Through the Goggles: LAR’s push to Shape the FEBA with FPVs (Part II)
LtCol John Dick
This article continues the conversation on frontline experiences and the broader implications of integrating First-Person View (FPV) drones into the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and Ground Combat Element (GCE). Drawing from lessons in acquisition, training, and sustainment, I examine how these eight-inch drones could reshape our approach to reconnaissance, convoy operations, and close combat. More importantly, I offer recommendations across procurement and training, which I hope will be helpful across the DOTMLPF spectrum—Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities—to institutionalize FPV capabilities as enduring warfighting tools.
As of 9 July, the battalion has received six Neros Archer variants and ten Archer Strike variants. An additional fifty Noa Poncho systems are en route, while payloads and simulation equipment remain in procurement. I initially believed this article would be easy to write, but the complexity of the underlying systems—and my own ignorance of them—made it far more challenging.
And Then the Game Changed
On 10 July 2025, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth issued a directive titled “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance”, declaring small, attritable unmanned systems as “the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation.” This memo swept away legacy acquisition barriers, empowering tactical units to rapidly procure, field, and experiment with low-cost drone platforms without traditional bureaucratic drag. It requires each Service to establish experimental drone-equipped formations by FY26, prioritizes Indo-Pacific deployment, and reclassifies small drones as expendable munitions rather than enduring capital equipment.
For the GCE, this represents a strategic inflection point. Units across infantry, reconnaissance, artillery, and logistics now have top-level endorsement to rapidly adopt FPV drones—compressing kill chains, decentralizing strike capabilities, and bringing persistent ISR to the squad level. Yet, this acceleration also exposes vulnerabilities: electromagnetic fragility, training shortfalls, lack of sustainment infrastructure, and the absence of formal certification standards. The burden now falls to HQMC—to harden platforms, build resilient communications, and embed drone training into the MAGTF’s individual and collective training pipelines.
As of 11 July, 3d LAR certified twelve Marines as FPV operators through a Neros-led Mobile Training Team (MTT), paid out-of-pocket, and executed in accordance with current Marine Corps policy. Each Marine received over eight hours of classroom instruction, eight hours of simulator-based training, and two hours of live flight—totaling over eighteen hours per operator. The MTT provided critical insight and validated the need for a four-Marine team construct: navigator/team leader, operator, payload specialist/ammunition tech, and assistant team leader/directional antennae operator. Despite harsh desert conditions, the team learned through failure, validated the Hotel variant’s resilience, and surfaced integration issues already being addressed by Neros engineers. Marines gave real-time feedback that directly shaped product improvements—a rare and commendable example of bottom-up innovation meeting responsive industry support.
A key finding was that the Hotel variant proved more durable than the Strike variant, as the bottom-mounted Electronic Safe and Arm Detonation Device (ESAD) on the Strike variant frequently sustained damage upon landing. Incorporating a landing pad or attaching flotation tubes to the underside of the drone could mitigate this issue by absorbing impact and reducing breakage. Moreover, the training reinforced key sustainment considerations, such as battery management, ground control system heat mitigation, and safe transport of lithium-ion cells. The positive collaboration between Marines and the Neros team during the MTT not only built operator confidence, but also accelerated the refinement of tactical employment standards, hardware reliability, and training best practices that will inform future doctrine. As a first step in formalizing FPV munition capability at the battalion level, this training marked a critical milestone.
From Scratch
Since February 2025, 3d LAR has executed three FPV training ranges and one live-fire demonstration with the Neros Archer. In the demonstration aboard MCAGCC’s Range 110, Marines launched one-way munitions against simulated dismounts and armored targets, validating their ability to extend lethal reach at minimal cost. These “flying robot bombs,” each costing just a few thousand dollars, can strike targets up to 20 kilometers away for a fraction of the price of conventional munitions.
This capability enables organic LAR platoons to find, fix, and finish targets, both directly and remotely, without risking Marine lives in direct or exposed indirect engagements.
It’s Not About Money… But It’s Also About Money
After months of experimentation, several truths emerged. FPV drones offer agility, speed, and surprise unmatched by legacy reconnaissance tools. We flew drones through windows, down ravines, and over company assembly areas—providing instant overwatch, terrain reconnaissance, and threat confirmation without risking exposure. These are true force multipliers. FPV drones are a cost-effective, scalable weapon that delivers “squad-level lethality up to 20 kilometers for under $5,000”. Let's break down the numbers.
