Tales from the MRF Part III: PREDATOR’S RUN
By Major Zach Schwartz
This is the third in a series. Please see Part I and Part II to get caught up.
In August 2022, 3/7 participated in EXERCISE PREDATOR’S RUN as part of our deployment to MRF-D. This Australian Defence Force (ADF) exercise was approximately three weeks long and conducted in the littoral zones around Darwin, Australia, and Mount Bundey Training Area, Northern Territory (MBTA). The first nine days of PRED RUN consisted of a large-scale force on force. The last half of the exercise was a series of live fire rotations within MBTA. Since we were so close to redeployment, 3/7 only had time to participate in the force on force. This ended up being some of the best training we got to take part in during the deployment and gave us a rep at battalion reinforced warfighting in the complex terrain of MBTA.
As in Parts I and II, I will give a brief overview of the exercise, major events, and then go into lessons learned
General situation: The overall situation for PRED RUN involved an amphibious landing to retake key maritime terrain from an increasingly hostile threat C enemy. 3/7 (Rein) was attached to 1 Brigade ADF as Battle Group Blade (BG BLADE). Our adjacent maneuver units were 1st Armored Regiment (BG LION), 1st Combat Engineer Regiment (BG GOANNA) with an attached Filipino infantry company as well as a Malaysian Special Forces platoon, 5th Battalion Royal Australian Rifle Regiment (5 RAR, motorized infantry, BG TIGER), and 7th Battalion Royal Australian Rifle Regiment (7 RAR, mechanized infantry, BG BOAR). Each of these maneuver elements was at about battalion reduced size. Support units included 8/12 Regiment (two batteries tubed artillery), 1st Combat Signals Regiment (CSR), and 1st Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB). BG BLADE consisted of 3/7 minus one rifle company (India was conducting a concurrent exercise), I battery 3/11, a SIGINT team, CLC B from CLB 5, and a team of ADF communicators from 1 CSR. We retained two CAAT platoons vice anti-armor/heavy guns and had three sniper teams. Air support was going to be limited to non-existent outside of SUAS and occasional notional sorties for both sides.
The exercise began with maritime shaping operations around the port of Darwin. Small boat detachments from 5 RAR and Regional Force Security Group (RFSG) seized the inlets around Darwin, enabling the offload of notional amphibious shipping within the port. All BGs had to simulate embarkation and debarkation aboard an established staging area in MBTA. During the planning, it was revealed that the L-Class ship transporting BG BOAR had been torpedoed by a threat C submarine. This surprise forced the brigade to modify plans extensively and set up BG BOAR to become our ADFOR (the original adfor was supposed to be a mix of reservists and Aussie TTECG type enablers but it was the Brigadier’s plan all along to make 7RAR the bad guys).
Orientation: MBTA (Bundy Island in the friendly country of Belasia) was split into four AOs. The Western AO belonged to BG LION and was good armor country with open plains and a N to S running road. The Center AO belonged to BLADE and was densely vegetated, rough terrain, with intermittent savannah-like plains and steep rocky hills. There was one high speed avenue of approach: RTE CANBERRA, an unimproved gravel road running N to S on the Eastern side of the AO. Center AO was bounded to the west by significant rocky terrain impassable to vehicles except for a few marshy passes. Center AO had a major cross compartmental danger area radiating south from a range complex denoted as OBJ BLUETONGUE. The Eastern AO belonged to BG TIGER and was also heavily vegetated though flatter than Center. It was cut through by several black soil plains and bounded on the East by another unimproved road. Finally, the Northern AO capped the three AOs and was the smallest in area. AO North controlled entry into the other AOs and harbored a critical airfield (OBJ ANACONDA). AO North belonged to BG GOANNA before being turned over to 1 CSSB. At the far south end of the AO was an urban training facility the size of a small town denoted as OBJ DRAGON.
Map: PRED RUN as it played out.
Enemy Situation: 7 RAR’s (Now threat C Olvanian 841 Amphib BDE) assessed mission was to DELAY friendly forces in zone IOT enable the landing of follow-on enemy forces. We expected him to focus on the high-speed avenues of approach in AO WEST and AO CENTER while only contesting AO EAST with security forces as an economy of force measure. We anticipated 7 RAR would contest OBJ ANACONDA and OBJ BLUETONGUE aggressively with fires and maneuver forces before withdrawing by platoon-squad bounds to a series of prepared battle positions in depth from N to S in the AO. We expected 7RAR to similarly contest AO WEST, with their battle positions anchored primarily on the rocky ridge running through the AO. The enemy main battle positions were expected to be IVO OBJ DRAGON. 7 RAR was known to be aggressive and we were conscious of the fact that they probably were maintaining a healthy reserve and would be probing for gaps and seeking opportunities to mass and counterattack at battalion(+) strength. 7 RAR was known to have limited cannon artillery and mortars as well as limited SUAS.
