The Greatest Economy of Force Asset
by Lieutenant Brad Galbraith
MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations describes Economy of Force as “the reciprocal of the principle of mass, economy of force allocates minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. The commander allocates the minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts, requiring the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority at the decisive time and location with the main effort. Devoting means to unnecessary efforts or excessive means to necessary secondary efforts violates the principles of mass and objective. Economy of force measures are achieved through limited attacks, defense, deceptions, or delaying actions.”
I would imagine that almost every reader at this point is not incredibly amused by a First Lieutenant copying and pasting the definition of economy of force. However, a clear understanding of this principle is critical to my argument that the Scout Sniper team is a commander’s greatest economy of force asset. Per our doctrine: economy of force is when a “commander allocates the minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts . . . to achieve superiority at the decisive time and location with the main effort.” Within the construct of the current infantry battalion, there is no individual unit that requires fewer individuals than a Scout Sniper Team. These small, high endurance, resource efficient teams execute “secondary efforts” (Read as “supporting efforts” or “shaping operations”) such as gathering intelligence and utilizing indirect fire assets to assist in “deceptions” and “delaying actions,” enabling a commander to mass the bulk of his/her combat power for the main effort.
All of the shaping operations our sniper platoons achieve: intelligence gathering, shaping fires on an objective, delaying fires, the occasional well placed round in the frontal lobe of an enemy leader; all come at no expense to a main effort company commander’s attack on an objective. Because the sniper platoon is providing these things to him, he now does not have to commit some of his own limited resources, and most likely some of his best Marines, to solve a problem. Marine Corps infantry battalions are more than capable of walking and chewing gum at the same time, that is to say, we can trust Scout Snipers to go forward deeper into the battlespace to
collect, releasing company commanders to leverage highly trained infantry squads in their local area to provide organic intelligence and effects through patrolling. We should not allow ourselves to think that the advancement and evolution of Scout Sniper platoons as an intelligence asset and enhancing the capability of our infantry formations are incompatible vectors.
Additionally, the claim that a Scout Sniper platoon’s ability to report, function autonomously, and shape a battlespace for a Battalion Commander is limited, is not true. Even in my limited time serving with a Scout Sniper Platoon, I have observed some pretty remarkable events in exercises we have conducted. During MAGTF Warfighting Exercise 3-22 aboard MCAGCC, a Scout Sniper Team consisting of seven individuals, loaded down with over a week’s worth of personal sustainment and radio equipment, was able to occupy a tactically advantageous position overlooking a suspected adversary avenue of approach. Over the course of the next week, while maintaining regular reporting with High Frequency (HF) assets, that Scout Sniper Team was able to continuously repel the advance of a numerically superior enemy force through indirect fires, all while not requiring a single resupply. This team demonstrated just how impactful an economy of force asset Scout Snipers are, particularly when executing “secondary efforts” such as area reconnaissance and observation of “delaying” fires. The results were so noticeable that the 1st Marine Division Commanding General awarded that team leader with a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal for his actions.
During Exercise Steel Knight 22, I got the chance to see a Scout Sniper Team ‘s abilities stretched beyond the confines of a single training installation (even one as big as MCAGCC). One of my Scout Sniper Teams was sent to Fort Hunter Liggett in the early stages of the exercise to identify the terrain and enemy situation on and around an air strip aboard the base. Fort Hunter Liggett Army Reserve is about a two hour drive south of San Francisco, and over 600 miles away from Twentynine Palms, CA. Armed with highly skilled Marines and HF communications equipment, those Marines were not only able to report back to the rest of the battalion still aboard MCAGCC, they were able to take a panoramic picture and send it back via tactical communications over 600 miles away in order to inform battalion operations to occupy the airfield.
These stories are not recounted to boast, they are put here to inform. Ask around the Marine Corps and you will soon find the overwhelming majority of Scout Sniper Platoons are capable of operations like this, enabling commanders to sense and make sense of the battlespace and helping them to preserve precious combat power for decisive operations.
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EABO
In 2019 General Berger released his planning guidance, which largely emphasized a shift away from the wars fought in the Middle East and a return to the Marine Corps’ amphibious roots. Specifically, the Commandant said “success will be defined in terms of finding the smallest, lowest signature options that yield the maximum operational utility. We must always be mindful of the ratio of operational contribution to employment cost.” He also calls for “a force composed of highly capable tactical units that can perform combined arms operations.”
