in the First Island Chain (FIC) that was supported by Global Fleet Support from MAGTF-TC. Over the course of eight days, units from 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Air Wing, 3d Marine Logistics Group, and III MEF Information Group (MIG), conducted force-on-force training in a field exercise environment throughout the Northern Fuji Maneuver Area (NFMA) and Eastern Fuji Maneuver Area (EFMA) that focused on RxR, counter air assault, and counter mechanized operations. The Adversary Force, led by Company E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, employed suppressing signatures, radio silence and communication windows, to enable their scout teams to conduct counter air assault operations as well as coordinate fires on key Exercise Force command and control nodes. It was real-world application of those techniques found in the FM 3-90 that had decisive effects as three battalion and larger command and control nodes were shaped off the battlefield over the course of the exercise.
The Exercise Force also had a vote in the employment of TAC-D. Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, employed amplifying signatures, to make a force appear larger and more capable or to simulate the deployment of critical capabilities, to position a platoon and two tactical vehicles to replicate a company sized force around suspected landing zones to counter an air assault. These small forces that mirrored larger capabilities changed the Adversary Force Commander’s decision-making that resulted in the selection of tertiary landing zones for an adversary air assault. The amplification of both physical and electronic signatures created a surface that was in reality a gap to subsequently increase the distance in which the adversary forces had to assault to seize their primary objectives.
Conclusion
Many aspects of military deception like Special Technical Operations (STO) are critical to higher echelons and will remain vital to execute the Single Battle Concept. At lower levels, however, the increased use of TAC-D can provide small unit leaders tangible benefits to friendly forces while disrupting the decision-making cycle of the enemy. MCDP 1 reminds us that Sun Tzu stated, "All war is based on deception." Deception is critical to small unit leaders and the tools found on Table 19-1 of the FM 3-90 will enable the use of tactical deception in everyday application. The choice to implement TAC-D is a decision that all unit leaders must understand and be willing to place in their tactical plans: it cannot wait for the next hotwash or after action!
Major Devin Fultz is currently the Future Operations Officer, 4th Marine Regiment, Okinawa, Japan. He can be reached at devin.fultz@usmc.mil.