Drones: One Platoon Commander’s Observations
by 1stLt Blaine Mainz
Editor’s Note: This article discusses the Blue UAS Cleared Drone List, which was recently updated with some platforms removed and others added. Additional information, including background on testing at MCAGCC in 29 Palms, can be found here.
In his 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance, General Berger stated, “The Marine Corps is not manned, organized, trained, or equipped to compete against near-peer adversaries in the current and future operating environment.” If the USMC were to engage in close combat with one of the forces fighting today’s wars, we would quickly be out cycled and overwhelmed by their use of a crucial technology: small unmanned aerial system (sUAS). We talk about flooding the battlespace with sUAS to observe and orient on the enemy, yet most infantry companies have only a couple of certified and currently qualified sUAS operators. We discuss how sUAS Video Downlink (VDL) can enhance decentralized command and control, but most members inside the company COC are not trained to utilize this capability. We are witnessing the profound impact of platoon-level (and lower) organic precision fires and mesh networking in Ukraine and Gaza, yet we struggle to keep up, even with the groundwork laid for us.
Still, battalions across the Marine Corps struggle to source sUAS platforms to employ these concepts. Despite being aware of the vital roles sUAS will play in future conflicts for over a decade, we have consistently failed to train an adequate number of operators, educate tactical commanders on the employment of sUAS, and acquire enough drones. We empower our small unit leaders to make decisions that can create operational and strategic opportunities, but we are failing to provide them the tools necessary to do so. Six years later, General Berger’s comments continue to ring true, we are not currently manned, equipped, or trained to provide our Marines the undeniable advantage of sUAS on the battlefield.
Recently, Captain Justin Shin of V15 shared several excellent insights into maximizing sUAS employment potential. This article continues that conversation and discusses similar challenges, focused on manning, training, and equipping sUAS within the infantry battalion. I draw from recent experiences during a workup, a Unit Deployment Program (UDP) to Japan, and conversations with peers across the Marine Corps. I believe this article is necessary to highlight the urgent need for action on preparing our Marines, particularly our small unit commanders, for the next fight. I intend to highlight the problems faced within an infantry battalion and offer tactical-level solutions for platoon and company commanders throughout the Marine Corps.
Manning
For each platoon attack during our workup, platoon commanders were given a SkyDio to facilitate the attack. However, most of the time, their operator was not organic to the platoon and was unlikely to be assigned to the platoon in future training and operations. In execution this meant operators were given little to no freedom to integrate the sUAS beyond an initial recon, and platoon TTPs never matured. Platoon commander’s ability to develop implicit communication and trust with operators was limited, so they halted their platoon when sUAS was in the air to look at the feed themselves. As a result, integrating sUAS into platoon attacks almost always reduced rather than accelerated the unit’s tempo.
Would a company commander tolerate a new FiST for every attack? Should a battalion commander accept a new FEC every month? Of course not. Granting unit leaders stability with their drone pilots is the only way they can foster the “human ability to communicate implicitly” with the Marine they rely on for critical battlefield information, minimizing the kill chain, and increasing overall situational awareness.
At the company level, the shortage of operators affects the commander's C2 capabilities by limiting his vision on the battlefield. The VDL capability on our platforms should allow a company commander to keep an eye on larger enemy formations and view the status of their platoons in real-time, reducing the reporting needs of his platoon commanders, and ultimately allowing him to out-cycle the enemy. While reducing the fog of war has always been sought after by commanders, often to little or no avail, current conflicts show how effective sUAS employment can be at increasing real-time awareness. Instead, our shortage of operators forces a commander to choose between observing his company's AO, or pushing the assets to his platoons to accomplish their tasks. If commanders in Ukraine and Gaza can have both, why can’t we?
The heart of the problem is that we cannot produce enough credentialed operators to adequately man, and subsequently train, our platoons and companies. The target number of SkyRaider and SkyDio licensed operators for our (legacy) battalion is 10 and 25, respectively. Our battalion deployed with only six (SkyRaider) and thirteen (Skydio) operators. 60% readiness is deemed unacceptable in any other aspect of unit readiness, yet we accepted it for one of our most critical assets at the small unit level. This is extremely problematic, but this shortfall is not the fault of the battalion. Despite filling every seat allotted for sUAS licensing we did not meet our target numbers due to far too few allotments. Based on this fact, I believe it is safe to say that TALSA (Tactical Aviation Logistics Support Activity) is not currently resourced to keep up with demand. I fully admit that this assessment may be in error, but if so, we need to expend time and energy to identify the actual source of this glaring shortfall. Consequently, the ideal level of cohesion between operator and leader never had a chance of coming to fruition.
