Tactical Decision Games Reconsidered
By Maj Geoff Ball
On February 1 the CxFile will publish the first installment of a series of Decision Making Exercises (DMX). We’ll talk more about what this entails in the initial post, but for now, readers can expect that the first of every month will bring a new DMX to your inbox. Submissions will be collected by the 21st and the solutions posted in Notes and Saved Rounds. We hope you get something out of it and that readers will submit their own DMXs (TDGs, Case Studies, Map Problems etc…) to share.
Our team has always enjoyed working through the old Gazette TDGs and John Schmitt’s Mastering Tactics, and though they have faded away a bit, we’re hoping to bring back their spirit on our platform. You will also soon find a Resource File on Substack that will highlight other PME venues and links to additional material to help you and your team develop your warfighting skills. These will be living documents that we’ll continuously update. Please send in your recommendations for additions!
As I’ve thought about our turn towards incorporating decision-making tools, I’ve reflected upon my own use of TDGs in training Marines. I can’t say that I look back too positively on the majority of the outcomes! How many times did I leave the room concerned that my expo marker and I catalyzed the proliferation of terrible tactics? Too often I had watered down substance to make sure every Marine in the room could benefit from something in the discussion. Very rarely did I feel like anything was accomplished beyond a way to pass the time on deployment. It was until after my TBS Instructor time did I realize there was a better way to facilitate TDGs and ultimately improve the development of my Marines. I wrote about this briefly in the early days of the CxFile. Zach Schwartz and I had just kicked off our first series of awkwardly formatted PDFs and were spending most of our COVID lockdown days battling each other in wargames and map problems outside of class during MCCC. One conclusion that we had was that our work with TDGs needed to be more deliberate. More focused on communication and more appreciative of Time and Space analysis. It led to a new perspective on their employment and ultimately, I was able to facilitate TDGs with more success as a company commander than I did as a Lieutenant or TBS instructor.
In this article I’m going to lay out some issues I see with TDGs as they are usually taught, and how we can do better. I genuinely believe that this method helped myself and my company, improve our ability to develop and deliver orders. We were adherents to McBreen’s Combat Orders Model and we used these methods to refine our communication and develop what I call “Tactical Intimacy.” Before moving on, I’ll close with this: When the time came for us to commit decisive action in Afghanistan, I believe this method of TDG employment was a crucial part of our success.
A Long History of Doing it Wrong
As a member of TBS’ Instructor Education Program, I non-qualified instructors during the Decision Making TDG more than any event. The TDG is the first one new Second Lieutenants encounter and requires them to make a decision when HHQ’s plan goes awry. The successful students think about intent, two levels up, and how they can act decisively to achieve it. Unfortunately, the TDG is better suited to teach the principles of MCDP-1 than the dual cognitive model of decision making we teach during platform instruction on the same topic. Consequently, instructors struggle to land the learning points and develop greater self-awareness on the use of System 1 and System 2. Instead, they rely on old adages (superficial bumper stickers, really) without much substance.
“Develop the Situation”
“Any decision is better than no decision”
“Find the 70% solution”
“You have to Achieve a Decision”
The period of instruction would usually conclude with a student asking what the facilitator would do and the Captain or Sergeant shrugging it off. As they had been told to do so. Students would then leave the classroom with very different interpretations of what had just occurred and few of them better off for it. Some potentially worse off!
I certainly made this mistake and I know that I watched many of my own instructors do this as well. As a result, the trickle down of weak facilitation has resulted in TDGs being utilized poorly throughout the Fleet. But they are fun. It gets everyone involved. You generally feel like you’ve had a good time. And the Marines all now thinking, right? Just get reps and sets!
No. Stop it. All of us.
Here’s what goes wrong in my opinion:
1. Endstate. The facilitator rarely knows what they are really driving at. It isn’t deliberate and this is why TDGs often look like a way to pass time in the ship’s berthing compartment. TDGs frequently are ambiguously employed to get “reps and sets” on decision making while not rehearsing any function of that process. “I just want to get them thinking!” About what? This suggests a lack of understanding of how this TDG nests with your current or forthcoming training evolution. If it isn’t building towards the theme or thrust of your training – get rid of it.
2. Dilution. The desire for this to be inclusive gets too many ranks involved so everyone compromises on their personal development. The lower billets get exposure to higher level material, that they likely do not understand and higher billets don’t end up developing in a meaningful way. The result is marginal growth – at best.
3. School House Answer. Quite often facilitators will not hint at how they would solve the problem to avoid boxing in the thinking of subordinates. The belief we will lose creativity stems from an overcorrection to the early 20th century when the School House Answer dominated PME and officers were told how to think. As a result, we allow dangerously unsound and illogical tactics to pervade the atmosphere and linger in the minds of Marines. Even worse, leaders take a pass on issuing commander’s intent.
