Here is my reply to Lt Danko’s article “Objective Lethality”
Good morning Sir,
I hope and pray you are well and enjoying a relaxing weekend. I enjoyed your recent article in the Connecting File, titled “Objective Lethality”
My name is Cannon Cargile, I am a retired Marine Gunner. I spent 30 years in the Marine Corps. I retired in 2013 as a CWO5 Marine Gunner and was the 2nd Marine Division Gunner. In 1998 I was selected to be a Gunner, my first tour as a Gunner was in V22 (1999-2003), then I served as v36’s Gunner (2003-2005), I was 6th Marines Gunner from 2005-2008, my last tour as a Gunner was as the 2nd Marine Div/ ll MEF FWD Gunner. I served 5 tours of duty to Iraq and Afghanistan. After I retired in 2013 I have worked as a training specialist for the Marine Corps. I work on the GCE T&R manuals. I work to help keep them updated and practical as well as ensuring our doctrine coincides with the T&R.
Please do not think I am trying to impress you with my bio. Not by a long shot. I am simply trying to emphasize the fact that I love the infantry and have spent the past 43 years of my life as an infantry Marine!
When I read your article my initial thought was “good” we have forward thinkers! Then I thought “bae!” In my humble opinion the fault does not reside in the step by step check list PECL of the T&R manual! It resides in the leaders who fail to be creative. They fail to see the performance steps in the T&R manual as the bare minimum! You as the leader can and should take the base model of a T&R event and create it into a practical evaluation designed to enhance the combat effectiveness and efficiency of individuals, teams, squads, platoon, companies, and Bn’s.
The things you described to improve the so called ineffective T&R are exactly what I think is expected of you as a leader of Marines! The T&R along with the unit METL is a basic guide to what must be accomplished and is reportable for combat readiness!
In football a coach designs a play book! In his playbook he has written out all the plays with details of each individuals actions and how those cumulative actions achieve the desired results of the team! However, as soon as the ball is snapped things change creative adaptability occurs!
Our leaders as forward thinkers do the best they can to plan training with creative adaptability in mind! They take a basic T&R event and turn it into a practical evaluation designed to train and maintain combat success! We are only limited by our own imaginations.
The actions you described are awesome and are exactly what I would expect from a platoon and Company Commander. Keep up the great work my friend.
One day you’re trying to determine the best shooter in your platoon. The next you’re inflating VC kill counts. Lieutenants beware - it’s a short and slippery slope from marksmanship to Saigon 1975.
Yes and it’s a pardon me recursive slope the military keeps going back down. As if Sisyphus made it to top then missed the familiar and rolled the stone back down.
We’re not sure you do need to take DRRS into account. You need to clearly understand effectiveness. Not only in your individuals, but also in your training and remediation programs. Those answers can inform your Battalion’s manipulation of DRRS, but the point is that we need to measure metrics for down in readiness, not just for up and out.
This is a good idea, but I think we will struggle to implement it just off deciding what needs to be measured by numbers alone, and then deciding what exact numbers they should be measured by next. In other words, I can see this process being hampered by the very same problem it sought to fix in the first place: everyone has different opinions on what needs to be graded, and how it should be graded.
With that being said, I think having a more stringent evaluation process than just "Pass/ Fail" is an excellent idea that is worth taking a look at. You always want to be getting better. Maybe we can work on finding the situations or events that we want to implement better grading metrics for first, then decide how they should be evaluated second.
I would argue we should identify common, core 1000 and especially 2000 level 03XX skills that apply to all USMC infantryman regardless of rank, billet, age, experience, unit, or MOS, and create a standardized, recurring annual evaluation of said skills. Establish that baseline of skills so that everyone- from Hawaii to North Carolina- understands what is expected of them. Then, implement new grading criteria, and go from there like they did with the new ARQ or IMC's core infantry competencies and their skill acquisition levels.
The CASEVAC 9-line example is where this really lands. Turning "Sgt X did fine" into a quantified delta against the platoon average is exactly how you build a culture that improves instead of one that just checks boxes. The creative metrics section (suppression gap time, rate of advance) is where it gets genuinely interesting. If you can measure the seam between fire and movement, you can train it deliberately rather than hoping good Marines figure it out through osmosis. Every military reformation that actually worked, from the Prussian general staff system to the IDF's post-action methodology, started by replacing subjective assessment with structured data collection. This belongs in that lineage.