Just as radio operators once were, drone operators in Ukraine and Gaza are becoming a primary target on the battlefield. sUAS will provide future commanders an undeniable advantage on the battlefield, limiting ourselves to a couple of “qualified” operators opens a critical vulnerability to the system. We must recognize that as the enemy targets the controller, not the system, we stand the chance to lose a critical asset - our specialized Marines. Battalions must start training incidental operators to meet not only mission requirements, but also combat replacement requirements immediately.
There is a clear and accepted precedence for the training of incidental operators. We have division level courses for incidental (vehicle) operators and missilemen and battalions train incidental machine gunners and mortarmen. Why are we not training incidental sUAS operators at the same rate of other critically skilled billet holders? Those who are TALSA certified and demonstrate a certain level of proficiency, as determined by the battalion Program Manager (PM), should be able to run incidental operator courses within their units. Once initially trained, the PM is responsible for verifying and maintaining the proficiency of incidental operators, just as he is for the licensed.
Though we are struggling to accomplish the bare minimum, we should still strive towards making controlling sUAS a common skill, much like programming a radio. Every Marine in the platoon should have the basic ability to fly a sUAS, just as every unit leader should understand employment principles. As with any incidental operator, there is inherent risk for the commanders accepting the responsibility of “unlicensed” Marines flying sUAS. However, the lack of current qualified operators and the immediate necessity for developing sUAS TTPs demands such risks be taken, given the proper measures for training and development of these Marines. The need is clear: we need cohesive and ready teams now, and combat replacements ready to go in the future.
Equipment
Like V15, battalions on the East Coast don’t have immediate access to their own suite of sUAS platforms. There is no predetermined TE for sUAS smaller than the Puma by battalion, as they are all held by TALSA and only available upon request. TALSA provides what they determine to be supportable, usually limited by the number of licensed operators in the battalion. I largely agree with Captain Shin’s “sUAS Equipping Target Numbers,” but I want to emphasize the importance of having one Skydio for each platoon commander, FiST, and Machine Gun section, and at a minimum, one SkyRaider and Puma per company and 81s section. Again, the modern battlefield requires more than the bare minimum - it requires redundancy.
Currently, sUAS readiness is not a reportable item on the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) as mission essential equipment (MEE) or non-MEE. I imagine this is primarily due to TALSA owning the sUAS platforms. Without a reporting requirement from DRRS, battalions have no official platform to voice their lack of readiness due to insufficient sUAS. Failure to equip every platoon commander with sUAS, which they can pull whenever they desire, leads to the same problems mentioned above. Platoon commanders should be able to count on having a sUAS available, flown by their own operator, for all company and battalion training events. And eventually, have the ability to execute independent and organic training with the Marines and equipment under their command.
In August, HQMC published MARADMIN 398/24 “Blue UAS Procurement and Training” authorizing units to purchase select, pre-approved commercial off-the-shelf sUAS platforms and retain them for unit internal training. This massive step taken by the Marine Corps is only beneficial if units take this opportunity seriously. Battalions must take full advantage and prioritize the purchase of Blue UAS to push to their companies. This will greatly expand the unit’s ability to train and develop TTPs without jumping through hoops to obtain platforms held by TALSA. I believe Blue UAS procurement should focus on smaller, man-portable UAS which can be utilized at the squad level. Approved platforms such as the Blue Halo Instant Eye, ANAFI Parrot, and Ascent Spirit are small enough to be packed out easily and rapidly deployed. Equipping our squads with such systems can instantly increase a squad situational awareness in distributed operations.
In Gaza, every IDF Platoon and squad is outfitted with these types of systems, and they are using them as de facto point men when entering buildings or breaches. Pushing sUAS platforms down to the squad level can allow us to build off TTPs like this, allowing squads to increase speed and develop momentum in battle. Though the intricacies of government spending escape me, we can also see in Ukraine that brigades are allotted money to directly purchase the equipment they desire. This would be ideal for units as they carefully select their TE based on the assigned Combatant Command and specific mission.
This is to say nothing of the fact that our current Programs of Record (PORs) are likely disadvantaged in the coming fight. The rapid advances in both Ukraine and Gaza when it comes to Electronic Warfare and Signals Intelligence suggests these platforms may be extremely vulnerable (see fiber optic FPVs), as well as lacking in the ability to rapidly create/join a meshed network of sensors and fires. Let this sink in: the Puma is as old as the first iPhone and the Puma AE came out the same time as the iPhone 5.