Friendly Situation:
MISSION, 1 BRIGADE: Ctg 598.2.1 (1 BDE) DEFEATS 841 AMPHIB BDE (7RAR) ON BUNDY (MBTA) AND MELVILLE ISLANDS NLT D+15 IOT DENY OLVANIAN REINFORCEMENT.
ME, BG LION, NLT 27 AUGUST, CLEAR TAOR ORME (AO WEST) OF BUNDY ISLAND, IOT DENY OLVANIAN REINFORCEMENT, IOT TRANSITION AO TO BELASIAN ARMED FORCES.
SE2, BG TIGER, NLT 27 AUGUST, CLEAR TAOR FREWEN (AO EAST) OF BUNDY ISLAND, IOT DENY OLVANIAN REINFORCEMENT IOT TRANSITION AO TO BELASIAN ARMED FORCES.
SE3, BG GOANNA, NLT 23 AUGUST, SECURE OBJ ANACONDA IN TAOR COLLIGBURN (AO NORTH) OF BUNDY ISLAND, IOT FACILITATE CTG 598.2.1 ACTIONS ON BUNDY ISLAND IOT TRANSITION AO TO BELASIAN ARMED FORCES.
SE4, BSG SUSTAIN AND SUPPORT FORCE PORJECTION OF CTG 598.2.1, IOT IOT TRANSITION BUNDY ISLAND TO BELASIAN ARMED FORCES.
MISSION, BG BLADE: NLT 27 AUG, BG BLADE, SE1, CLEARS TAOR MOLAN (AO CENTER) OF BUNDY ISLAND IOT SUPPORT BDE ME. BPT BECOME THE BDE ME, CROSS ATTACH BG BLADE UNITS, O/O TRANSITION AO TO BELASIAN ARMED FORCES.
Execution: The plan was for BG GOANNA, heavily reinforced with multiple units, to secure OBJ ANACONDA and AO NORTH. Prior to GOANNA conducting their attack, Brigade would soak the AO with multiple recon assets including our scout snipers. GOANNA’s attack would set conditions for the other BGs to FPOL into their respective AOs. From there, each BG would clear south in their AOs. 1 Brigade would control the rate of advance through a series of “report lines” (similar to phase lines), detaching and attaching units between the BGs to reduce enemy strongpoints and exploit opportunities. Upon identification of the enemy’s main defensive positions, 1 BDE would coordinate a brigade level attack to destroy them. Simple enough right?
The battle for BG BLADE played out in four main phases summarized below
Day 1-2
-FPOL to OBJ BLUETONGUE: GOANNA encountered a mech platoon(+) on ANACONDA and cleared the objective in the first few hours. They signaled that they were ready for the FPOL and passed BLADE forward (after we “disembarked from shipping”) on the evening of day 1. BLUETONGUE was seized in a night attack by LIMA (SE1) company with no resistance encountered. KILO (ME) passed around LIMA and linked up with CAAT RED (D/S Kilo) on RTE CANBERRA during that same night. KRAKEN (81s) set up in position to provide support to both rifle companies. BLADE MAIN established on BLUETONGUE with CLC B whose trucks were critical in transporting KILO into their AO. I Battery was firecapped to the north to support the assault into the AO. SNIPERS were chopped back to BLADE. During the night at least one enemy cache site IVO BLUETONGUE was located and destroyed. The enemy was expected to be operating in small recon teams and did not make contact.
Days 2-7
-The Clear South: By midnight on day 2, KILO and LIMA were abreast and clearing south in the AO. CAAT RED remained D/S to KILO on RTE CANBERRA. CAAT WHITE and a motorized platoon from LIMA were in reserve. Thus, began about five days of constant contact as the companies cleared south. The companies mostly cleared in a series of platoon bounds and squad patrols. They were in almost constant contact with squad to platoon sized elements of 7RAR. Dismounted 7RAR soldiers would probe for gaps between the companies night and day. The reserve had to be deployed several times to DESTROY/BLOCK dismounted and mechanized penetrations. BLADE FORWARD bounded forward to C2 the advance. It soon became evident that the bulk of 7RAR’s combat power was pressing against BLADE. A minimal enemy force was delaying LION across the open ground in AO WEST and TIGER was in the process of attempting to bypass the enemy security forces in AO EAST in a wide sweeping run down EAST’S MSR.
