Drones Are Commander’s Business: How Are You Leading Your Marines to Success?
by Captain Justin Shin
Editor’s Note: This article references several documents that are worth the reader’s time. See the footnotes for access.
Company commander: the odds are not in your favor. Right now, they're probably getting worse. Frontline units without lots of drones—to sense, track, control fires, deliver effects, and conduct resupplies, all employed by professionalized operators—are flatly unprepared for their next fight. You know this. And yet when you look around, you see not enough systems, not enough operators, not enough training, not enough TTP development to make full use of the few systems you might have. All that, and not enough people actually doing anything about it (notwithstanding all the social media posts, and these 182 pages of … definitions)1. So, what's a red-blooded, combined arms-loving company or battery commander to do? Send a few Marines to a few courses, maybe run a few "fly days" so they remember how to work the controls, and hope someone else in your battalion figures out the rest?
Of course not. And yet that is what most of us end up doing. Because for company commanders seeking to go further, to leverage drones for tactical advantage in everything they do, many institutional hurdles lie in store. Meanwhile, our Marines—and your company—fall further and further behind the global competition, even as they pour time and sweat into mastering old TTPs that might only put them at further disadvantage. If you think it will all work out in the end because your company's (sUAS-less) HE battle drills are on point, well, I've got some Armenian property in Nagorno-Karabakh to sell you.
If you don't think that, then this article aims to help. What follows are eight lessons I learned, most of them the hard way, that might help you move just a little further, a little faster. I write this after a long PTP and MEU deployment, after doing a few things with Marine Corps sUAS and CUAS capabilities that maybe hadn't been done before2, after helping publish a half-finished, halfway-helpful MCWL NeXt File3 on this topic—and then after all that, realizing that there were many things I could and should have done much better. So, company commander, as you think about how to get ahead in this fight, here's what you might consider.
Tip #1: Figure Out What You Want, Then Never Stop Asking for It
“We are currently fielding thousands of small UAS in the GCE to provide small unit leaders with an organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.” – FD 2030 Update (June 2023)
Problem: After a year and a half since this statement, the Marine Corps has yet to field anything close to this number of sUAS to its Divisions. In 2023, Ukraine was reportedly expending over 10,000 drones every month, while Russia is now fielding ten times that amount per month. Meanwhile, as of early 2024, 1st Marine Division possessed only 245 total systems, roughly equating to fewer than 4 drones per company and battery. Worse, these systems are rotated among deploying battalions, so most units don't get their hands on more than just a few drones until the end of their PTP—after their prime time to develop integrated TTPs and a professionalized operator cadre has passed. The result is what we see all around us: companies with a few amateur operators who can perform some basic ISR tasks, but not much else.
Recommendation: Fixing our larger institutional problem—low inventory and poor allocations—may start with sending a much clearer demand signal from the lower echelons. And fixing your immediate problem—getting qualified operators, with drones in their hands, for your prime-time training—may also begin with sending a very clear demand signal. Don't hope for someone at a higher level to do this for you; it ain't happening. So, you need to:
Study. Know your drones—see Figure 1. This is not nerd stuff for your CLIC Marine to deal with. Just as you should know the particular advantages of different night optics, or best uses for different rockets, recoilless rifles, and ATGM munitions, so should you know the mission tradeoffs between, say, a Skydio X2D and a Parrot ANAFI. Another rock in the pack, sure. Nobody said your job should be easy.
Imagine. Consider your unit's mission set. Rifle companies, weapons companies, LAR companies, headquarters companies, cannon batteries, rocket/missile batteries, reconnaissance companies, engineer companies—all have different use cases, different pack-out abilities, and different power/charging capacities. Different quads for different squads. Determine what models are best for your unit.
Quantify. Take a stab at some math. What would sustained drone-supported operations require in terms of systems, operators, and perhaps extra Ground Control Stations (GCSs) and batteries? See Figure 2 for a simple example from my battalion. You can improve on this.
Forecast. Based on your long-range training plan, when will you need to have X operators and Y systems to train, test, and refine your company's necessary skills and TTPs?
Ask, Advertise, and Get in Line. Now show your work. Let your boss know what you think you need, when, and why. If your battalion won't be able to support with the systems it has, learn how to draft "FOS" messages for your OpsO—you'll be much more likely to get quick action. Identify your future operators, have them complete the necessary pre-work—now, not later—then register them for future courses and send them on stand-by to every one before those. Issue guidance to your platoon commanders and section leaders—what do they need to be able to do, by when. As you progress in your training and equipping, provide feedback to your battalion, other company commanders, and your Division—and use every AAR as an opportunity to also advertise where you're trying to go. Communicating a clear vision and providing feedback on your progress will likely get your more support.