Here is my reply to Lt Danko’s article “Objective Lethality”
Good morning Sir,
I hope and pray you are well and enjoying a relaxing weekend. I enjoyed your recent article in the Connecting File, titled “Objective Lethality”
My name is Cannon Cargile, I am a retired Marine Gunner. I spent 30 years in the Marine Corps. I retired in 2013 as a CWO5 Marine Gunner and was the 2nd Marine Division Gunner. In 1998 I was selected to be a Gunner, my first tour as a Gunner was in V22 (1999-2003), then I served as v36’s Gunner (2003-2005), I was 6th Marines Gunner from 2005-2008, my last tour as a Gunner was as the 2nd Marine Div/ ll MEF FWD Gunner. I served 5 tours of duty to Iraq and Afghanistan. After I retired in 2013 I have worked as a training specialist for the Marine Corps. I work on the GCE T&R manuals. I work to help keep them updated and practical as well as ensuring our doctrine coincides with the T&R.
Please do not think I am trying to impress you with my bio. Not by a long shot. I am simply trying to emphasize the fact that I love the infantry and have spent the past 43 years of my life as an infantry Marine!
When I read your article my initial thought was “good” we have forward thinkers! Then I thought “bae!” In my humble opinion the fault does not reside in the step by step check list PECL of the T&R manual! It resides in the leaders who fail to be creative. They fail to see the performance steps in the T&R manual as the bare minimum! You as the leader can and should take the base model of a T&R event and create it into a practical evaluation designed to enhance the combat effectiveness and efficiency of individuals, teams, squads, platoon, companies, and Bn’s.
The things you described to improve the so called ineffective T&R are exactly what I think is expected of you as a leader of Marines! The T&R along with the unit METL is a basic guide to what must be accomplished and is reportable for combat readiness!
In football a coach designs a play book! In his playbook he has written out all the plays with details of each individuals actions and how those cumulative actions achieve the desired results of the team! However, as soon as the ball is snapped things change creative adaptability occurs!
Our leaders as forward thinkers do the best they can to plan training with creative adaptability in mind! They take a basic T&R event and turn it into a practical evaluation designed to train and maintain combat success! We are only limited by our own imaginations.
The actions you described are awesome and are exactly what I would expect from a platoon and Company Commander. Keep up the great work my friend.
Just my thoughts my brother!
Semper Fidelis and God bless
Cannon Cargile
Metrics are for machines.
Not men.
Metrics for men are a trap and HR wins, the warriors lose.
Where McNamara failed others will not succeed, he was a statistical genius.
And the ranks will train to the metrics and the organization align to them but that is not victory.
One day you’re trying to determine the best shooter in your platoon. The next you’re inflating VC kill counts. Lieutenants beware - it’s a short and slippery slope from marksmanship to Saigon 1975.
Yes and it’s a pardon me recursive slope the military keeps going back down. As if Sisyphus made it to top then missed the familiar and rolled the stone back down.
AMTP and similar programs are already getting at this.
We already have metrics built into T&R standards, what we need is to capture and publish the current metrics for comparison’s sake.
One thing to consider is how these metrics feed into DRRS without flattening them to a Yes/No binary.
We’re not sure you do need to take DRRS into account. You need to clearly understand effectiveness. Not only in your individuals, but also in your training and remediation programs. Those answers can inform your Battalion’s manipulation of DRRS, but the point is that we need to measure metrics for down in readiness, not just for up and out.
This is a good idea, but I think we will struggle to implement it just off deciding what needs to be measured by numbers alone, and then deciding what exact numbers they should be measured by next. In other words, I can see this process being hampered by the very same problem it sought to fix in the first place: everyone has different opinions on what needs to be graded, and how it should be graded.
With that being said, I think having a more stringent evaluation process than just "Pass/ Fail" is an excellent idea that is worth taking a look at. You always want to be getting better. Maybe we can work on finding the situations or events that we want to implement better grading metrics for first, then decide how they should be evaluated second.
I would argue we should identify common, core 1000 and especially 2000 level 03XX skills that apply to all USMC infantryman regardless of rank, billet, age, experience, unit, or MOS, and create a standardized, recurring annual evaluation of said skills. Establish that baseline of skills so that everyone- from Hawaii to North Carolina- understands what is expected of them. Then, implement new grading criteria, and go from there like they did with the new ARQ or IMC's core infantry competencies and their skill acquisition levels.
The CASEVAC 9-line example is where this really lands. Turning "Sgt X did fine" into a quantified delta against the platoon average is exactly how you build a culture that improves instead of one that just checks boxes. The creative metrics section (suppression gap time, rate of advance) is where it gets genuinely interesting. If you can measure the seam between fire and movement, you can train it deliberately rather than hoping good Marines figure it out through osmosis. Every military reformation that actually worked, from the Prussian general staff system to the IDF's post-action methodology, started by replacing subjective assessment with structured data collection. This belongs in that lineage.