Days 2-8
-Gunfight on RTE CANBERRA: As BLADE compressed the enemy south, 7RAR continued to seek opportunities to break out and penetrate into 1 BRIGADE’s rear area IVO the airfield. Most of these attempts were oriented on RTE CANBERRA. As CAAT RED and KILO cleared south, CAAT RED engaged in a game of ambush/counter ambush with 7RAR’s mechanized infantry. RTE CANBERRA remained highly contested up until the last day of PRED RUN. RED and KILO gradually wrested control of CANBERRA from 7RAR, though small teams of dismounted ADFOR would remain a threat until ENDEX.
Day 8-9
-Encirclement and Final Assault: By day 8, the enemy had been forced into the rocky terrain just north of OBJ DRAGON in what was a perimeter of company(+) strongpoints. TIGER was threatening his east flank and rear. BLADE had him fixed from the front. LION attempted to deliver the coup de grace with a west to east attack. They were repulsed but managed to draw the enemy’s attention. 1 BDE rapidly chopped a tank company(-) to BLADE and we launched a dawn attack against the main enemy position, OBJ MELBOURNE, with I battery supporting the closure. LIMA and 2xtanks supported by fire as KILO and 3x by tanks penetrated and cleared the enemy position from east to west. As the infantry completed the final closure, the attached tanks linked up with CAAT RED and WHITE as well as a motorized platoon from KILO to exploit south and cut off the enemy’s withdrawal before he could reach the urban terrain in OBJ DRAGON. This TF linked up with TIGER as “white flags” was called.
Lessons Learned
-The FPOL struggle: We knew the initial FPOL with BG GOANNA had the potential to be difficult. We were linking up with a foreign force in fading daylight and then passing forward into an immediate night attack against a likely enemy position. Our two FPOL lanes were divided across BG GOANNA’s AO. The bulk of the battalion was set to pass through a 5RAR recon company that was attached to BG GOANNA. CAAT RED was set to pass through a 1 ARMORED tank platoon also attached to BG GOANNA but separated from the rest of BLADE by at least 12 km. Upon the bulk of the battalion arriving at the contact point, our ADF guide was nowhere to be found. CAAT WHITE was deployed as our security force as we called out to the stationary unit. After about 15 minutes, we made physical linkup with 5RAR and CAAT WHITE led BG BLADE through the FPOL lane as the sun began to set. LIMA was next in line and dismounted from 1CSSB transports before the Passage Point and Handover Line (HOL). This was the attack position for their clearance of OBJ BLUETONGUE. Once the bulk of our combat power and a C2 node were over the HOL, we radioed 5RAR to complete the hand over. They never responded and likely broke down once LIMA company deployed.
Plan the FPOL in nauseating detail. Ensure this plan includes decisionmakers from the stationary and moving unit. 5RAR planners were never available for the FPOL plan and we mostly dealt with BG GOANNA staff. This likely led to the stationary unit not knowing the full plan.
Rehearse the FPOL in nauseating detail. Though BG BLADE rehearsed extensively, we never managed a joint rehearsal with the actual stationary unit. Utilize the actual signal plan!
Plan and discuss contingencies with all players. Stationary unit doesn’t show? How long do you wait? Be prepared to turn your FPOL into a defense or offensive operation when the stationary unit gets held up, destroyed, is a no show.
-Mobility and composition of the reserve: Our AO was over 150 sq miles of rough semi-jungle terrain with minimal trafficable roads. We were minus one rifle company. To complete our mission, our line companies were stretched thin. We devoted CAAT RED to the RTE CANBERRA axis. That left CAAT WHITE as the bulk of our reserve. We took a platoon of LIMA, mounted them in 7 tons, and made them the rest of the reserve. This ended up being sufficient to block gaps (extremely important due to how thin/porous our lines were) and reinforce the companies, but insufficient to effectively exploit breakthroughs, facilitate penetration, enable us to really trap the enemy.
-LP/OPs for security on C2 nodes: Units conducting an MWX can sometimes get away with having minimal security at their C2 nodes. The battlespace is vast and open enough that close range infiltration attacks against HQs is less likely. This is not the case in the heavily vegetated and complex terrain of Mount Bundey. The battalion forward utilized 3-4 two man LP/OPs and roving patrols to hold security around the forward. These elements paid off at least once when they spooked a likely enemy patrol into diverting away from our position.
Plan for the security of HQs. This includes sigman and a security element. A basic security force should be able to provide enough warning for the C2 node to breakdown and relocate.
