The Death of Small Unit Tactics
by Capt Ethan Fromm
Throughout planning and execution of MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX) 3-21, aboard Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) Twentynine Palms, CA, I served as the company commander for India Company, V37. For context, I was a member of the Adversary Force (Adfor) (7th Marine Regiment) opposing the Exercise Force (Exfor) (1st Marine Division, V15, V25, and V28). The exercise force was tasked to seize two out of three urban centers (R220, R215, and R210) and establish significant combat power (a battalion) beyond the 78 easting. The Adfor was tasked to prevent that from occurring for a period of 5-days until we could be “reinforced” by a notional brigade-sized element.
The purpose of this article is not to recount the execution of MWX 3-21 in its entirety. I also want to keep the conversation from devolving into a fruitless discussion centered on how as leaders we have no authority over, policies we cannot realistically alter, or technology we have no means of acquiring should change, be altered, or developed.
This article is written specifically for this audience: the small-unit leaders of the Marine Corps. My purpose is to refocus us on positive changes that we can actually affect. Throughout planning, execution, and the after-action of MWX 3-21 we (and I include myself in this) are consistently asking, pleading really, for others to provide us with what we need so that we can accomplish our designated tasks. The “others” I refer to in the previous sentence typically being higher (Bn, Reg, Div). If and/or when that support is denied, we suddenly perceive ourselves as less capable or incapable of accomplishing our task.
It is this mentality that will keep us and our Marines perpetually attached to the umbilical cord of higher level command and inevitably lead to a higher level of centralization in an organization that desperately needs to decentralize. In essence MWX 3-21 served as evidence that our respective commands, from the battalion to division level, do not trust us enough to employ decentralized, mission-based, command and control.
While we could easily spend our time pointing out how, doctrinally speaking, our respective higher-levels of command are inherently flawed and misguided, let us first ask ourselves the hard question of whether or not we are the inherent problem. Trust is earned by “demonstrating competence, a sense of responsibility, loyalty and self-discipline” (MCDP 6, 3-10). Have we done that? Or, rather, do we assume that our rank and position alone should have earned the trust of our leaders?
Regardless of your answer to the above question we must realize further the “the command-and-control process must be self-starting at every level of command as all commanders within their own spheres act upon the need for action rather than only orders from above” (MCDP 6, 3-7), and that our opportunities to demonstrate competence, responsibility, loyalty and self-discipline are fleeting. If we fail to take advantage of these opportunities, we will have been complicit in the death of small unit tactics and maneuver in the United States Marine Corps.
So what can we affect?
The answer to this question is simple and is a phrase we have all heard a nauseating amount of times. Be brilliant in the basics. While I am sure that statement elicits an appropriate amount of eye rolls ask yourself, really ask yourself if your company is truly exceptional in basic marksmanship on a platoon attack range. My company is not, in fact they are very far from it and there a multitude of other examples I could run through where my company specifically is not brilliant in the basics and how that alone should diminish the amount of trust my battalion commander has in me and my company.
That being said, the true reason we should strive to be brilliant in the basics, in addition to fostering a relationship of trust and confidence with our commanders, is so that we can apply the basics to form unique solutions to dynamic, unfamiliar, and uncomfortable circumstances.
Within the construct of MWX 3-21, the opportunity to employ this concept that was most clear for me was with V15’s integration of tracks in their mechanized assault of R220 on D+4 of the exercise. For context I was, at that point, tasked with retaining R220 with C Company 1/25 and the Alpha Command for V37 who controlled all the air and fire support brought to bear on V15’s approach.
What Happened
From my perspective, what happened when V15 rolled through the Quackenbush two companies strong with what was assessed to be 40 tracked vehicles was exactly what you probably expected would happen to a mechanized unit not yet used to moving independently without tanks as security. Every tracked vehicle was neatly stacked on MSR Boston (directly center V37 EA) where they were engaged by indirect fire, rotary winged aircraft and fixed wing aircraft All but one company (reduced) were destroyed.
V15 MSR Boston North to South Movement to R220
The purpose of the above paragraph is not to rub salt in the wounds of V15 or to suggest that V37, would have approached this problem any differently had we been on the offense. In fact, V37 did attack R220 in an identical manner with identical results the week prior as part of the Adversary Force Exercise (AFX) Battalion Assault lane. Rather, it is to provide you with an example of something we as leaders can positively influence on our level.