For example, a single FPV drone (turned into a munition) system may require procurement of a drone ($2,300), a battery ($325), a long-range ground signal extender—recommended but not required—($7,600), non-kinetic inert payloads ($2,400), a control module ($1,800), and a warhead ($1,600), totaling approximately $16,000 per system. With vendor-certified training, expect at least $20,000 per qualified operator. Even so, this remains cost-effective.
Compared to traditional precision-guided munitions, FPV drone systems offer a remarkably low-cost alternative. For instance, loitering munitions like the Switchblade 300 are often cited at $60,000–$80,000 per unit, though contract-level pricing frequently approaches $100,000–$120,000. The cost of a Switchblade 600 remains undisclosed, but open-source estimates range from $200,000 to as high as $2 million. Similarly, a single Javelin anti-tank missile costs approximately $176,000. The Multi-Role Anti-Armor/Anti-Personnel Weapon System (MAAWS) launcher costs around $20,000, with individual rounds ranging from $500 to $3,000 depending on type. Even at the Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS) School at the School of Infantry – East (SOI-E), a $150,000 SkyRaider has been used to deliver Mjolnir munitions—roughly the size of a soda can—highlighting the high procurement costs of legacy Group 2 systems.
FPVs are unmatched for cost-effective attritable strike, especially for OWAM applications—wide saturation of the battlespace with low-cost munitions that force adversary overcommitment of high-end defenses.
Switchblades and Hero-series drones offer precision, but their cost limits scalability in attrition warfare.
Dropper drones fill a niche for reusability and improvisation but lack precision.
Rockets remain reliable but increasingly outclassed by maneuverable FPV and loitering drones/munitions in complex environments.
FPV drones offer the GCE scalable, attritable, and lethal tools for under $20K per system—capable of saturating the battlespace, disrupting enemy planning, and extending the MAGTF’s strike reach.
Pick Your Poison: GCPC or DLA
Innovation at the battalion level rarely starts with a program of record. It starts in a motor pool, a range brief, or a commander’s question: “How do we do more with less?” We began with six unused Neros drones acquired via 1st Marine Division, I MEF, and MCWL. They were free—and they worked. But the real challenge was the procurement maze that followed.
As a battalion commander, I assumed fiscal and audit risk when using Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds, traditionally set aside for sustaining the material readiness of a LAR Battalion (heavy junk unit), to procure cost-effective commercial FPV drones. This decision, while operationally sound, fell into a bureaucratic gray zone. Friends and peers in DC Programs & Resources told me plainly, buying drones is wrong because there are programs of record that already exist. The issue isn’t legality—it’s culture.
O&M funds can support training and readiness initiatives. However, units risk being seen as stepping outside the lines if PoRs exist. We framed our training as TADSS (training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations) and authorized field experimentation. Proper documentation, alignment with mission-essential tasks, and coordination with comptrollers transform this from a process foul into a doctrinally consistent adaptation to operational need.
The broader Department of Defense invests around 2–3% of its total budget ($100–120 billion annually) into Science and Technology (S&T) and Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E). Congressional intent is clear: this funding should support warfighter relevance, inter-Service collaboration, and operational transition-ability. Yet, our battalion spent just over that threshold on FPVs this year—not on science experiments, but on tools that made us faster, more survivable, and deadlier in simulated engagements. This isn’t S&T, it’s readiness. For other Marine units, from Battalions to Regiments, my recommendation is simple, have Supply Officers and Comptrollers in the room when formulating the budget outlay for FPV drones.
But innovation isn’t just about money. It’s about patience, supervision, and procedural endurance.
DLA: Buy the Whole Package
Take the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) process. What looks like a simple purchase from a vendor is actually a multi-stage operation involving urgency classification, interdepartmental purchase requests (MIPRs), bid analysis, contracting officer validation, FOPOC (Finance Office Point of Contact) submissions, and extensive timelines—followed by manufacturing, shipping, and final receipt. Each of these steps introduces delays measured in weeks, not days. FPVs require an information technology waiver to procure, which will be discussed in a following section. You’ll likely hit approval bottlenecks, personnel wait times (one of one person is on leave), and requests for more information, which could and most likely take weeks to months.
