Tremendous! What a great article! A clearly-defined problem, relevant to the future fight, that needs attention. Then the initial ideas for solutions, already being tested. Very impressive (and important) work, Marines!
I am happy to see this issue being comprehensively addressed. I like the effort to solve the digital issues. I am glad to see the GCE CO involved, though I wonder where the GCE OpsO's input is. All that said, I am surprised to see these issues with basic reconnaissance and intel prep. This is not a new problem.
I have a varied background, including a few in the 80s and 90s as an active duty Recon Marine. We managed Route Reconnaissance with simple analog tools...very crude, but very effective, and relatively quick. No GPS until '91 and very little sat imagery. It was implied and expected that if our maps were old and out of date, part of our job was to fix that. We were prepared to task org as necessary if we required extended mounted mobility and/or engineer support. Assessing grade, slope, radius, and consistency was part and parcel of working up a RouteRep.
As for the amphibious work, I am disheartened to hear of the issues with the Navy accepting ConBReps from Marines. The USN not accepting Marine reporting sounds like a MEU-ARG/MarForPac/Pacom/USN level problem that should be solved last Tuesday if it is truly more than a local issue. For reference, 35 years ago in the same AOR, we did not have that problem. In fact, we were tasked to perform a hydrographic survey for the USN on sensitive ship facilities in Subic. This was in support of recovery operations following the Pinatubo Eruption in order to confirm the usability / non-usability prior to restoring pierside operations.
A few years later, I was a Marine Tank Officer. Recon in support of operational mobility remained a key priority if one wanted to be operationally successful. This was hammered home in several schools. Advising the supported unit and working with the staff with respect to mobility was an implied task. At one point, I was on the SLRP for the Kosovo Contingency. Part of our deliberate planning included post-SLRP missions...like planning the Route Recon Operation that was going to be required in support of follow on operations.
Moving into Iraq during the invasion, in stride route recon was part and parcel of ops. We used our Scouts and creatively used other assets when we could. It wasn't much different from previous ops where we used scouting elements with as much separation as METT-T(SL) allowed. Sometimes the ME's mission was effectively, a route recon to contact. Nature of the beast. The route IS the fight.
Bridging assets can often increase the speed of movement, for both deliberate reconnaissance and in stride reconnaissance. Whether used to reinforce existing bridges, create a bypass, or to develop an alternate/supplemental route, bridging (vehicle launched, towed, or packed) is an absolute necessity for motorized and mechanized operations. It preserves tempo like no other asset. Lack of bridging is a critical vulnerability.
I understand the challenges of those islands especially with wheeled vehicles. The ACV's may have low ground pressure, but they don't have the continuity of traction that a set of tracks with equivalent ground pressure would provide (to include the shallows). I used to tease my LAR friends that they should just get a set of half tracks while they were busy compensating.
One bright spot...the denser jungle should make cable operated drones much less effective at distance and preserve anti/counter drone EW effectiveness for Friendly Forces.
In closing, I hope my anecdotes provide food for thought. I appreciate the candor and professionalism of the authors in sharing the challenges they faced during current exercises and operations under current conditions. Ground Reconnaissance is indeed an important problem, but it is an old problem that is new again.
On behalf of the whole writing team, let me offer a tremendous thanks for your feedback. Thanks also for sharing all your experiences -- there clearly aren't many Marines, us included, who've cracked this nut from as many angles and across so many scenarios. That, we think, is the root of our problem today: any lack of proficiency and capacity among our reconnaissance teams follows, more or less directly, from sustained lack of appreciation and prioritization by their supported leaders. What's old isn't exactly "new," but it does need to be refreshed with some very focused attention. Fortunately, there are also many new tools that we can/should take advantage of. Bottom line: without saying any of this will ever be easy, we also think that reviving and re-energizing ground reconnaissance shouldn't be that hard. More leaders need to be put in more scenarios where "the route IS the fight!"
What an information packed article! As far back as 2021, USMC engineers in 9th ESB established the first USMC "Littoral Engineer Reconnaissance Team (LERT)", a 12 Marine squad that conducts mobility assesments, beach reconnaissance, establishing helicopter landing zones, assessing infrastructure, and so on. Maybe one day the entirety of engineers attached to Marine Infantry battalions could be LERT trained and capable to aid in the reconnaissance fight and overall intelligence picture?
Would love to learn more about 9th ESB's LERT -- especially what it might offer as a model for some GCE reconnaissance practices. Could be a great article here!
Great article! We need to stop with jltvs. The logistical footprint isn’t sustainable in the island chains. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel either. We should acquire Toyota hiluxes. They are cheep, easy to fix, less detectable and better suited to maneuver this environment.
A fantastic real world historical example of a failure to properly consider soil composition is the Dieppe raid.
The Diep raids amphibious landing site was composed of chert stones (a hard sedimentary rock commonly found in slabs), these rocks caused setbacks because they became lodged in the amphibious tanks drive sprockets and broke the tracks.
Because of the error of not analyzing landing sites soil composition, the infantry on shore were without tank support. This is one of many factors that contributed to the overall failure of the raid.
Also OORAH SIR, MPOD, I left 1/5 Blackfoot company shortly after your change of command ceremony. Happy to come across your article. I’m just an 0311, 0369 soon but this article has opened my eyes!
Tremendous! What a great article! A clearly-defined problem, relevant to the future fight, that needs attention. Then the initial ideas for solutions, already being tested. Very impressive (and important) work, Marines!
Sir,
That means a lot to us! Thanks for your encouragement, and thanks for your great example to all of us over the years!