4. Playing Pick Up. You don’t get better at basketball by playing pickup games. You get better by practicing techniques repeatedly and then testing them in pick up games. You then return to techniques and refine them as necessary afterwards. Every professional athlete knows this, but quite often, for a myriad of reasons, we discard this proven approach and just jump into decision games that leave us with superficial familiarity of the concepts being taught. We don’t go to the range and just start shooting, we instead arrive with a deliberate plan to work specific skills. We need to do that with TDGs as well.
5. Form over Function. We often place students or Marines in dilemmas and then ask them to give us an EMLCOA, a SOM, Tasks and Coordinating Instructions. When in reality we need to train their brain to rapidly orient on the situation and then issue clear and concise orders or directives – as they would in combat. If we are dealing with a novice who is still trying to wrap their brain housing groups around the 5 Paragraph Order, then they are likely more focused on the form of their response vice the function. As a result, common sense and creativity both go out the window.
6. Time and Space. In a time limit of ten minutes, tell me what you will do? During TDGs we rarely pay respect to what the Enemy is doing during this period. Quite often we freeze them in time and space allowing us to operate in a fake reality. Somehow, we can act independent of the Enemy SOM. This is equivalent of drawing Boyd’s OODA Loop as a self-contained circle, vice one that interacts with the environment. We also loose the chance to see how quickly our Marines go through the loop, or allow them to believe that time is theirs to throw away.
7. Hesitancy. Ever do a TDG with peers and hear someone cold called respond with “I would want to get eyes on or learn more about X or Y first.” This is passive language meant to distract from the absence of decisiveness or the self induced fear of imposter syndrome. They’re nervous to be exposed, when really, they have nothing to be nervous about. We’re all learning and trying to get better! How we facilitate the conversation determines if the responses we get are aggressive, or passive.
I’ll pause here to thank you for hearing me out on the above rant. My objective in sharing is to highlight the mistakes that I’ve made in delivering TDGs to help readers provide better training.
The Big Blue Arrow of it All
There is a better way forward. In fact, there are many ways forward to improving upon what I have previously described, but I’m going to focus in on the method I primarily used during company command and the one I value the most. What I lay out in the second half of this article is focused on three things: Mutual Understanding, Time and Space, and your Training Continuum.
Mutual understanding, also known as communication, is the foundation of trust. I come up on the net, I need you to understand what I’m saying. This is “Tactical Intimacy” and leader and led must know one another better than a spouse or parent. Quite often, junior Marines and leaders struggle to effectively communicate what’s in their head. Their responses or directives stumble out of their mouths requiring several rounds of verbal reattack until effective communication occurs. TDGs focused on communication greatly help to speed this up.
On the topic of speed, we also know time is of the utmost importance to us. As Col CJ Douglas wrote for us in 2021, he was getting out-cycled by the enemy in Iraq until he stumbled upon McBreen’s combat orders article. He then developed his team through the use of TDGs and STEXs until they all were aligned with a more concise way of speaking on the net. Full combat orders in only a handful of short and impactful transmissions. They retook the initiative and the enemy was soon put on the back foot. The execution of TDGs must account for the time it takes to Observe, Orient, Decide, Communicate and Act. This is what keeps us honest as we explore potential solutions to presented problems.
The problems we present in the TDG should match the forthcoming challenges in our current training plan. Keep the main thing the main thing and deliberately develop leaders, or Marines, at echelon for the next tactical problem set they will face. This is a great way to kick off a training package and begin their orientation on the next set of techniques and procedures they will have to combine to find tactical solutions. Company Commanders: run your Staff/O through this and then expect them to keep the snowball rolling downhill. Develop a TDG that can be passed down through the ranks and altered to fit which level of leader you are targeting and keep their sight picture on the next FEX.
What follows is my recommendation on how to do this:
Mission analysis. Why are you teaching this TDG and what ends does it serve? How does it fit with what is next or how does it tackle a problem you need to correct or shape individuals you need to mentor? This will guide your scenario development or your choice of topic.
Audience. Keep this at echelon and in small groups. By focusing on three key leaders, of the same billet, you can have a much more productive conversation. You can then coach them on how they need to deliver this to their own three subordinate leaders. You’ve now not only developed them as tacticians, you have developed them as coaches as well. And you’ve empowered them.
Delivery. There are two approaches with two different outcomes.
Verbal delivery. Recommended if you want to train them to receive orders or reports over the net in your tone or delivery style. This plays nicely to the development of mutual communication. Make sure it is realistic for a radio transmission.
Visual delivery. Recommended if you want the audience challenged on Observation (in the OODA sense) and Information management. Deliver on a piece of paper and allow them to decide how they will take it all in. It forces them to work on their own mental models and focus as they begin to orient on the problem. It isn’t a perfect match to Observing the battlefield, but there are parallels.
Maps and Imagery. Recommend providing them with imagery or a map chip that might assist with communication. By using a GRG for an MOUT TDG the participant could decide to save him or herself time by communicating primarily through Ops Terms and Graphics.