GCPC: One Time Buys or MTT
If DLA is slow, the Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) process can be outright exasperating. Designed for quick buys under $10,000, GCPC was never intended to support iterative, multi-component systems like FPVs. Budget ceilings are hard caps. Purchases must match narrow mission codes, funding objects, and program manager approvals. After our battalion retrained three supply Marines and one officer—taking over two months to reestablish card user permissions—we were still waiting 45 days for payload casing approvals, hamstrung by bureaucratic overhead and Regional Contracting Office (RCO) bandwidth. Direct supervision from my Battalion Executive Officer was required. I engaged the G8 and I MEF Comptroller directly. It still took months.
All of this underlines a sobering truth: modern innovation at the tactical edge requires kneecap-to-kneecap supervision, aggressive coordination, and operational patience. You have to build relationships with contracting officers. You must constantly check timelines. You must push paperwork forward every day or risk a stalled effort. And still, you will be questioned. Good luck!
1. DLA-Managed Supply Chain Constraints
Waive-itis for IT/property-on-site: To deploy digital platforms like FPVs and the simulation equipment, users often need IT or classified equipment processed through DLA. Approval requires deep coordination with Division G6, I MEF G6, DLA personnel security offices and sponsor-program agreement. When I engaged at the onset, we saw timelines shrink to five days. However, the IT waiver process can delay for weeks or months for equipment to even arrive on base.
Unanticipated audit demands: DLA contract vehicles often require extensive documentation, ranging from NACI adjudications to data center diagrams—for items perceived as low risk. This ripples delayed fielding even for non-SCI systems, at odds with the rapid cadence required by operational experimentation.
2. Government Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) Limitations
People: GCPC has been DOGE’D! By direction, the total number of authorized users of the Card was reduced by 50 percent. The process requires approval through Division to MEF.
Successive thresholds: The spending ceiling limits are real and require consideration. A GCPC, usually capped at $10K–$25K per purchase, is insufficient for emerging technologies—like FPV systems, as they are typically for one time purchases. We used GCPC for payload casings and training. Each purchase took over 45 days from initiation to approval.
IT Waivers & ITPRAS Requirements for FPV Drone Procurement
The Department of the Navy and Marine Corps tightly manage the Information Technology Procurement Request Approval System (ITPRAS) to ensure accountability and interoperability when acquiring any IT-related systems. Initially defined in MARADMIN 375/11, the scope of ITPRAS was expanded in MARADMIN 453/21 to specifically include procurement of commercial cloud services, interfaces with Marine Corps systems, IT architecture, and transformative business process technologies, broadly capturing devices as seemingly innocuous as FPV ground stations or mission laptops when linked to Marine C4 networks.
Further, for any Blue UAS system—such as FPV drones on the DIU-approved list—the requirement is crystal clear in MARADMIN 398/24: an approved ITPRAS submission is mandatory prior to purchase. The end user must provide evidence of compliance, including possessing reciprocity for the specific UAS, and must be a certified SUAS operator (e.g., MOS 7316) if flying Group 2 systems unsupported by tethering.
On the hardware side, Marine Corps policy governing computers and mission support systems—derived from MARADMIN 397/14 and outlined in MCBUL 5234—establishes approved operating systems and hardware acquisition pathways (e.g., via the Marine Corps Common Hardware Suite). Any deviation from enterprise standards (such as acquiring ruggedized Ground Control System laptops or custom Mini-PCs) requires explicit approval from the Marine Corps Authorizing Official, supported by waiver coordination with the local ISSM and MCEN AO.
*The Mini-PC requires ITPRAS waiver and approval (ours is still being processed). The PC is not on MCEN and does not require internet to use. Marines can check-out over the weekend and get logged simulation time.
In practice, this means battalion-level efforts to field FPV drone kits must navigate:
ITPRAS Submission: Each request must define cloud services (e.g., encrypted live video), data interfaces with Marine C2 networks, or architectural integration points.
Blue UAS Compliance: Proof of ATO reciprocity, MOS qualification, and inclusion on the DIU Blue UAS list.
IT Hardware Waiver: If the ground station deviates from approved OS or form factors, a waiver from MCEN AO via ISSM is required.
Patience and Compliance: These steps introduce friction—delays in approval, classification scrutiny, and rigorous documentation—but are essential for legal compliance and cyber hygiene.