Training
Ukrainian and Russian forces are developing and adapting sUAS TTPs at a rapid pace. While our tactical commanders may be studying what is happening in this war, the shortcomings of our sUAS program limit our opportunities for training employment techniques and procedures. Thus, sUAS training must be deliberately planned and implemented at all levels within the battalion.
Individual and Operator Level
Effective sUAS employment starts with competent operators. sUAS operators should be selected based on aptitude and tactical prowess. The Marine drone pilot needs to know what information is relevant, understand the commander’s priorities, and act within intent. He must be able to do the following, at a minimum, and do it well through an eight inch screen:
Identify all types of enemy weapon systems and vehicles
Determine the composition and disposition of an enemy force
Identify enemy withdrawal routes or avenues of approach
Assess effects of both enemy and friendly units
Analyze the movement of friendly forces and identify lead trace
Identify and describe enemy force composition and actions
This will require significant amounts of time and rigorous training to standard. Designated platoon/company drone operators should be given special attention in the training plan to build relationships and specified skills outside of what is expected of a general population 0311 or even a team leader. Whenever in the field, operators should be expected to bring their platform to conduct concurrent training, practicing the skills listed above.
Platoon Level
The platoon sUAS operator is as crucial as the RO, making the platoon commander responsible for training their operator. Battalion/company flydays are essential for the hard skills of flying, troubleshooting, and routine maintenance, however, the platoon commander must also conduct one-on-one training with their operator for the softer skills required and most importantly, to build trust. This training should be deliberate and focused and should benefit both billet holders. The operator learns the platoon commander’s priorities, and the platoon commander learns how to effectively communicate these requirements. This training does not require platoon commanders to be in a TA with live drones. Simulations can provide realistic training at no cost inside an office. Countless hours of recorded drone footage on YouTube from current conflicts can be used for platoon commanders to coach his operator on reporting procedures and techniques, weapons identification, etc.
Platoon commanders must know the capabilities and limitations of their sUAS as if it were a TO weapon system. They need to know the max range, battery life and go/no-go criteria based on weather conditions. Additionally, they must fully understand the signature emissions, both physical (audible compromise range) and electromagnetic and the risks associated with each. Again, this is an opportunity to build trust between the operator and the commander, as the operator ensures the commander understands the maximum potential of the platform and the potential risks.
Force-on-force field training will provide platoon commanders with the best opportunity to develop and practice sUAS TTPs. Whether platoon vs platoon or squad vs squad, every training evolution should involve sUAS. Be creative with it. Force-on-force allows us to be experimental with limited risk. Allow only one side to have sUAS to demonstrate the significant advantage. Give one unit multiple drones and observe how they integrate them. Make it competitive and fit it within the preplanned training objectives. If the focus is patrol base operations, challenge the opposing forces to find each other with sUAS and punish the unit found first. In defensive operations, challenge the units to use sUAS to map out locations of crew served weapons and left/right lateral limits of the defense they are fighting. Conduct shorter evolutions, or narrow the training objectives, to allow for multiple iterations, debriefing and refining TTPs in between each. Training in this manner also develops TTPs around countering sUAS, an equally important skill. Aside from learning to hide from or shoot down threat sUAS, units can develop and practice TTPs to analyze the spectrum to find sUAS operators, forcing operators to find better ways to mask themselves. Ultimately, force-on-force training helps us find what truly does and doesn’t work and is the best way to develop TTPs around this technology.
Platoon commanders beware - FoF will certainly advance our abilities, but the exercises must also be tethered to reality. Do you have the equipment to mimic up-to-date battlefield TTPs? Are you orienting the ADFOR towards modern tactics? Are you aware of cutting edge C-UAS TTPs and adversary EW/SI? If you are not doing your best to remain current on actions in Myanmar, Ukraine, Gaza, and against transnational criminal elements, you’re potentially lying to yourself.
Company Level
Similarly, company sUAS training should be led and directed by the company commander. It must emphasize networking and reporting of all company assets in the sky. Company-level operators should work closely with the commander in the same manner as platoon operators, while also being proficient in setting up HH-VDL, connecting to various platforms, and conducting sUAS handoffs with platforms like the Puma. Company commanders should establish TTPs with their platoon commanders regarding reporting requirements, sUAS battlespace coverage, and the use of company assets at the platoon level. Much of this can be practiced without locking on airspace and frequencies. Simulations and planning exercises can provide valuable training. Company commanders should provide clear intent on their specific concerns for various missions and observe how platoon commanders plan to use sUAS to address these concerns. This process allows commanders to give feedback on drone utilization and offers opportunities for clear communication.