Mechanized Infantry Movements Throughout the Battlespace
Throughout the 5-day exercise mechanized or motorized movements of infantry at the company level and above, on the red and blue side, resembled the example shown above. As in the example above most if not all were targeted and were destroyed, neutralized, disrupted, interdicted etc. In short, no motorized or mechanized force above the platoon level was able to move without being molested by their respective adversary.
Within V37 Lima Company was the battalion’s mechanized reserve and counterattack force and was ambushed or engaged with direct or indirect fire every time V37 attempted to employ it. As a result, Lima Company sustained heavy casualties and was never able to decisively enter the fight.
Within R220 I was closely nested with V37’s fires node and can say with certainty that V37 rarely targeted mechanized or motorized infantry below the platoon level (4 tracks or less) due to our strict adherence to our high payoff target list. At one point we went so far as to not engage two AAVs until they were within our defensive line as our indirect fire and air assets were prosecuting targets of higher value somewhere else in the battlespace.
In summary, the Adfor was reluctant to target distributed enemy mechanized, motorized, or dismounted assets that were lower on the high payoff target list. However, most if not all mechanized and/or motorized units moved in massed formations to traverse the battlespace.
The Problem
For the Exfor the problem was clear: How do I move rapidly through the open desert while preserving my combat power to my objective area? The default solution in all of our minds here is clear: cover my movements with fires. The unfortunate reality is that we are training against a peer adversary capable of eliminating our indirect fire support before I reach the objective. Therefore, our artillery must move every time it fires or, if it doesn’t, it will likely be eliminated. Thus, the effects of our artillery support may be inadequate or non-existent.
The most common answer to this next problem from both red and blue was “we will not move unless we have air superiority,” which is all well and good until you are operating in contested airspace. By waiting for air dominance, we allow the enemy to fortify his position or maneuver unmolested for an undetermined amount of time. Even when we have achieved air superiority: who is to say the air fight won’t shift mid-movement and expose a maneuver force on their approach?
Both of the above example “solutions” are centered on answering the “what can higher give me to solve my problem.” The unfortunate truth for most of us is this is the point where we say “fuck it. Let’s just get to the objective as fast as possible and when we die, they will see that they should have listened to me and supported me in the way that I told them to.” If you read that and are appalled that anyone could ever think like that, I agree with you that it is disappointing, but you have clearly never participated in an MWX.
The Solution is in the Basics
As problem solvers in the Marine Corps we should be capable of rapidly identifying potential issues we will run into prior to crossing the line of departure. With the case of integration with tracks in MWX, for example, we know we will be confronted with the following issues:
The tracks that will be attached to me will be attached to me very late. Likely 24 hours prior to execution.
AAVs historically train to standard under limited guidance driven by one publication (Employment of AAVs MCTP 3-10C) and supplemented only by a brief excerpt of one other (Convoy Operations MCWP 4-11.3F) which is outdated.
MCTP 3-10C openly states that, in order to effectively employ AAVs in the offense, “infantry, tanks, and AAVs must work together in pursuit of a common goal” (MCTP 3-10C. 4-12) and generally accepts that AAVs are at least partially tank reliant across the spectrum of their tactics. MCWP 4-11.3F, in addition to being outdated, defines the purpose of mechanized vehicle movements as “relocation, with the primary consideration being rapid movement of units” (MCWP 4-11.3F) which overly simplifies their role in a contested environment.
Tanks, which AAVs have consistently relied upon for security for the past 20 years, are no longer in the Marine Corps.
We are currently training in, and will likely one day operate in, a contested environment where our AAVs will be easily targetable and not easily supported externally.
So how do we, small unit leaders of the Marine Corps, use what is organic and attached to us to accomplish our mission? This is not a question I claim to know the answer to as I did not have tracks attached to me in the offense to test any theory I might have had. That being said what follows is (in my opinion) a viable course of action rooted in the most basic of infantry tactics that could be applied to answer the above question.
While it is difficult or even impossible to move large mechanized units rapidly through the open desert undetected, patrolling and infiltration tactics remain a viable option.
“A patrol is a detachment of ground forces sent out by a larger unit for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, or security mission.” (RP0501)
“Infiltration is a maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires. Infiltration is also a tactical march technique used within a friendly territory to move forces in small groups at extended or irregular intervals.” (FM 3-90)
The key to this theory is that we must accept that in in a peer-on-peer conflict we often will not be capable of avoiding detection. We can, however, acknowledge that our enemy will be similarly limited in their ability to mass indirect fires or close air support on targets at will and that they will be equally reluctant to expose their assets to ours for anything less than a high value target. The enemy will likely seek to put us in a position where we must choose to sacrifice security for speed, causing us to mass in areas where we are easily targeted and destroyed. The question then is not how do we avoid detection but rather how do we remain below the engagement criteria threshold or low on the high value target list set by the enemy while maintaining our ability to conduct offensive operations against the enemy?
