Tales from the MRF Part II: Lessons Learned from Live Fire Company Movement to Contact
by Major Zach Schwartz
In July 2022, 3/7 executed live fire company supported movement to contact (OPERATION HINDER STONE) through the outback of Mount Bundey, Australia. I had the opportunity to observe Blade Company Commanders and their teams as they tackled this challenging training event. As I recounted for our platoon attacks, here are some of my observations and lessons we all learned from our time in the bush.
Scenario Synopsis
Our scenario was rooted in a running narrative throughout the MRF-D deployment. For our company attacks: a threat Charlie modeled force, the 13th Mechanized Infantry Battalion, reduced (MIB), is consolidating within Mont Bundey Training Area (MBTA) after a contested amphibious landing. They are using the complex terrain of MBTA to expand their foothold and enable the arrival of follow-on forces.
The attrited 13th MIB consists of two reduced mechanized companies, a reduced platoon of self- propelled artillery, electronic attack (jamming) capability, and counterbattery radar (shaped off by battalion/regiment upon company commander identification and request). There is also a suspected enemy light attack helicopter section (Z-10) and limited air assault capability located at a local airfield (OBJ NICKELBACK). One of the MIB companies is tasked to GUARD the MIB Western flank IOT enable the MIB to strengthen their foothold on MBTA. The guard company is split between two platoon (-) battle positions. These BPs, OBJECTIVE STEEL and OBJECTIVE CHROME, each consist of multiple concealed infantry fighting positions and 1-2 ZBD-05s. The objectives are densely vegetated and located on rocky hills with a limited anti-vehicle wire obstacles located in low ground between the BPs. The enemy MIB can reinforce his companies with 4x ZBDs and two reduced platoons from IVO OBJECTIVE CREED.
3/7 is conducting a battalion attack to DESTROY the enemy in MBTA IOT prevent the MIB from retaining a foothold in the AO. The EXFOR company is SE1, they are tasked to SEIZE OBJECTIVEs STEEL and CHROME IOT allow the ME (two notional companies) to SEIZE OBJECTIVE CREED. Upon CREED seized, the battalion commander plans to exploit success to SEIZE OBJECTIVE NICKELBACK (the airfield).
The EXFOR company has an engineer squad attached, two LAAD firing teams D/S, 1x81mm mortar section D/S, 1x155mm platoon D/S, One CAAT platoon (JLTV/HMMWV: capable of employing MK19, JAVELIN, M2, SABER) D/S, and PUMA D/S.
We wanted to challenge the company commanders with two separate objectives while giving them the opportunity to take STEEL and CHROME either simultaneously or sequentially. Upon seizing their objectives, EXFOR would be forced to establish a hasty defense ready to support the passage of the ME to seize OBJECTIVE CREED.
From the TAA to OBJECTIVE STEEL was about a 4.5 KM movement through hills covered by rough semi-jungle vegetation interspersed by savannah like grassy low ground. OBJECTIVE CHROME was offset to the Northwest by about 2 KM. The enemy had an LP/OP on some high ground 2 KM North of the TAA. The movement was designed to be physically challenging while also allowing our company commanders to flex formations, rotation criteria, and security posture.
Observations/Best Practices
Targetry: MBTA does not offer reactive targetry and the existing targetry is unwieldy and difficult to relocate. Our Gunner, Jeremy Ludwig, came up with three different targets for our attacks. One was a welded ZBD target for our vehicles, missiles, and rockets to engage. Gunner Ludwig asked the LCE to cut some 1⁄2 inch steel frames into the rough outline of armored vehicles. The LCE welded two frames together with steel pipe to form a passable vehicle flank target. We made these targets small enough to be transported onto the objectives strapped to UTVs and JLTVs. Personnel targets were echo silhouettes on hinged wooden frames. They were supported by flimsy wooden stakes designed to give-way after getting shot up. Finally, bunkers were represented by pallets. Looking back, the steel targets worked great, bunkers were fine, and the silhouettes weren’t super. The silhouettes didn’t fall down reliably to small arms but were often completely blown away by indirect fire. This meant we had to get aggressive with “paints” rather than allowing Marines to just go off their visible effects on these echoes.
Red Cell: Like platoon attacks (see CxFile Episode 20), we had our red cell on the objectives for dry runs. This team, led by Blade 2, provided insights into the enemy decision-making cycle based off the EXFOR’s actions during the dry run. Red Cell enabled us to provide EXFOR commanders with specific feedback on when their companies were compromised. This also enabled the EXCON to provide appropriate “paints” such as the arrival of reinforcements or the launching of enemy aircraft. Red cell had live UAS to simulate enemy drones as well as an EW team sourced from 5th Marines. These EW Marines actively searched for EXFOR with direction finding equipment. They also actively opposed EXFOR with jamming. This was a huge sustain and allowed us to challenge our EXFOR in the electromagnetic spectrum.
JLTV/HUMVEE Durability: CAAT and 81s were mounted in a combination of HMMWV and JLTVs. Though capable on unimproved roads, both platforms struggled off road. While we had anticipated they would be limited in the rocky, vegetated, high ground, we were all surprised when they routinely failed to traverse low black-soil flood plains. The biggest offender was tires. Almost every run saw the destruction of at least one JLTV or HMMWV tire. Some runs saw as many as three or four tires ripped to shreds, usually by sharp rocks or erosion sharpened, fire blackened, tree stumps. Vehicle scouts were critical in proofing routes for the trucks. But they couldn’t catch everything. Close in vegetation punished vehicle paneling and ripped off side mirrors at an alarming rate. During one attack, CAAT couldn’t even make it to OBJECTIVE CHROME due to blown tires.