-Anti Armor munitions/tactics: The adversary was a mechanized force. His .50 CAL armed M113 APCs were extremely reliable in the rough terrain of MBTA. Each enemy section (ADF for squad) typically travelled close to their M113. Our rifle companies planned for at least one AT4 or LAAW in each Marine rifle squad. We further bolstered the line companies with javelin teams from weapons company. Even with these considerations, our anti-armor assets would have likely been used up rapidly! Contact was typically initiated as 1) a close range meeting engagement between dismounted infantry within 20-200m with the M113 rumbling up to support the dismounts 2) An anti-armor ambush with Marines getting the drop on an M113 and enemy infantry with the M113 given away by its audible signature 3) dismounted infantry getting the drop on Marines with the M113 coming up to exploit the ambush.
Ensure Marines understand what rates a missile, what rates a rocket, what rates a 40mm what rates a .50 CAL. This calculus will be critical in preserving limited DODICs.
Understand the vulnerable points of enemy armored vehicles to inform shot placement.
Fighting a mechanized adversary? Plan for more anti-armor munitions than you are currently budgeting.
Ruthlessly train teams, squads, and platoons to the hasty anti-armor ambush. Train point Marines and scouts to detect enemy ambushes. Train to breaking ambushes and winning chance contact at close range.
-Daily SITREP: Battalion pushed out a daily sitrep to all BG BLADE callsigns in an evening window. This SITREP was pushed as a chat transmission and included: enemy situation update, friendly situation update, update to fires, and any updates to mission, CONOPs, or tasking. The companies then had a window to reply with acknowledgement, questions, or concerns. This SITREP proved useful in maintaining a common operation picture across the BG and for increasing coordination for all hands.
-Incorporating heavy armor: One of the best parts of PRED RUN was the opportunity to train with ADF M1 Abrams tanks. For the final attack, 1 BDE attached a reduced company (platoon reinforced with a company commander) of 5xtanks to BG BLADE. Myself, the S6, and leaders from KILO and LIMA hiked to a night link up with the tanks the evening before the attack. We conducted rapid planning together before laying the tanks into a laager site. The tanks linked up with our companies in the dawn of the attack and moved with the rifle companies into the assault. Some thoughts:
ADF was confident fighting split section. We had 3x tanks with the ME (assault company), 2x tanks with the SE (SBF company).
ADF tanks utilize a “grunt phone” for enabling infantry to talk to the tank crew. Identical to the grunt phone on US tanks.
ADF tanks were surprisingly mobile in the rough terrain. They routinely pushed down trees and smashed through thick underbrush.
Though we had a VHF coordination net with the tanks, LIMA company placed a liaison officer from the company FiST into their tank section to provide redundant comm. This helped with coordination and provided a comm backstop.
In complex terrain, lead with infantry and pull tanks forward! Reference TALES FROM THE MRF PART II.
For a battalion level attack, a battalion level decision maker should meet with the tanks and incorporate them into the SOM. Even if the plan is just about done, you need to make sure the plan makes sense to the tankers and incorporates their input. They know their capes and lims! The brief to the tankers should sound a lot like an oporder: situation, mission, CONOPs, tasks, coord instructions. Bring along a solid S6 rep to ensure everyone can talk and make sure you brief the signal plan.
For laagering up, the tanks will require at least a 1km square hide site. Be prepared to cut them this area as well as routes into and out of the laager site.
If the tanks are attached to you: their supporters, fuel, and ammo are now your problem! Our 5 tanks had at least a platoon of maintainer M113s and M88 wreckers in tow. We had to account for these vehicles. On top of that, our meager fuel reserves were not adequate for keeping the tanks around for more than 24 hours! We would have needed to pull brigade support to keep them fueled for another day of action. Anticipate 2x refuels a day when working with tanks.
-Attempts to trap the enemy, the breakthrough: One of our biggest challenges was trapping the enemy. More specifically: As we cleared south, the enemy was pushed back but could always flee south. The challenge was preventing his withdrawal, trapping him, and destroying him. Our rifle companies achieved this on a micro tactical level when they successfully ambushed or cut off small squad to platoon sized elements in daily gunfights. This was harder to achieve on the battalion level due to 1) how difficult the terrain was for rapid movement 2) adjacent units that could potentially foul geometries for enveloping units 3) our lack of a third rifle company. We tried several options to trap the enemy. Two of the most notable are recounted below.