From the Adfor perspective, a mechanized Marine rifle squad reinforced, a historically lethal maneuver unit, was very low on our high value target list throughout the duration of MWX. It is entirely possible that had the Exfor elected to steadily piecemeal forces into position one or two tracks at a time, rather than attempt to perfectly time movements with air superiority windows (which are unrealistic as it is) and move rapidly as a massed whole, they would have made it to their respective assault positions relatively whole and capable of accomplishing their assigned task. Furthermore, if the Adfor did begin to target mechanized squads upon discovering the Exfor’s end game, their battery would have likely been identified and destroyed and their aircraft would have been incapable of inflicting a decisive blow.
What this requires is fundamentally sound squad leaders and above who are brilliant in every aspect of offensive operations as defined by MCWP-3-11.2 (Marine Rifle Squad), Chapter 4, and MCWP 3-11.3 (scouting and patrolling), chapter 11. It also requires commanders that are equally brilliant in the basic employment of small units, capable of communicating and integrating with attachments to effectively execute basic forms of maneuver and infantry small unit tactics in conjunction with tracks.
To reiterate, I am not presenting the above course of action as a proven solution. What I am doing is providing an example as to how basic small unit tactics could be applied to solve complex problem sets.
The Marine Corps Solution
It should also be noted that the issues associated with employing AAVs on land, specifically in a desert environment, were identified by small unit leaders in 2001 when AAVs were predominantly viewed as fulfilling the same function as 7-tons at a faster rate with improved armor (MCWP 4-11.3F. 2-2). The Marine Corps heard these complaints and determined the institutional solution to employing AAVs on land was to doctrinally bind them to tanks as we can easily see throughout MCTP 3-10C. Years later the Marine Corps, addressing other institutional necessities, eliminated tanks from the Marine Corps arsenal.
The new institutional solution to answering the “how do we effectively employ mechanized infantry in a contested environment” problem is ongoing. The implementation of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), coupled with a more infantry-centric mission and doctrine, is a step in the right direction.
“The ACV will provide protected mobility and general support lift to the infantry. The ACV possesses the requisite water and land mobility necessary to enable ship-to-objective surface maneuver. The ACV mitigates gaps in capability by providing improved infantry support by fire against mounted and dismounted threats, effective protected mobility, and increased survivability from blasts, fragmentation, and kinetic energy threats” (MCRP 3-10C.1).” So, the issue is not that the Marine Corps as an institution doesn’t listen to us when we bitch moan and complain. The issue is that the institution, bound by economic and political bureaucracy, is understandably and painfully slow to adapt, which is where we come in.
Conclusion
Small unit tactics within the Marine Corps will prosper or die as a result of our actions or inactions. We can be content with our own ability to identify a problem, voice it as a problem to the powers that be and wait for them to eventually come up with a solution that will probably come down too little or too late. Or, we can “seek and rapidly exploit fleeting opportunities, possible only through low-level initiative,” (MCDP 6. 3-7) to decide how to apply small unit solutions to complex problems, then act.
If you take the time to review MCRP 3-10C.1, the Marine Corps solution to mechanized infantry tactics is to simply apply basic infantry tactics to a vehicle. It should be professionally embarrassing to everyone in this audience that a problem, identified in 2001, has a solution rooted in the most basic fundamentals of what we do as the small unit leaders of the Marine Corps.
The root problem is we have become so focused on what actions are occurring three levels up that we have neglected to manage three levels down. As a result, we as a service are far from brilliant in the basic fundamentals of small unit tactics and are therefore unable to readily apply them to complex problems. Consequently, we seek support or solutions from an agency outside of our own which encourages greater centralization across the service.
It is highly likely that many of you do not fall in this category and consistently do the right things. All I ask is that we all take a truly introspective look at ourselves, honestly evaluate the basic proficiency of our respective units, and determine whether or not we as a community of company-level leadership are “ready to quickly adapt to the situation as it develops” (MCWP 3-11.3 11-10). I would argue that across the service, we are not. As a result, we are complicit in the death of small unit tactics.
Captain Fromm is the former CO of India, V37. He can be reached at ethan.fromm@usmc.mil