Battalion Level
Flydays, whether at the battalion or company level, are crucial for the overall development of the unit’s sUAS capabilities. Monthly flydays must be anchored in training objectives and deliberately and intentionally focused on a set of specific TTPs each training evolution. They should include all available operators, incidental operators, and sUAS platforms, allowing everyone to observe and share TTPs developed at the platoon level. This also helps all operators in the battalion to become familiar with one another’s capabilities, enhancing interchangeability in the case platforms need to be redistributed. Objectives might include identifying weapon systems and vehicles at various levels of cover and concealment, determining the composition and disposition of enemy forces, tracking friendly movements, and assessing impacts from friendly weapon systems.
Complimentary CUAS training should be conducted simultaneously. This should include friendly vs. threat sUAS identification at various altitudes and distances. Additionally, ADFOR squads can be tasked with patrolling and digging in while avoiding detection from and reporting on sUAS. Debriefs should be conducted between the operators and ADFOR to determine effective TTPs for both sUAS employment and CUAS. Platoon and company commanders should be present when possible to gain insight into the actual capabilities of the platforms and their operators. While not all objectives need to be covered in a single flyday, mastering these skills requires repeated practice. A deliberate training plan should be created for the entire workup, addressing each of these objectives.
The battalion PM is the main effort for organizing sUAS training. This billet should be given to a capable officer or SNCO as it will require significant time and attention to execute properly. A dedicated and skilled PM sets conditions for all sUAS operations. If utilized properly, the PM can relieve the headaches related to attaining frequency requests, locking on training areas and ROZs, maintaining the currency of operators, and maintenance of sUAS platforms. This billet should develop the overall sUAS training plan for achieving the aforementioned objectives. While not a solution for today, I envision the infantry battalion PM to be a standalone billet held by a SNCO 7316, sUAS Operator charged with these duties, including the research, development and recording of sUAS TTPs.
Saved Round
We can address the training gaps caused by too few licensed operators, inaccessible sUAS, and restricted airspace through the use of video games / simulation platforms such as Arma 3 and VBS which allow users to view simulated battlespace through drone feeds in a simulated tactical environment. These simulations allow for unlimited TTP development and hours of practice for operators from either their barracks room or the company office. The SAVT also offers this feature, and contractors can create any scenario the platoon commander needs to achieve his training objectives. While there are limitations within the virtual world, they provide easy, low impact training at relatively no cost. They keep the Marines engaged and allow operators and unit leaders to work on building implicit communication for sUAS operations, while identifying top performers for school seats or incidental training. In short, training should be creative, deliberately planned, and thoughtfully executed, with the goal of training as many Marines as possible.
Conclusion
Although there are issues that need to be resolved regarding manning, training, and equipping our sUAS program, solutions are in the works. The Marine Corps is incentivizing lateral moves to the 7316, SUAS operator MOS. 1st Marine Division has established a division “SUAS/CSUAS Integration Course” which focuses on the integration of sUAS in support of the ground scheme of maneuver. The previously mentioned MARADMIN has opened the door to sUAS procurement. These actions at the higher level are great, but as always, take time to implement and have an effect. I believe the shared sentiment between Capt Shin and myself, writing from units on opposite coasts, highlights the need for this dialogue for tactical commanders to share how they are solving these problems within their ranks. We owe it to our Marines and their families to address these gaps now.
We must be more deliberate in training and operating sUAS at the tactical level. Training incidental operators who are organic to their units, using simulations to train and develop TTPs, and implementing deliberately planned flydays will significantly increase our tactical capabilities with sUAS. These simple actions will increase the lethality of our Marines, by allowing tactical commanders to observe, orient, and act on the enemy quicker and more effectively. Success on the battlefield is dictated by the belligerent who can close the kill chain the fastest. This is a call to action for tactical leaders in the Marine Corps to identify these deficiencies and tackle them at our level with creative solutions to manning, imaginative training, and prioritizing putting sUAS in the hands of our Marines. But it is also a request for more senior leaders to hear our ideas and heed our requests as we attempt to solve this problem from the bottom up.
1st Lieutenant Blaine Mainz is an Infantry Officer and is currently serving as the Assistant Operations Officer for V32. He can be reached at blaine.mainz@usmc.mil.
I wonder if we are doing enough to standardize the operator/human interface with our drones to allow for quicker training and transition from one system to another by operators?