You probably won't get everything you ask for, but when it comes to sUAS right now, you most definitely won't get anything you don't. And until more company commanders start asking for a lot more sUAS/CUAS (and sharing their employment models, and providing more feedback on their training), their Division will most likely keep rotating a few systems among a few deploying units, perhaps assuming the system is working because nobody is saying otherwise. So get after it, and start asking. If your PTP has already started, then you're already behind.
Tip #2: Okay, So Your Installation Has Hurdles to sUAS/CUAS Employment. Get Good at Hurdling
Problem: If we all had a nickel for every time we heard from someone say they couldn't train with sUAS due to some base restriction, we'd all have a lot of nickels—and our Marines would still be no better off. And yet, some units seem to have no problem getting sUAS (and even EA CUAS) approvals for their training. You want your company to be like those units.
Recommendation: Be a warfighter, not a victim of bureaucracy. Learn your installation's policies, get to know the good people who execute them, and get after it. Pay a visit to the folks at your installation's range control office and let them know you intend to use sUAS (and CUAS) with everything you do. If they think you're crazy, show them some footage from Ukraine and then invite them to some of your training. Be sure to request all possible frequencies, and a reasonable range of ROZs and/or ACAs (see Figure 3 for Camp Pendleton), for every field training event you plan. If you miss some 90-day submission deadline (you will), work with your battalion and the range control office to get an exception to policy (ETP) approved. Then rinse, repeat, and do better—and be sure to keep thanking the range control office for their help. With a little bit of professional initiative, personal engagement, and consistent expectations, your company will join the circle of units who make it all look it relatively easy. And your Marines, once given the opportunity to use sUAS with everything they do, will surprise you with what they come up with.
A note for OCONUS training, at least in INDOPACOM: Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones require an approved application for frequency allocation (form JF-12 DD1494) and a designated Pacific Coordination (PC) serial number. sUAS employment in some countries also requires separately approved CONOPS. Requests may take 6-8 months to process. So, look at where your company will be training/operating on your coming deployment, and start working on those requests.
Tip #3: Your sUAS Capabilities Are Only as Good as Your Ability to Observe Airspace Control Measures (ACMs). Make Your Marines Train with Them
Problem: Your assessments of sUAS operator proficiency should always include their knowledge of, ability to plan with, and competence in strictly adhering to ACMs and terminal control restrictions. Most operators in the GCE are not consistently held to these expectations, creating a perpetual cycle of low trust with the ACE, implementation of sub-optimal ACMs designed to keep you as far away from the action as possible, and continued low proficiency with methods for tighter integration. The current "standard" ACMs for sUAS, namely restricted operating zones (ROZs) and airspace coordination areas (ACAs), therefore tend to reflect an ACE-centered set of concerns about the ability of sUAS operators to dependably abide by strict procedural controls. Lousy integration of sUAS into overall fires and collections plans should fire you up—there's no excuse for the MAGTF to be this far behind in dependably stacking sUAS with manned aviation. As a MEU BLT, my unit was lucky: we were able to work closely with weapons and tactics instructors (WTIs) from our ACE's HMLA detachment to develop, test, and implement some modified ACMs and terminal control restrictions4 that allowed us to operate sUAS and H-1s over the same objective. But even these modest, sensible control measures (or improvements to them) will never see wider acceptance across the MAGTF unless 1) the GCE keeps pressing the issue, and 2) we ensure the unquestionable proficiency of our operators. You can be a force for both of those efforts.
Recommendation: Don't let your Marines train with sUAS without putting them in scenarios involving a range of ACMs, and hold them to them. Better yet, train them to consider, construct, and recommend their own ACMs to you and your FAC based on scenarios you give them. Designate a sUAS controller for your FiST, assign a VHF sUAS control net, and make him/her answerable to your FAC and responsible for ensuring the adherence of all systems to directed procedural and terminal controls. And as soon as you know you'll be working with a particular squadron, reach out and start discussing deconfliction methods and what training you've done. While the current lack of MAGTF-wide standardization means you'll always face an uphill battle to keep your sUAS in the air, failure to hold your operators to these expectations during your PTP will guarantee that they have no place at the big kid's table when manned aviation comes knocking. If you want to be lethal with your sUAS, you've got to be absolutely professional with it, too.
Tip #4: Beware sUAS CFF Methods Requiring Complicated Software and Radio Configurations. Get Your Marines Started with This Instead
Problem: There are several now-established methods out there to use sUAS to control indirect fires. My unit started with one developed by several contractors and first advertised by the intrepid path-breakers out at SOI-East. This method, which depends on the "Mortar SpotPlot" plug-in for Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) tablets along with mesh-networked radios, worked great for small demonstrations but presented challenges (namely, all the precise technical configurations) when scaling across a fast-moving infantry battalion. Further, in controlled testing against other, simpler methods at Fort Moore, GA, it didn't perform any better in terms of second-round timing or accuracy. And because this method also depends on accurate sensor point-of-interest (SPOI) grids from the sUAS optic, it is prone to error from shallow camera angles as well as GPS interference.