Sniper envelopment, not successful- BG BLADE inserted two sniper teams behind the enemy FLOT by UTV and foot movement. To facilitate this, rifle companies conducted offensive operations and aggressively flew UAS in an attempt to capture the adfor’s attention. The sniper teams were intended to detect the enemy as he retrograded south, calling for fire as the adfor repositioned. One team did not manage to detect any significant enemy forces. The other was within range of the enemy battalion commander when their UTV broke down and had to be abandoned. The team was destroyed in a running gun battle as they attempted to recover the vehicle. A KILO platoon sent to facilitate their escape and evasion/recover their remains found no trace of the team (they had already gone to “zombie FOB”). I think with more teams inserted this could have been successful. Maybe even a job for a few squads of capable riflemen?
Motor/Armor Penetration and exploitation, semi-successful- Leading up to the final attack against the enemy, BG BLADE finally got bolstered with some more maneuver in the 5xADF tanks. The tanks supported the attack and once the infantry was reducing the enemy defense (clearing inside of grenade range), the tanks broke contact and linked up with CAAT RED+WHITE and a motorized reserve platoon from KILO company. This motor/armor task force “TASK FORCE PINK” exploited south down RTE CANBERRA. They established a blocking position behind the likely enemy avenue of retreat and seized key terrain overlooking the urban complex where the enemy was expected to withdraw to. The exercise was “white-flags” shortly after they got in position. Had the enemy been allowed to play through their withdrawal, I think “TASK FORCE PINK” would have been in a good position to destroy him.
-Company level reconnaissance: Our most effective reconnaissance asset as we closed in on the enemy’s final defensive positions was aggressive patrolling and SUAS employment by the rifle companies. These patrols continually updated the enemy situation and had the added benefit of killing enemy troops and misleading him to the direction of our attack to clear his defensive position.
-Team planning: Before the final attack, we took the time to go through deliberate tac planning with the company commanders. They traveled by UTV and linked up at the forward to build the plan for the final attack with me. This enhanced everyone’s understanding and buy in for the attack and allowed us to ROC through the SOM. I would recommend this team planning when time, resources, allow. Particularly for critical and/or high-risk events.
-Lost medical training opportunity- At the conclusion of the final attack, BG BLADE had sustained approximately thirty cherry-pickers. BAS was staged ready to receive these Marines. We worked a CASEVAC plan to pull the cherry-pickers out by seven-ton. Due to a miscommunication, the rifle companies thought whiteflags had been called early and did not execute the evacuation of these cherry-pickers. BAS missed out on a challenging training opportunity.
By hook or crook: run the mass cas. These reps are too few and far between to be missed. Even if it prolongs the scenario, do not skimp on training your BAS for realistic contingencies.
-Company logistics: each company had a UTV. These were crucial for company logistics. The little vehicles made multiple trips daily to resupply their companies and pull out cherry-pickers/real world casualties. CLC and BLADE 4 did an excellent job establishing link up points for UTVs to draw supplies from MTVRs, JLTVs, and HMMWVs. The vehicles would link up, exchange supplies/personnel, and then rapidly disperse to prevent targeting. Looking back, our company commanders would have preferred to have two UTVs vice one.
-Types of contact: Most contacts with the enemy became immediate, messy, gunfights when there were often other options. Varsity level squads and platoons that detected the enemy while remaining hidden through good field skills realized and exploited more options other than yelling “contact front.” Some units launched UAS, stalked the enemy back to their vehicle, or called for fire. ADRP 3-90 describes 8 types of contact: visual; direct fire; indirect fire; obstacles; aircraft; CBRN; electronic; non-hostile. According to FM 3-21.10 there are four steps upon contact: deploy and report; evaluate and develop the situation; choose a course of action; execute selected course of action. Though you must maintain contact THE MOST DECISIVE course of action may not be opening fire immediately! Train small units to exploit contact in creative ways that best enable decisive results! I believe that this is a hallmark of elite infantry units.
-Battalion level decisions: Most of our battalion level decisions revolved around
enabling c2 through bounding HQs and retrains sites, daily sitreps, orders.
employing, reconstituting, and shifting the reserve.
controlling and allocating battalion assets to place the enemy in combined arms dilemmas.
thinking ahead and planning the next two critical events.
This article ended up spilling over our typical size more than an extra hefty BCP Marine spilling out of that tape measure. That being said, I still had to make significant cuts! If there are details you want to know or any other resources I can provide to help you and your team, don’t hesitate to reach out! PRED RUN was a great rep for 3/7. Our team learned a ton and hopefully yours will too.
Maj Schwartz is formerly the OPSO for 3/7. He can be reached at zschwartz2012@gmail.com
Tales From the MRF Part II: Company Attacks
Tales From the MRF Part I: Platoon Attacks