Understanding this process is vital. While bureaucratic, these requirements—if anticipated and managed—enable lawful experimentation and scalable FPV integration, rather than ad hoc workarounds. With well-prepared ITPRAS packages and waiver coordination, innovation at the tactical edge can proceed in full compliance and with institutional support.
Range Control, Approval Process, & Safety Framework
To conduct Group 1 operations aboard Marine Corps ranges, units must adhere to a layered set of requirements outlined in NAVMC 3500.107 (UAS T&R Manual), MCO 3500.109A (Range Safety), and relevant Range Control Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Group 1 UAS—including inert and ISR-configured FPV drones like the Neros Archer or Skydio X2, may be operated for training purposes within a restricted airspace under the supervision of a certified UAS Range Safety Officer (RSO). Approval from the Installation Range Control Officer is required via a UAS range request package that includes airworthiness documentation, a flight safety worksheet, proof of operator certification or training intent, and communication protocols.
A Limited Range Safety Release (LRSR) is required for live-fire ranges. The LRSR is episodic and every range requires a new approved document. The LRSR is the mechanism and protocols implemented to ensure safety within a designated operational area or "range" for activities that involve potential hazards, like ballistic projectiles, explosives, or hazardous materials. It involves a controlled release or execution of these activities within predetermined boundaries to protect personnel, property, and the environment. Required documents include:
ARCHER HOTEL User manual, Neros Technologies, Rev 1
Wind / Weather Limitations Specification, from NEROS Engineering.
Launch Surface Danger Zone, Neros Archer
Flight Profile Danger Zone, Neros Archer
Operator's Manual Terminus-LV (SDED LV), March 2025, Rev. A
TERMINUS-LV EOD PROCEDURES (NEROS ARCHER STRIKE VERSION)
Target Location Surface Danger Zone, Neros Archer with Terminus-LV
Unit CONOPs with ORMW
Safety of Use Memorandum 8-16, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Use Within Installation Ranges and Training Areas
MCSCO 9300.1, Marine Corps Systems Command Implementation of the Naval Lithium Battery Safety Program, 20 Oct 16
Range Safety Responsibilities and procedures provide a doctrinal and regulatory foundation for unit-level execution of such training aboard military installations. The regulation establishes that all live-fire training events must be governed by an approved Range Safety Plan (RSP), which includes a detailed risk assessment, identification of surface danger zones (SDZs), range use overlays, and hazard mitigation protocols. Crucially, Section 3 and Appendix C outline the requirement for UAS, including FPV drones, to comply with Department of Defense (DoD) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airspace coordination procedures, particularly in cases involving group 1 and group 2 UAS platforms.
Units intending to conduct FPV live-fire must submit a complete RSP package to the Range Control authority no later than 45 days prior to execution. This submission must specify the nature of the drone payload (e.g., inert, training munitions, or live), flight profiles, operator certification, link frequencies, and battery safety handling procedures. The unit must also request a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) through the base airspace manager if the operational area intersects with controlled or shared airspace. Safety measures must include designated observer roles, emergency abort protocols, and fail-safe procedures for link loss, as highlighted in the document’s unmanned system risk matrix.
Moreover, the regulation supports innovation by not explicitly prohibiting experimental or non-program-of-record drone systems, as long as all hazards are addressed and mitigated through approved risk assessments and real-time supervision by qualified Range Safety Officers (RSOs). This regulatory flexibility aligns with emerging Marine Corps experimentation efforts and provides a legitimate pathway for FPV drone employment in a live-fire context—particularly when conducted under the auspices of TADSS as outlined in supporting MARADMINS and FPV pilot initiatives.
The good news is that both training and live-fire demonstrations have already been successfully conducted aboard MCB Quantico, MCAGCC, and Camp Lejeune (we’re still waiting on Camp Pendleton). All required documentation is available, and depending on the selected warhead, units can begin the range approval process without having to build it entirely from scratch.
Externally, 3d LAR coordinated with base Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (1st CEB) through feasibility of support requests. These requests enabled EOD (required to utilize high hazard impact areas) to clear the impact area and emplace targets, and Engineers to support the explosive loading and arming of the drone. Additionally, 1st CEB provided a Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) to serve as an Assistant Range Safety Officer (ARSO). Notably, 3d LAR maintains a standing Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 1st CEB, formalizing the attachment of engineer reconnaissance teams to LAR companies for Unit Deployment Program (UDP) rotations. We are currently in the process of modifying that MOA to incorporate demolition support requirements for FPV employment.