General Berger’s comments sound a lot like a returned emphasis on economy of force. Specifically, the comments sound a lot like a Scout Sniper Platoon and the training they undergo at the Scout Sniper Basic Course. This may be the writer’s bias talking, but Scout Snipers are trained to perform exactly what the commandant calls for; operating in 4-8 person low- signature teams that can thrive in adverse conditions and terrain for extended periods of time. A typical planning consideration for the time snipers can be employed is 2-7 days, and they yield maximum operational utility relative to other infantry Marines within a rifle battalion. If you think a Scout Sniper Platoon is limited by the amount of school trained Scout Snipers within the platoon, or that they are not performing well in an area, then GREAT! It is important that we as a Marine Corps continue to observe the areas where dedicated Reconnaissance and Surveillance assets fall short and ruthlessly improve them just like we would identify and improve shortfalls in any other formation. Improvement needs to start with the training individuals receive at the lowest levels. If we recognize that Marines are not up to the standard that is expected of them tactically, let’s work to get them there; if we don’t have enough school trained Snipers, let’s find a way to make more. Either way the answer should not be the elimination of a crucial asset within our infantry battalions.
On the topic of precision fires: it is true that new optics and weapons make it possible for an infantry Marine to hit targets out to 600 meters, or roughly 656 yards. I would argue that sustained accuracy at this range is possible, yet not likely for most of our infantry Marines. The Annual Rifle Qualification (ARQ) that was adopted in 2021 made a lot of necessary changes in training and evaluating combat marksmanship, but the furthest Marines are even expected to shoot through that entire course of fire is 500 yards. I personally think it is safe to say we have seen and are going to see pretty realistic figures about how many infantry Marines are reliably hitting out to 500 yards and how accurate we really are at this distance.
This is not to say that we as a Marine Corps are on the wrong path or that we should not sincerely hope that every Marine Infantryman becomes as lethal as humanly possible. Instead we should continue to foster training from the bottom up that allows them to flourish. The combat marksmanship training that Marines are now being introduced to in entry level settings is a step in the right direction. With that being said, the Marine Corps should be incredibly reluctant to eliminate Scout Sniper Platoons under the guise that highly trained infantry squads with new weapons and drones can take the place of school trained Scout Sniper formations. The fact remains that you cannot mass produce quality with purchasing power, and that commanders will almost always want the ability to employ more organic intelligence assets to inform their decisions on the battlefield.
HISTORY AS A GUIDE
Historically, conventional R&S assets have been similarly employed. These formations are typically given a specific area, terrain feature, and/or task to shape their plan off of. Whether it was Marine Scout Snipers, Australian or British SAS, Rhodesian Light Infantry trackers, or a number of other famed reconnaissance groups, units took this information and executed based on their commander’s intent. Although each had a different way of achieving their assigned task and purpose, the general concepts behind the reconnaissance remained. In his book The Mission, The Men, and Me this is what former Delta Force commander, LtCol Pete Blaber calls “developing the situation.” He argues that commanders cannot begin to effectively plan in unknown environments without dedicated forward reconnaissance assets effectively developing the situation for them with accurate and timely intelligence. This involves not tying teams to a specific scheme of maneuver, but rather giving them a well thought out end state and allowing them to rapidly employ and emplace to “develop the situation” for the commander.
Finally, it is important to always note the psychological factors that Scout Snipers can uniquely influence in the mind of an enemy commander far beyond friendly lines. This is an often intangible but very real factor that is seldom mentioned. I would suspect it remains seldom mentioned because of the difficulty in quantifying it. Not only do Scout Snipers possess the ability to decimate the enemy's ranks, but the sniper's effect on enemy morale and psychology cannot be understated. When the enemy must adjust their plan due to the actions of a sniper team, we have not only delayed them through the complication of their decision making cycle, but we have also bought supported units time to potentially exploit the adversary’s indecision. Leaders can seize this advantage through the planning of disruption missions spearheaded by sniper units.
It is best to leave Scout Sniper Teams at the infantry battalion. Judging the capabilities and limitations of Scout Sniper Platoons based on previous experiences is a slippery slope when assessing combat readiness. This is a pitfall that we all must avoid. As we look forward to the next fight, and how Scout Sniper Platoons can best be employed to allow highly skilled infantry Marines to close on an objective, start by asking platoons to provide a realistic assessment of their own capabilities. We must continue to identify weaknesses and improve upon them, not eliminate Scout Sniper Platoons and what they provide. Again, leaving Scout Sniper Platoons at the battalion level is the right balance between decentralization and ensuring Scout Snipers have the support and structure they need to best enable decisive effects on the battlefield.
Lt Brad Galbraith is the scout sniper platoon commander at 3/7. He can be reached at bcdg50@gmail.com.