Recommendation: For controlling fires with sUAS, you want a method that is easy to train, platform-agnostic, easy to verify, and fast. So, keep it simple, and use the "best of breed" method we ended up with at Fort Moore, called (for now) "sUAS Direct Alignment5." No TAK plug-ins are required, and any radio will do. Further, its simplicity makes it easy for observers and FDCs to train to, understand, and therefore be able to reliably verify. All you need is the ability to correlate what you're seeing through your drone with ground imagery, and the kind of range-and-bearing tool that's built-in to TAK and every other mapping software out there.
Tip #5: The SkyRaider Can Drop Things. Set Your Marines Loose to Exploit
Problem: The SkyRaider system has an "Osprey" device consisting of a hook that can be opened or closed by a motor based on the operator's commands. Capable of holding (and flying with) 7-8 pounds of whatever you want, this drone can therefore be used to conduct small aerial deliveries . . . or attacks. My unit started by using it to send much-needed batteries to dispersed elements during an early-PTP Mountain Exercise (MTX). Challenged to do more, though, a mad-scientist federation of young NCOs, our battalion gunner, and the phenomenal team at 1st Maintenance Battalion's Electronics Maintenance Company (ELMACO) came together to produce a 3D-printed attachment that could hold and drop grenades (Figure 4). While embarrassingly rudimentary in terms of what was already being used in Ukraine at the time, the SkyRaider Payload and Marking Attachment (SPAM-A) was certainly a notable, if overdue, step forward for Marine Corps sUAS. The team continued to improve it, expanding the number of smoke or fragmentary munitions it could hold, and the Marines of the battalion were soon using it as a matter of course for obscuration and HE attacks. When one team put a water balloon right through the hatch of an opposing LAV during our MEU training, we knew we were finally gaining the equipment and the skills to employ sUAS closer to its potential.
Recommendation: Challenge your Marines to keep day-dreaming of devious ways to be more violent. You might have them start by downloading the 3D-printing files6 for the SPAM-A, and perhaps using the payload-delivery procedures offered here7. But tell them you want more, and see what they come back with. Connect them with your battalion's gunner, with other units experimenting in this area, and with the 3D-printing wizards at your installation. Keep in close touch with your air shop and the range control office as you get closer to trying anything—and triple-check all applicable regulations and exception requirements. If I could go back in time (and if I were you now), I'd get my hands on one of those tactical resupply UAS (TRUAS) they have in the MLGs. With a 150-pound, droppable payload capacity, the potential those offer to maneuver companies is something really worth exploring.
Tip #6: Do More with Less. Master the Puma Hand-Off
Problem: As you probably know, the Puma can be "handed off" from one GCS to another. For dismounted infantry formations, this is basically a sUAS superpower. Elements far forward, such as scout teams or just rifle squads on patrol, can leverage high-endurance fixed-wing sUAS while only having to pack a GCS (and batteries) rather than a complete system (impossible when dismounted). However, these hand-offs are tricky: the receiving station generally must be transmitting the same flight altitude and bearing as the releasing station, and failure to establish a firm connection within 5-7 seconds will cause the drone to execute "lost link" procedures and return toward its launch point. Spotty comms between releasing and gaining stations, task overload for forward-positioned elements, and concerns over tight airspace control measures (especially near an objective with multiple other aircraft operating) can all threaten the dependability of this capability. In my unit, we didn't practice this enough, and as a result we were not able to reap the obvious benefits of Puma hand-offs for R&S elements operating near amphibious raid objectives.
Recommendation: If you're a rifle company, you absolutely want the benefits of the Puma without all the bulk. So work with your battalion to master Puma hand-offs to your Marines. To do this, you must request additional GCSs for every Puma. They exist, but you won't get them unless you make a compelling case. Practice dismounted loadouts for the GCS components, and determine how you'll spread-load the antenna stand, laptop, cables, and batteries. With the battalion teams that will be launching Pumas forward, develop and practice radio calls for hand-off requests, to include transmission and confirmation of controls data to enable smooth flight through the hand-off. Most importantly, don't wait to get started on this. There's only one way to get better at doing hard things: by doing them.
Tip #7: Get Your Hands on this Software, and Use It.