The Operational Risk Assessment Matrix (ORAM) identified and mitigated key hazards including electromagnetic interference, hard landing risks, loss of link, and lithium battery-related incidents. It ensured that each phase of operations—setup, launch, flight, and recovery, was assessed for procedural vulnerabilities, with corresponding severity ratings and mitigation controls applied prior to execution. This disciplined risk management framework safeguards Marines, protects range infrastructure, and fosters institutional confidence in the employment of emerging unmanned systems. Of note, the LRSR and ORAW were processed more rapidly than any other component of the approval process, due in large part to the fact that their requirements are well-defined and procedurally established—yet the process still required the full 45 days.
Conclusion
LAR FPV experiments proved the concept – small drones can dramatically enhance reconnaissance and lethality, but also exposed plenty of growing pains. The challenge now is turning these hard-won insights into lasting capability. The Marine Corps must address the institutional frictions (in training, acquisition, doctrine, etc.) that currently force units to hack the system to use drones. Fortunately, the Secretary of Defense has made that much easier in the coming months.
What’s Next
From 14–18 July, I will attend the MCTOG Armed Drone Pamphlet Writing Symposium, which will provide guidance on many of the challenges outlined above.
In parallel, I am actively exploring the role of FPV drones in counter-reconnaissance operations. I have submitted a proposal—currently under review by the Service Level Training Exercise (SLTE) staff—to integrate a small Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) command and control (C2) node with three armed drone teams into MAGTF Warfighting Exercise (MWX) 4-25. The concept of employment is to support a Regimental Command Team (RCT) commander during Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations, specifically within the reconnaissance–counter-reconnaissance (RXR) fight.
LAR’s mission will be to fight for information forward of the RCT’s forward line of troops (FLOT), leveraging layered ISR, enhanced SIPR-on-the-move intelligence platforms, and armed drone teams. The task is to confirm or deny the commander’s Priority Information Requirements (PIRs), shape the battlespace when feasible, avoid becoming decisively engaged, and, after 24–36 hours, prepare for re-tasking by Division.
This scenario will not only place disaggregated reconnaissance forces—such as LAR, Recon, and MARSOC—into a competitive RXR environment, but it will also stress-test the RCT staff’s intelligence estimates and operational planning. The overarching goal is to return LAR to its doctrinal roots: conducting reconnaissance forward, in support of the commander’s decision-making.
In a world where our adversaries are racing to redefine the character of war through unmanned lethality, we cannot afford to wait for perfect programs—we must get after lethality now, aggressively, intelligently, and with the full weight of our initiative pressing forward from the frontlines.
Notes
MTT highlights
Environmental Impacts and Endurance: The operating environment impact on these systems is identical to that of other Group 1 and 2 assets. The high temperatures of Twentynine Palms degrade the system. Plan for less time and loss link.
Fragility and Reliability: These small drones are inherently less rugged than conventional military hardware, and the harsh desert environment quickly exposed their limitations. We began the training week with 15 drones and ended with only three operational systems. Throughout TTECG and MCADT, 70 percent attrition rate in training is the standard. To their credit, Neros was present throughout and actively troubleshooting the issues. However, it's important to remember that these systems are designed for one-way missions—not sustained use—highlighting the need for a more durable training surrogate. This fragility also reinforces two critical points. First, units must anticipate high attrition rates and maintain an ample supply of spare parts. Second, FPV drones are a complementary asset—not a replacement—for robust ground platforms. They are precision tools in the broader arsenal: specialized, disposable, and effective when employed deliberately. They are knives in the toolbox, not the toolbox itself.
Electronic Vulnerabilities: These drones are highly susceptible to radio-frequency interference. Operators must be spaced out in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines. We successfully operated two systems simultaneously, and believe we can get up eight, with proper dispersion. When the operators are too close, interference results in loss of link and crash. The distance between frequency bands is very important.
Operator Skill and Workload: Flying an FPV drone—particularly in a high-speed attack profile—is a cognitively and physically demanding skill. Unlike the push-button interfaces of larger Group 2 military drones. Our training revealed a clear truth: not every Marine is suited for this role. Some struggled with spatial orientation, while others experienced nausea or disorientation under the FPV goggles. Marines require screening for attributes such as visual acuity and vestibular (inner ear) stability.