Instructions. How you word the questions will trigger, or prime, different responses in their brain. I have noticed you get very different outcomes if you ask for SOM and Tasks vice “tell me how you are going to win.” One method trains for speed in developing a 5-paragraph order and one method emphasizes creativity. Know which one you are choosing and why.
Preferred method. Write down EXACTLY what you will say, to whom, and in what orders. This includes both directives to subordinates and reports to higher and adjacent units.
Time limit. Don’t have one. Start the clock as soon as they flip over the paper to begin and see how long they take to go through Observe Orient Decide and Communicate. Stop the individuals time as soon as the pencil drops. You are getting an opportunity to assess their thinking and how they view time and space by taking this approach. (Yes, our DMX on Thursday suggests a time limit! Up to you on whether to use it or not.)
Debrief. By having each of them write out their responses you can more thoroughly analyze their thought process in its true and unfiltered form. They can change their answers later, but let’s see what their gut told them to do initially. Your Marines can then keep these and look back later on to see how far they have come!
Start With Why. Give them a chance to unpack their complete estimate of the situation (METT-TC) and how they arrived at this initial perception. This will help illuminate what comes next and will guide your follow-on questions.
Word Choice. Now that you know what they have been thinking you can answer: would they have been understood? What could have been confused? Was there a more efficient way to write this? What are wasted words that are implied, and therefore unnecessary? Are you wasting time? You don’t even have to address their tactical choices at this point and instead get at their ability to communicate what is in their head. Doesn’t matter how outstanding the plan is if they cannot spit it out in a timely and clear fashion.
Sequence. Why did you talk to this person first? Why did you report to higher instead of passing guidance? Did you buy yourself any time taking this approach? Are they enemy focused or friendly focused? This is a great way to help understand how they instinctually prioritize action and information.
Time. It took you seven and a half minutes to go through OOD+C. The enemy was moving at this rate of speed, and they likely would have been at this grid by the time you issued that report. Would your First Squad leader even have had the opportunity to metabolize your intent, yet alone to execute? Are we trying to be perfect rather than effective? Time-space analysis is how you emphasize the importance of the play clock and the critical need to manage it.
Tactics. Once you address the above, you can then play out the TDG much more like a wargame. Would your selected tactics have worked? What other techniques or procedures could you have employed differently? Now is a good time to shift conversation to the TTPs you plan to execute in upcoming training, as well as how MCDP 1-3 can be incorporated.
Identify and call out terrible tactics. There is no need to shame, but it is unacceptable to allow dangerous ideas to linger. You owe it to your Marines to provide coaching and mentorship and they certainly want to improve. Develop the trust required for “Tactical Intimacy” by tactfully correcting their misjudgments and take the time to explain why. They’ll appreciate you for it.
Follow up and reflection. Once you complete the training package aligned with your TDG topic, revisit their answers during the AAR and allow your Marines to reflect on their tactical growth. The conversation should be illuminating for all involved. They can then do the same with their subordinates.
Finally, be ready to show them your answer and explain why. As a commander, you owe them your intent and a window into your thinking. It might even… behoove you… to run it by your own boss first to make sure that you two are in synch. Something about Command and Control comes to mind here.
If you’re an instructor in a school house, highlight several solutions and the tradeoffs they each have. Or spend time discussing the variables that could be included or ignored in your decision making. This can be a lot of fun and you show that you’re capable of doing this yourself, while also leaving them excited about the challenge and wanting to learn more. You can still enrich and expand their decision making by providing solutions – it all depends on how you convey the answers.
I’m sure many of you have better ways to do this! Don’t keep it to yourself, and write in to the CxFile on a better way to shape the next generation of tacticians. And if I can be of assistance to you and your Marines, please reach out. Lastly, the CxFile staff would like to give a special thank you to Maj Jeffrey Schuller for sharing his insights on TDGs with us, along with his passion for active learning methods.
Stay lethal.
Maj Geoff Ball is responsible for the majority of grammatical mistakes found within the pages of The Connecting File. He can be reached at cxfile0302@gmail.com.
Maj Ball, kudos to you on this article - simply fantastic. TDGs are an essential part of "deliberate development", not only of our subordinates, but for ourselves as leaders, and something I failed at consistently throughout my career. So it's quite refreshing to see that someone has taken it so seriously and deliberately. I've spent the day digesting the contents of this article and am inspired to incorporate some of your points into my instruction of Ukrainian cadets. Our recent course for senior cadets - of a dozen topics - entailed a dedicated class on TDGs, focusing on their value in developing decisionmaking and communication skills in both leaders and their subordinates. During the TDGs, I would have the cadet Plt Cmdr issue verbal orders to 3 chosen cadet squad leaders. Upon receipt of the verbal order, I then grilled the squad leaders on their understanding of their Plt Cmdr's plan in an effort to underscore the importance of clear, concise, and comprehensible orders. Your addition to the OODA-Loop of "communicate" is an essential nuance for those engaged in small unit leadership in combat - god bless you for pointing that out. You and I need to sit down over a beer...