I am happy to see this issue being comprehensively addressed. I like the effort to solve the digital issues. I am glad to see the GCE CO involved, though I wonder where the GCE OpsO's input is. All that said, I am surprised to see these issues with basic reconnaissance and intel prep. This is not a new problem.
I have a varied background, including a few in the 80s and 90s as an active duty Recon Marine. We managed Route Reconnaissance with simple analog tools...very crude, but very effective, and relatively quick. No GPS until '91 and very little sat imagery. It was implied and expected that if our maps were old and out of date, part of our job was to fix that. We were prepared to task org as necessary if we required extended mounted mobility and/or engineer support. Assessing grade, slope, radius, and consistency was part and parcel of working up a RouteRep.
As for the amphibious work, I am disheartened to hear of the issues with the Navy accepting ConBReps from Marines. The USN not accepting Marine reporting sounds like a MEU-ARG/MarForPac/Pacom/USN level problem that should be solved last Tuesday if it is truly more than a local issue. For reference, 35 years ago in the same AOR, we did not have that problem. In fact, we were tasked to perform a hydrographic survey for the USN on sensitive ship facilities in Subic. This was in support of recovery operations following the Pinatubo Eruption in order to confirm the usability / non-usability prior to restoring pierside operations.
A few years later, I was a Marine Tank Officer. Recon in support of operational mobility remained a key priority if one wanted to be operationally successful. This was hammered home in several schools. Advising the supported unit and working with the staff with respect to mobility was an implied task. At one point, I was on the SLRP for the Kosovo Contingency. Part of our deliberate planning included post-SLRP missions...like planning the Route Recon Operation that was going to be required in support of follow on operations.
Moving into Iraq during the invasion, in stride route recon was part and parcel of ops. We used our Scouts and creatively used other assets when we could. It wasn't much different from previous ops where we used scouting elements with as much separation as METT-T(SL) allowed. Sometimes the ME's mission was effectively, a route recon to contact. Nature of the beast. The route IS the fight.
Bridging assets can often increase the speed of movement, for both deliberate reconnaissance and in stride reconnaissance. Whether used to reinforce existing bridges, create a bypass, or to develop an alternate/supplemental route, bridging (vehicle launched, towed, or packed) is an absolute necessity for motorized and mechanized operations. It preserves tempo like no other asset. Lack of bridging is a critical vulnerability.
I understand the challenges of those islands especially with wheeled vehicles. The ACV's may have low ground pressure, but they don't have the continuity of traction that a set of tracks with equivalent ground pressure would provide (to include the shallows). I used to tease my LAR friends that they should just get a set of half tracks while they were busy compensating.
One bright spot...the denser jungle should make cable operated drones much less effective at distance and preserve anti/counter drone EW effectiveness for Friendly Forces.
In closing, I hope my anecdotes provide food for thought. I appreciate the candor and professionalism of the authors in sharing the challenges they faced during current exercises and operations under current conditions. Ground Reconnaissance is indeed an important problem, but it is an old problem that is new again.
Sir,
On behalf of the whole writing team, let me offer a tremendous thanks for your feedback. Thanks also for sharing all your experiences -- there clearly aren't many Marines, us included, who've cracked this nut from as many angles and across so many scenarios. That, we think, is the root of our problem today: any lack of proficiency and capacity among our reconnaissance teams follows, more or less directly, from sustained lack of appreciation and prioritization by their supported leaders. What's old isn't exactly "new," but it does need to be refreshed with some very focused attention. Fortunately, there are also many new tools that we can/should take advantage of. Bottom line: without saying any of this will ever be easy, we also think that reviving and re-energizing ground reconnaissance shouldn't be that hard. More leaders need to be put in more scenarios where "the route IS the fight!"
Semper Fidelis
What an information packed article! As far back as 2021, USMC engineers in 9th ESB established the first USMC "Littoral Engineer Reconnaissance Team (LERT)", a 12 Marine squad that conducts mobility assesments, beach reconnaissance, establishing helicopter landing zones, assessing infrastructure, and so on. Maybe one day the entirety of engineers attached to Marine Infantry battalions could be LERT trained and capable to aid in the reconnaissance fight and overall intelligence picture?
Would love to learn more about 9th ESB's LERT -- especially what it might offer as a model for some GCE reconnaissance practices. Could be a great article here!
Hello, here are some links to articles that go into further detail about the LERT:
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/871904/us-marines-participate-littoral-engineer-reconnaissance-team-screening
https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2752347/9th-engineer-support-battalion-screens-assembles-first-littoral-engineer-reconn/
https://www.2ndmlg.marines.mil/News/Article/Article/3263758/sgt-latuner-thrives-with-the-littoral-engineer-reconnaissance-team/
https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2870418/marines-with-9th-7th-engineer-support-battalion-complete-interoperability-exerc/
Great article! We need to stop with jltvs. The logistical footprint isn’t sustainable in the island chains. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel either. We should acquire Toyota hiluxes. They are cheep, easy to fix, less detectable and better suited to maneuver this environment.
A fantastic real world historical example of a failure to properly consider soil composition is the Dieppe raid.
The Diep raids amphibious landing site was composed of chert stones (a hard sedimentary rock commonly found in slabs), these rocks caused setbacks because they became lodged in the amphibious tanks drive sprockets and broke the tracks.
Because of the error of not analyzing landing sites soil composition, the infantry on shore were without tank support. This is one of many factors that contributed to the overall failure of the raid.
Also OORAH SIR, MPOD, I left 1/5 Blackfoot company shortly after your change of command ceremony. Happy to come across your article. I’m just an 0311, 0369 soon but this article has opened my eyes!
MPOD!!! And thanks for pointing us to the Dieppe Raid case study!