Problem: As a tool for reconnaissance, sUAS tends to present several challenges: limited endurance, low stand-off, and the task of piecing together details of an objective while peering at a tiny screen's display of a not-great camera. One way to overcome that last one is a tool that we received too late in our PTP: Reveal Technology's Farsight software. This application processes drone video footage to create 3-D models, and the results are pretty good. In addition to providing rotatable depictions of the objective area (Figures 5a and 5b), these models can also generate line-of-sight, helicopter landing zones (Figure 5c), and route and slope-gradient (Figure 5d) studies with first-person viewing modes. The catch? Each MEF has a limited number of software licenses, so you'll need to request (and justify) one for your unit, and likely on a temporary basis each time.
Recommendation: Talk to your battalion S-2 about borrowing a kit/license from your Division's geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) section. Challenge your CLIC to build collections plans and conduct post-mission processing in order to produce helpful 3D models of objective areas during your training.
Tip #8: Headed to a Partnered Exercise? Bring Plenty of Drones, and Plans to Use Them.
Problem: The Marine Corps is behind the curve when it comes to sUAS and CUAS integration. You know who else is? Far too many of our foreign partners. That's a serious problem. But another problem, if you're not ready, is that they will absolutely expect you to show up and share/demonstrate advanced sUAS and CUAS capabilities and TTPs with them. You are the Americans, after all—surely you've got this stuff figured out. Over the course of our 10-month staggered MEU deployment, every INDOPACOM partner unit that was worth its salt wanted to train with drones. Don't disappoint (Figure 6).
Recommendation: Be polite, be professional, and have a plan to integrate drones with everyone you meet. This isn't just about satisfying some partner curiosity—sUAS is now a critical weapon on the modern battlefield, and demonstrating credible capabilities with these systems is a serious matter of competition and deterrence. So as you look ahead to future partnered exercises, register your requirements: systems, frequencies, airspace, and training areas. Don't let your unit's planners tell you that sUAS is not on the exercise sequence of events (SOE)—your partners will expect it to be baked-in to every event, whether their own planners mentioned it at the last planning conference or not.
Conclusion
I wrote this article because there's no time to waste, and yet we're not moving nearly fast enough. While our Service is sometimes slow, company commanders aren't. Much work remains at higher levels, but there is still much that can be done now, among our frontline tactical units, with what we currently have—the chief resource being our often-brilliant Marines. My unit was lucky to have lots of these, but I also learned from my boss that you make your own luck when you present a vision, challenge your team to achieve it, and foster creativity by offering resources and knocking down obstacles. I also observed that while the technology may change, habits of constant learning and adaptation, coupled with disciplined mastery of TTPs, are powerful ingredients for lasting tactical advantage. Now, I urge you all to take the baton and keep running this race. Just as importantly, keep handing it off: share what your team has tried, tested, accomplished. Help us all learn from each other. If we don't, our Marines will end up learning all the same, but in ways too terrible to contemplate—and to the unending shame of us, their leaders.
Captain Justin Shin is currently serving as the intelligence officer for BLT 1/5. Trained as a signals intelligence officer, he is also a prior combat engineer officer. He can be reached at justin.shin@usmc.mil.
Have ideas or experiences that could benefit other infantry and reconnaissance leaders? We need to hear your voice! The Connecting File depends on the willingness of readers to share lessons learned. Read more here about how you can contribute to our community.
The opinions expressed above are those of the author and The Connecting File. They do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, or any other government entity.
United States Marine Corps. (2023, October 13). Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-10.3 Small Unmanned Aircraft System. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. The School of Infantry – East authored, and manages, the doctrine regarding sUAS employment. Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-10.3 SUAS Operations can be found on the USMC Doctrine Sharepoint. Anyone with issues obtaining MCRP 3-10.3, or questions regarding sUAS employment can contact the sUAS School at 910-449-0425/0177. (https://usmc.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/MCEN_Support_MCDoctrine?e+1%3A444d307a8b6d4affaca1775d1534e198)
Ibid.
Ibid.
Battalion Landing Team 1/5. (2023, August). SkyRaider Payload and Marking Attachment 3-D Printing Files. Battalion Landing Team 1/5 Small Unmanned Aircraft System SharePoint/Teams Page. Contact author for access or a copy - use USMC or Gov email.
Battalion Landing Team 1/5. (2023, November 12). After Action Report For The Parrot ANAFI Small Unmanned Aircraft System Training. Marine Corps Center For Lessons Learned. Contact author for access or a copy - use USMC or Gov email.
To quote the guy from RoboCop ('87) "I like it!"
This is pure gold: "Quantify. Take a stab at some math. What would sustained drone-supported operations require in terms of systems, operators, and perhaps extra Ground Control Stations (GCSs) and batteries? See Figure 2 for a simple example from my battalion.". Figuring out how to keep it going over time is a key capability.
Any thoughts on Anti/Counter sUAS? Did you get into training in non Permissive sUAS environments? (I get it if you didn't; sounds like the plate was full just getting to a good baseline).
I am intrigued by the existence of drones as platform as well as an expendable round.