"Speed is a weapon and speed in mountains is a trained technical skill, not a byproduct of fitness and toughness alone." General fitness is important, but Commanders and Staffs are well warned that a high degree of physical fitness by itself will not trump a certified lack of skill in the execution. Not surprisingly, units that are in a high state of general fitness, that then undertake the training to build the requisite skills, will typically develop the fitness necessary alongside those skills. Great article by the CxFile Staff.
Excellent point: "units that are in a high state of general fitness, that then undertake the training to build the requisite skills, will typically develop the fitness necessary alongside those skills,"
That was certainly what the 10th Mtn vets took away from the Camp Hale experience. After the war they focused mountain training on training complete units that had already mastered the basics before moving into the mountains.
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)
Mountaineering breeds high-level leadership skills throughout the ranks. It teaches you quickly logistics planning, route-finding, judgement/risk analysis and resource management. Having a platoon of mostly southern boys in Bridgeport starkly highlights the need to know your men and their capabilities. Especially in winter, you can't arrive at the objective with only part of your force.
You highlight a good, if uncomfortable, point: units will have to identify which of their personnel into those who have the skills and aptitudes for mountain skills and those which do not.
Those that do will need to be grouped together by ability, to ensure all can move together.
Those that don't can and certainly will execute combat tasks, but the heavy lifting of mobility and route preparation will fall on those who do have the skills.
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)
Another WW2 instance in which the Army had to call upon civilian expertise was in the creation of the glider force to support parachute formations. They began by bringing in civilian sail plane and soaring pilots.
Alas, Fort Carson and the nearby Pinon Canyon Training Area are simply too useful for Stryker training; looks like the Army is going to make the 4ID all-wheeled.
The SOF community has the Special Operations Mountain Warfare Training Center at Carson and the 1-157 INF (MTN) of the CO Army National Guard has a Mountain Training Group of troops who have civilian certs along with military quals.
IF the money was available, a mountain schoolhouse could be built at Carson on these foundations. But that money (as it would come from many different pots), is a BIG if!
And concur on a reserve company at Bridgeport, would be a reservoir of individual skills, a great instructor pool, and a potent OPFOR, motivating units as no one wants to lose to the reservists!
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)
"Speed is a weapon and speed in mountains is a trained technical skill, not a byproduct of fitness and toughness alone." General fitness is important, but Commanders and Staffs are well warned that a high degree of physical fitness by itself will not trump a certified lack of skill in the execution. Not surprisingly, units that are in a high state of general fitness, that then undertake the training to build the requisite skills, will typically develop the fitness necessary alongside those skills. Great article by the CxFile Staff.
Excellent point: "units that are in a high state of general fitness, that then undertake the training to build the requisite skills, will typically develop the fitness necessary alongside those skills,"
That was certainly what the 10th Mtn vets took away from the Camp Hale experience. After the war they focused mountain training on training complete units that had already mastered the basics before moving into the mountains.
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)
Mountaineering breeds high-level leadership skills throughout the ranks. It teaches you quickly logistics planning, route-finding, judgement/risk analysis and resource management. Having a platoon of mostly southern boys in Bridgeport starkly highlights the need to know your men and their capabilities. Especially in winter, you can't arrive at the objective with only part of your force.
You highlight a good, if uncomfortable, point: units will have to identify which of their personnel into those who have the skills and aptitudes for mountain skills and those which do not.
Those that do will need to be grouped together by ability, to ensure all can move together.
Those that don't can and certainly will execute combat tasks, but the heavy lifting of mobility and route preparation will fall on those who do have the skills.
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)
Another WW2 instance in which the Army had to call upon civilian expertise was in the creation of the glider force to support parachute formations. They began by bringing in civilian sail plane and soaring pilots.
Very true and good example; and the parachute training first looked to smoke jumpers and recreational jumpers too.
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)
I'd hope that one day the Army will move their Mounrain Warfare School back to Colorado, and that the 10th Mountain and 4th ID will swap places.
Regsrding the USMC, I think its high time we stationed at least a Reserve Company, let alone a Battalion/ Active Battalion in Bridgeport.
Alas, Fort Carson and the nearby Pinon Canyon Training Area are simply too useful for Stryker training; looks like the Army is going to make the 4ID all-wheeled.
The SOF community has the Special Operations Mountain Warfare Training Center at Carson and the 1-157 INF (MTN) of the CO Army National Guard has a Mountain Training Group of troops who have civilian certs along with military quals.
IF the money was available, a mountain schoolhouse could be built at Carson on these foundations. But that money (as it would come from many different pots), is a BIG if!
And concur on a reserve company at Bridgeport, would be a reservoir of individual skills, a great instructor pool, and a potent OPFOR, motivating units as no one wants to lose to the reservists!
(Apologies for the delay in commenting; had some issues with my Substack account.)