Even among skilled operators, fatigue remains a limiting factor. After just an hour of combined simulator and live flight time, noticeable drops in concentration and performance began to emerge. This cognitive load underscores the need to treat FPV piloting as a specialized skill, not a collateral duty. In fact, our 7316 SNCOs have recommended the establishment of a dedicated Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for FPV operators, with tiered qualifications based on flight hours:
Basic Qualification: 20 hours simulator, 20 hours live flight
Advanced Qualification: 40 hours simulator, 40 hours live flight
Instructor/Trainer: 60 hours simulator, 60 hours live flight
These thresholds would ensure standardization, build institutional expertise, and help formalize the role of the FPV operator as a permanent and sustainable capability within the MAGTF.
Integration and Coordination: Integrating FPV drones into the platoon- and company-level fight introduces a range of new coordination challenges. My battalion’s FPV policy—a 34-page directive to both the battalion and line companies—outlines the guidance necessary to train safely, to standard, and effectively employ these systems within the armed drone team. Key considerations we are working with MCTOG pamphlet include deconflicting airspace, ensuring adjacent units are aware of friendly drone activity, and synchronizing drone strikes with fires and maneuver elements.
While these challenges are entirely solvable, they require the development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), as well as consistent training and rehearsal. The successful integration of FPV capabilities into ground maneuver will depend not only on technical proficiency, but on disciplined coordination across the combined arms team.
Miscellaneous
The Neros Strike variant has been updated twice, since we started this process requiring reprogramming/updates. The requirement for vendor interaction is a most likely scenario you should plan for.
3d LAR will receive fiber optic Neros Archer enabled systems later this summer. MTF
A Neros Archer FPV successfully gained an altitude of over 10,000 feet AGL (C-Air opportunity).
Neros Archers have successfully engaged (non-kinetic demo) Group 1 ISR assets loitering at 2500 feet agl (C-Recon).
New five- and 10-inch variants that support numerous mission types across the competition continuum are coming soon.
3d LAR is coordinating with MCAGCC and Range Control to establish R215 and adjacent training areas as on-call FPV ranges, that do not require frequency requests, etc. Show up and fly (under 1000 feet AGL of course).
3d LAR will deploy three FPV operators this fall on UDP rotation.
Lieutenant Colonel John Dick is the commanding officer of 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. He can be reached at john.dick@usmc.mil.
References:
**DRAFT** Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group. Armed Drone Operations: MCTOG Pamphlet, Draft, 8 June 2025.
**DRAFT** 1st Marine Division, UAS & C-UAS Handbook
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. FPV Training Plan v4, 2025.
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, FPV 5-Day Course Syllabus, Internal Battalion Training Material.
CJCSI 3255.01, Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards.
CNAF M-3710.7, Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization Manual.
NAVMC 3500.107, UAS Training and Readiness Manual.
MARADMIN 398/24 Blue Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Procurement and Training
In this gold mine of an article, this thoroughly engaging and covering such a broad spectrum of critical facts, "This cognitive load underscores the need to treat FPV piloting as a specialized skill, not a collateral duty." is one of the most important take aways. Yes, the guidance through the maze of bureaucracy alone is worthy of the CMC throwing out a meritorious something to LtCol Dick, and the intricate breakdown of the assets utilized, and their corresponding caps/lims will prove invaluable going forward, but acknowledging that not every Marine is capable of being a proficient drone operator and the subsequent necessity for this to be a MOS reinforces a debate that's been going on for some time. We can't keep throwing stuff at the 03xx and just expect them to "FITFO." After the devastating "precise mass" we saw from Operations Spider's Web and Rising Lion, these price tags that LAR had to eat (and God bless them for it) are still grossly inaccessible at scale. Why is Ukraine able to procure quadcopters for $600-$1000? As LtCol Dick points out, the benefits for the GCE almost cannot be quantified, and watching $1000 quadcopters destroy $330m Russian early warning and control aircraft, and $270m long-range bombers serves as continued reinforcement that the cost/benefit ratio can't be argued. Of course, LtCol Dick is correct when he said "Its not about the money, but its about the money." We can make these, here, cheap.
Thanks for posting this well-thought out and informative article. The 'devil is in the detail' and this article provides some great insights into capability development.