UTV employment: In a complete 180 from their heavy brethren, UTVs performed exceptionally. These little vics were workhorses. They served as gunny vics, CASEVAC platforms, and target haulers. Every single one we had made it through the entire exercise. Going forward, I would look to employ them in hauling heavy weapons and missiles. Though not as durable as JLTVs under fire, they could be dismounted in defilade from the enemy, enabling the crew to man-handle whatever weapon into its firing position.
Early FiST/81s insertion: Companies gained a huge advantage by inserting their FiSTs forward and early by stealth. The FiSTs were dropped off by CAAT vehicles, hiking into an identified OP. From there, they would set up to observe and execute the fire support plan. FiSTs had time to identify objectives they could not fully observe and to utilize UAS to cover down on dead space. 81s also “gained a march” by occupying their MFP by stealth the night before the attack. The 81s section conducted a tactical convoy, concealed their MFP, and set their own security.
UAS employment for fires: UAS proved excellent for observing fires. Due to the craggy and broken terrain, UAS (PUMA in particular) was often the best bet for observing the objectives.
Movement formations: Each of the companies executed sequential flank attacks for their form of maneuver. They used a North-South running ridge to bypass prepared enemy engagement areas oriented Southeast (STEEL) and Southwest (CHROME). Each company used an approach march formation with CAAT conducting a SCREEN or GUARD on the West side of the column. This formation worked well for control in the rough terrain. The companies all struggled to keep proper space between platoons and squads. Marines tended to clump together, particularly when they were tired. Leaders had to supervise this spacing and ensure proper security posture. Though each company utilized flankers and an advanced guard squad, Marines still struggled to locate the enemy LP/OP during their approach march. Each company used bounding overwatch to some degree, though not as much as they should have particularly in the crossing of several sizable valleys.
Internal re-trans: One company anticipated communication issues and developed a novel solution. The company headquarters had a foot mobile re-trans team with several radios and antennas. When comm was spotty, these Marines pushed out to higher terrain and conducted re-trans for the company commander.
Attack considerations in vegetated, compartmentalized terrain: These were some of the best lessons learned. Attacks were planned with clear SBF positions and textbook ~90 degree offset for maneuver. Reality in the “bush” was far different. Due to the severely reduced visibility, most engagements happened at 50m to 150m. The advance guard would typically initiate SBF at this close range while the main body would kick out to their briefed assault position. Unfortunately, this often took far too long. The main body frequently got delayed or lost searching for the assault position in the dense brush. Meanwhile, SBF is eating through ammunition in a close-range gunfight with a prepared defensive position. Not the ideal situation! What our commanders found worked best:
The approach march cuts IDF as they approach the objective without stopping.
The advance guard, with machineguns right behind, uses scouts ranging a terrain feature ahead to ID the enemy position.
These scouts pull the advance guard and machineguns into the SBF hot position.
The main body maintains a physical/visual connecting file with the advance guard.
Once suppression is effective, main body is vectored into an action left or right. They attack off of the SBF’s “shoulder,” maintaining that connecting file.
This cuts machineguns quickly but maximizes control, shock, and tempo.
Rear guard platoon remains in reserve, reinforces maneuver, reinforces SBF, or exploits success.
For our attacks, the rear-guard platoon typically spearheaded the movement to CHROME while STEEL was still being reduced. All platoons are armed with ample rockets to deal with any armor that may be on the objective.
CAAT as a “pull” asset in close terrain: As the companies assaulted the objectives, it was important not to let CAAT get ahead. The vehicles hit hard but are vulnerable to infantry in the complex terrain. Best practice was to have CAAT hold at a phase line 200-300m away from the objectives. As the companies assault the objective, CAAT is called up to reduce hardened positions, enemy vehicles, and counterattack forces. During one attack, CAAT was forced to bulldog against a prepared position without infantry support. They would have likely been destroyed.
Human factors on OBJECTIVE CHROME: OBJECTIVE CHROME was another 2km from OBJECTIVE STEEL. The forces sent to seize CHROME were typically “feeling it” as they closed. Temperatures were hot and humidity was high. The attack on CHROME demanded a lot from leaders who needed to rapidly brief and violently execute a plan that had likely changed several times. Friction took a toll as the “easy became difficult.” Hand and arm signals gave way to frustrated yelling and tired Marines often looked for the easiest routes to the objective, not necessarily the most covered or concealed. This was a great lesson, particularly for platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders: keeping the team together in the face of physical/mental hardship. Skills that were at a premium: verbal orders fluency, camouflage, simple plans with adequate suppression and anti-armor considerations built in.
Rapid transition to a defense: Upon seizing both objectives, the companies had to rapidly form a defense and prepare to pass forward the rest of the battalion. Leaders had to supervise the emplacement of crew served weapons including JAVELIN and machineguns. This also included LAAD teams. Each company commander had to establish LAAD to defeat enemy light attack aircraft. Camouflage on the objectives was typically good, though CASEVAC and resupply UTVs often stood out. Marines tackled this by hacking down low tree limbs and disguising the vehicles with the boughs.
This was a great training event for our battalion. The learning was eye-opening. Any fight in even a semi-jungle environment will be very different from the range 400 runs we were used to aboard MCAGCC. But after executing OPERATION HINDER STONE, the Blade is now more ready to ruthlessly fight combined arms maneuver warfare in “any clime and place.” NO SHIT.
This article is just a brief look at this training event. As always: please don’t hesitate to reach out for more information, products, or support.
Major Schwartz is currently the OPSO at 3/7. He can be reached at zschwartz2012@gmail.com.